My
CV in HTML and CV in PDF
Papers
“An
Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete
Goods,” (Submitted for publication)
“Impossibility of Existence of Opposite Equilibrium Preferences on Law Enforcement,” (Submitted for publication)
“Stability of Coalition Formation Games and Fixed-Point Methods,” (Coming Soon- A Draft is Available Upon Request)
“Private
vs. Public Externalities and Enforcement.”
Presentations
“An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods,”
[Refereed] GAMES
2008, Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Evanston, Illinois, July
2008.
[Refereed] SED
2008, 5th Conference on Economic Design,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, June, 2008
Other
Papers
“The Design of an Experimental Study on Elections and Some Negative Results on Strong Nash Implementation,” unpublished M.A. Thesis, Bogazici University, 1999.
“On Strongly Implementable Social Choice Correspondences,” mimeo.,
“Notes on the Refinements of the Broad Majoritarian
Compromise,” with Murat R. Sertel, mimeo.,
Abstracts
of Recent Papers
Essay 1: Stability of Coalition Formation Games and Fixed-Point Methods
I consider the coalition
formation games where agents' preferences over partitions depend on the
identity of the members of the coalition to which they belong. I construct a
mapping of coalitions, and show that its fixed points are the core stable
partitions of coalitions. I propose an algorithm using the map to find core
allocations. (Coming Soon- A Draft is Available Upon Request)
Essay 2: An Extension of Ausubel's
Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods
Ausubel's dynamic private-values auction for heterogeneous discrete goods, Ausubel (2006), yields an efficient equilibrium outcome but it is designed for a limited class of environments. If bidders' values for bundles of goods are not integers, then the auction mechanism may not yield an efficient allocation without any information on bidders' values. In this paper, I extend Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous discrete goods to real-valued quasilinear utility functions. The mechanism I propose reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price vector in finite “steps” without any additional information on bidders' values. In the extension of Ausubel's auction, truthful bidding constitutes an efficient equilibrium. [DOWNLOAD] (Submitted for Publication)
Essay 3: Impossibility of Existence of Opposite
Equilibrium Preferences on Law Enforcement
I derive preferences of
people over equilibrium enforcement levels and show that it is impossible to
have agents with “completely opposite” preferences over the enforcement level
in the same society. [DOWNLOAD] (Submitted for publication.)
Essay 4: Private
vs. Public Externalities and Enforcement
Law and enforcement policy
is among the key elements of a civil society that ensures the achievement of a
higher social welfare. I study socially optimal law and enforcement policy making
under two different environments. In the first
environment, private externalities, an activity a person engages harms equally
likely everyone in the society. In the second environment, public
externalities, it harms the whole society. I show that social welfare functions
of these two problems are the same under certain conditions. Polinsky and Shavell (1984) show
that the optimal level of punishment in equilibrium is such that expected level
of punishment is less than the harm it causes. I generalize their result to
public and private externality environments where all agents are either risk
neutral or risk averse with respect to uncertainties in harms they face. On the
other hand, by allowing private and public externality acts in the same
environment, I show that even though contribution of agents to the public harm
is greater than the harm they may cause by choosing private externalities, the
punishment level of a private externality may be greater than the punishment
level of public externality if agents are sufficiently risk averse. This result
shows the limitation of a result in Shavell (1992),
and also shows that the distinction between private and public externalities is
important. [DOWNLOAD]