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Curriculum Vitae PDF
2011
HAKAN INAL
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Home Address |
Home: (804) 562-6981 |
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9240 Stony |
Cell: (804) 477-0319 |
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Office: (804) 827-2796
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Fax: (804)
828-6838 |
Married, 2 children
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E-mail: hinal@vcu.edu |
Citizenship Turkey
(H-1B Visa)
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Web Page: http://www.people.vcu.edu/~hinal
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Employment
Visiting Assistant Professor,
Virginia
Commonwealth University 2009-Present
Department of Economics, School of Business
Center
for Public Policy, L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs
Visiting Assistant Professor,
Virginia
Commonwealth University 2008-2009
Department of Economics, School of
Business
Fields: Financial
Economics, Law and Economics, Microeconomics, Public Economics
Education
University
of Minnesota, M.A. in Economics; Bogazici University (Turkey), M.A. in
Economics,
B.Sci.
in Computer Engineering
References
Prof. Marcel K. Richter (612) 625-7832
Prof. Jan Werner (612)
625-0708 Department of
Economics
jwerner@econ.umn.edu
4-101
Hanson Hall
Prof. David Rahman
dmr@umn.edu Minneapolis, MN
55455 USA
Dr. Simran Sahi (612)
625-6353
Prof. Edward L. Millner (804) 828-1718 Department of
Economics
emillner@vcu.edu Virginia Commonwealth
University
Snead Hall, Room B3153B
301 West Main Street
Richmond, VA 23284 USA
Honors and Awards
2008 Travel Grant, Department of Economics,
Fall 2004 Distinguished
Instructor Award, Department of Economics,
1999-2000
1997 Letters
of honorary mention from the Rector’s office and from the Dean’s office for
extraordinary services as a teaching assistant,
1992-1996 Husamettin Tugac Foundation
Scholarship- TUBITAK (Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Council).
Teaching
Experience
Graduate Level
2009- Ph.D.
Program in Public Policy and Administration, L. Douglas Wilder School of
Government and Public Affairs, Virginia Commonwealth University. Taught Ph.D. level Economics of Public Policy course. Prepared and graded Ph.D. Comprehensive Exams questions.
2010- MBA, School of
Business, Virginia Commonwealth University.
Taught Concepts in Economics
(microeconomics and macroeconomics) class.
Undergraduate
Level
2008- Department of
Economics,
2000-2007 Department of Economics,
University of Minnesota. Taught Principles
of Microeconomics, Principles of Microeconomics for Honors, Intermediate
Microeconomics, International Economics, and Public Economics.
1994-1995 On
a volunteer basis, for computer design and Pascal programming language courses
in
Guest Lecturer
2008 Whitman College, “Current Federal Government Budget
Policy and Resulting Debt Issues.”
2002-2003 University
of
Teaching
Assistant
2007-2008 Operations and Management Science Department,
Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. Teaching Assistant for Business Statistics.
1999-2000 Department of Economics,
University of Minnesota. Led recitation sections for Principles of Microeconomics.
1998-1999 Research
and Teaching Assistant in the Department of Economics, Bogazici University.
1997-1998 Research
and Teaching Assistant in the Department of Mathematics, Bogazici
University.
1995 Department
of Computer Engineering, Bogazici University.
Papers
“An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous
Discrete Goods,” (Submitted for publication)
“Impossibility of Existence of Opposite Equilibrium
Preferences on Law Enforcement,” (Submitted for
publication)
“Stability of Coalition Formation Games and
Fixed-Point Methods,” (Coming Soon- A Draft is Available Upon Request)
“Private
vs. Public Externalities and Enforcement.”
Presentations
“An Extension of Ausubel's
Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods,”
Whitman
College 2009; Central Michigan University 2009; GAMES 2008 [Refereed]- Third
World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Kellogg School of Management,
Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois; SED 2008 [Refereed]- 5th
Conference on Economic Design, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan;
Virginia Commonwealth University 2008.
Publication
[Undergraduate]
“A Heuristic Approach for Finding the Minimum
Delay Spanning Tree in Topological Design of Interconnected LANs,” with Cem Ersoy,
in Proceedings of the Eleventh International Symposium on Computer and
Information Sciences, November 1996, vol. II. pp. 785-791.
Other
Papers
“The Design of an
Experimental Study on Elections and Some Negative Results on Strong Nash
Implementation,” unpublished M.A. Thesis, Bogazici University, 1999.
“On Strongly Implementable
Social Choice Correspondences,” mimeo., Bogazici University, 1998.
“Notes on the Refinements of
the Broad Majoritarian Compromise,” with Murat R. Sertel, mimeo., Bogazici University,
1998.
Professional
Experience
1999 Software
designer and developer for an economics experiment at Bogaziçi University.
1999 Data
processor and software controller for Sisli City Planning Project, Turkey.
1995-1997 Software
expert in a software company (SFS-MAN) in Turkey.
Computer Skills
Various software programs
(Word, Excel, PowerPoint, LaTex, etc.) and programming languages (C, C++,
Pascal, Visual Basic, HTML, etc.). Experience in designing software projects
using both structured programming and object-oriented programming.
Languages
English (fluent), Turkish
(native).
Abstracts
of Recent Papers DOWNLOAD
PAPERS
Essay 1: Stability of
Coalition Formation Games and Fixed-Point Methods
I consider
the coalition formation games where agents' preferences over partitions depend
on the identity of the members of the coalition to which they belong. I
construct a mapping of coalitions, and show that its fixed points are the core
stable partitions of coalitions. I propose an algorithm using the map to find
core allocations. (Coming Soon-A Draft is
Available Upon Request)
Essay
2: An Extension
of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods
Ausubel's
dynamic private-values auction for heterogeneous discrete goods, Ausubel
(2006), yields an efficient equilibrium outcome but it is designed for a
limited class of environments. If bidders' values for bundles of goods are not
integers, then the auction mechanism may not yield an efficient allocation
without any information on bidders' values. In this paper, I extend Ausubel's
auction for heterogeneous discrete goods to real-valued quasilinear utility
functions. The mechanism I propose reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price vector
in finite “steps” without any additional information on bidders' values. In the
extension of Ausubel's auction, truthful bidding constitutes an efficient
equilibrium. (Submitted for publication.)
Essay 3: Impossibility of Existence of Opposite
Equilibrium Preferences on Law Enforcement
I derive
preferences of people over equilibrium enforcement levels and show that it is
impossible to have agents with “completely opposite” preferences over the
enforcement level in the same society. (Submitted
for publication.)
Essay 4: Private vs. Public Externalities and Enforcement
Law and
enforcement policy is among the key elements of a civil society that ensures
the achievement of a higher social welfare. I study socially optimal law and
enforcement policy making under two different environments. In the first
environment, private externalities, an activity a person engages harms equally
likely everyone in the society. In the second environment, public
externalities, it harms the whole society. I show that social welfare functions
of these two problems are the same under certain conditions. Polinsky and
Shavell (1984) show that the optimal level of punishment in equilibrium is such
that expected level of punishment is less than the harm it causes. I generalize
their result to public and private externality environments where all agents
are either risk neutral or risk averse with respect to uncertainties in harms
they face. On the other hand, by allowing private and public externality acts
in the same environment, I show that even though contribution of agents to the
public harm is greater than the harm they may cause by choosing private
externalities, the punishment level of a private externality may be greater
than the punishment level of public externality if agents are sufficiently risk
averse. This result shows the limitation of a result in Shavell (1992), and
also shows that the distinction between private and public externalities is
important.