My
CV in HTML and CV in PDF
Papers
Auction Theory
“An
Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete
Goods,” (Submitted for Publication)
“Ausubel’s Auction for
Heterogeneous Discrete Goods When
Values are Interdependent,” (Submitted for Publication)
“An Efficient Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods,” (Work in
Progress).
“Unification
of Auction and Matching Mechanisms,” (Work in Progress)
“Axiomatic
Analysis of Auction Rules,” (Work in Progress).
Law and Enforcement
“Choice of
Law Enforcement,” (Submitted for Publication)
“Private
vs. Public Externalities and Enforcement.”
Presentations
“An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods,”
GAMES
2008, Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Evanston, Illinois, July
2008.
SED
2008, 5th Conference on Economic
Design, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June, 2008
Other
Papers
“The Design of an Experimental Study on Elections and Some Negative Results on Strong Nash Implementation,” unpublished M.A. Thesis, Bogazici University, 1999.
“On Strongly Implementable Social Choice Correspondences,” mimeo.,
“Notes on the Refinements of the Broad Majoritarian
Compromise,” with Murat R. Sertel, mimeo.,
Abstracts
of Recent Papers
Essay 1: An Extension of Ausubel's Auction
for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods [Job Market
Paper]
Ausubel's dynamic private-values auction for heterogeneous discrete goods, Ausubel (2006), yields an efficient equilibrium outcome but it is designed for a limited class of environments. If bidders' values for bundles of goods are not integers, then the auction mechanism may not yield an efficient allocation without any information on bidders' values. In this paper, I extend Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous discrete goods to real-valued quasilinear utility functions. The mechanism I propose reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price vector in finite “steps” without any additional information on bidders' values. In the extension of Ausubel's auction, truthful bidding constitutes an efficient equilibrium. [DOWNLOAD] (Submitted for Publication)
Essay 2: Ausubel's Heterogeneous Goods Auction When Values are
Interdependent
When heterogeneous goods are to be auctioned in environments where bidders have interdependent values, no auction has been designed that yields efficient allocation. In interdependent-values setting, each bidder's value for a bundle of goods depends on the profile of signals in the society. So, bidders do not know their own values for goods. Therefore, bidders do not know at what price to lower the quantity they demand to maximize their utilities as the price increases. Perry and Reny (2005) introduce strategies and show that these strategies, Perry-Reny strategies, constitute an efficient equilibrium in Ausubel's homogeneous goods auction, Ausubel (2004). In this paper, I show that an extension of these Perry-Reny strategies for heterogeneous goods constitute an efficient equilibrium in Ausubel's heterogeneous goods auction, Ausubel (2006), when there are two bidders with interdependent values and utilities are separable in goods. [DOWNLOAD] (Submitted for Publication)
Essay 3: Choice
of Law Enforcement
I derive preferences of
people over equilibrium enforcement levels and show that it is impossible to
have agents with “completely opposite” preferences over the enforcement level
in the same society. [DOWNLOAD] (Submitted for publication.)
Essay 4: Private
vs. Public Externalities and Enforcement
Law and enforcement policy
is among the key elements of a civil society that ensures the achievement of a
higher social welfare. I study socially optimal law and enforcement policy
making under two different environments. In the first
environment, private externalities, an activity a person engages harms equally
likely everyone in the society. In the second environment, public
externalities, it harms the whole society. I show that social welfare functions
of these two problems are the same under certain conditions. Polinsky and Shavell (1984) show
that the optimal level of punishment in equilibrium is such that expected level
of punishment is less than the harm it causes. I generalize their result to
public and private externality environments where all agents are either risk
neutral or risk averse with respect to uncertainties in harms they face. On the
other hand, by allowing private and public externality acts in the same
environment, I show that even though contribution of agents to the public harm
is greater than the harm they may cause by choosing private externalities, the
punishment level of a private externality may be greater than the punishment
level of public externality if agents are sufficiently risk averse. This result
shows the limitation of a result in Shavell (1992),
and also shows that the distinction between private and public externalities is
important. [DOWNLOAD]