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Curriculum Vitae PDF
November
2009
HAKAN INAL
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Home Address |
Home: (804) 562-6981 |
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9240 Stony |
Cell: (804) 477-0319 |
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Office: (804) 827-2796
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Fax: (804)
828-6838 |
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E-mail: hinal@vcu.edu |
Citizenship
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Web Page: http://www.people.vcu.edu/~hinal
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Employment
Visiting Assistant Professor,
Department of Economics,
Center
for Public Policy, L.
Fields: Financial
Economics, Law and Economics, Microeconomics, Public Economics
Education
Dissertation Co-Advisors: Professors
Marcel K. Richter and Jan Werner
Title: “Designing Auction Mechanisms for Multiple Goods,” 2008
References
Prof. Marcel K. Richter (612) 625-7832
Prof. Jan Werner (612)
625-0708 Department of
Economics
jwerner@econ.umn.edu
4-101
Hanson Hall
Prof. David Rahman
dmr@umn.edu
Dr. Simran Sahi (612)
625-6353
Prof. Edward L. Millner (804) 828-1718 Snead Hall, Room
B3153B
emillner@vcu.edu
Honors and Awards
2008 Travel Grant, Department of Economics,
Fall 2004 Distinguished
Instructor Award, Department of Economics,
1999-2000
1997 Letters
of honorary mention from the Rector’s office and from the Dean’s office for
extraordinary services as a teaching assistant,
1992-1996 Husamettin Tugac Foundation Scholarship-
TUBITAK (Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Council).
Teaching
Experience
Graduate Level
2009- Ph.D.
Program in Public Policy and Administration, L. Douglas Wilder School of
Government and Public Affairs, Virginia Commonwealth University. Taught Ph.D. level Economics of Public Policy course.
Graded Ph.D.
Comprehensive Exams.
Undergraduate
Level
2008- Department of
Economics,
2000-2007 Department of Economics,
1994-1995 On
a volunteer basis, for computer design and Pascal programming language courses
in
Guest Lecturer
2008
2002-2003 University
of
Teaching
Assistant
2007-2008 Operations
and Management Science Department, Carlson
1999-2000 Department of Economics,
1995 Department
of Computer Engineering,
Research
Experience
1998-1999 Research
and Teaching Assistant in the Department of Economics, Bogazici
University.
1997-1998 Research
and Teaching Assistant in the Department of Mathematics, Bogazici University.
Publications
“A Heuristic Approach for Finding the Minimum
Delay Spanning Tree in Topological Design of Interconnected LANs,” with Cem Ersoy, in Proceedings of
the Eleventh International Symposium on Computer and Information Sciences,
November 1996, vol. II. pp. 785-791.
Papers
Auction Theory:
“An Extension of Ausubel's
Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods,” (Submitted for publication)
“Ausubel’s
Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods When Values are Interdependent,”
(Submitted for publication)
“An Efficient Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete
Goods,” (Work in Progress)
“Unification
of Auction and Matching Mechanisms,” (Work in Progress)
“Axiomatic Analysis of Auction Rules,” (Work in Progress).
Law and
Enforcement:
“Choice
of Law Enforcement,” (Submitted for
publication)
“Private vs. Public Externalities and Enforcement.”
Presentations
“An Extension of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods,”
Whitman
College 2009; Central Michigan University 2009; GAMES 2008, Third World
Congress of the Game Theory Society, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern
University, Evanston, Illinois; SED
2008, 5th Conference on Economic Design, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, Michigan; Virginia Commonwealth University 2008.
Other
Papers
“The Design of an Experimental
Study on Elections and Some Negative Results on Strong Nash Implementation,”
unpublished M.A. Thesis, Bogazici University, 1999.
“On Strongly Implementable
Social Choice Correspondences,” mimeo., Bogazici
University, 1998.
“Notes on the Refinements of
the Broad Majoritarian Compromise,” with Murat R. Sertel, mimeo., Bogazici
University, 1998.
Book Review
International Economics,
Robert C. Feenstra and Alan M. Taylor
Managerial Economics, W.
Bruce Allen, Keith Weigelt, Neil Doherty, and Edwin Mansfield
Professional
Experience
1999 Software
designer and developer for an economics experiment at Bogaziçi
University.
1999 Data
processor and software controller for Sisli City
Planning Project, Turkey.
1995-1997 Software
expert in a software company (SFS-MAN) in Turkey.
Computer Skills
Various software programs
(Word, Excel, PowerPoint, LaTex, etc.) and
programming languages (C, C++, Pascal, Visual Basic, HTML, etc.). Experience in
designing software projects using both structured programming and object-oriented
programming.
Languages
English (fluent), Turkish
(native).
Abstracts
of Recent Papers DOWNLOAD
PAPERS
Essay
1: An Extension
of Ausubel's Auction for Heterogeneous Discrete Goods
[Job Market Paper]
Ausubel's dynamic private-values auction for heterogeneous discrete
goods, Ausubel (2006), yields an efficient
equilibrium outcome but it is designed for a limited class of environments. If
bidders' values for bundles of goods are not integers, then the auction
mechanism may not yield an efficient allocation without any information on
bidders' values. In this paper, I extend Ausubel's
auction for heterogeneous discrete goods to real-valued quasilinear
utility functions. The mechanism I propose reaches a Walrasian
equilibrium price vector in finite “steps” without any additional information
on bidders' values. In the extension of Ausubel's
auction, truthful bidding constitutes an efficient equilibrium. (Submitted for publication.)
Essay
2: Ausubel's Heterogeneous Goods Auction When
Values are Interdependent
When heterogeneous goods are to be auctioned in environments
where bidders have interdependent values, no auction has been designed that
yields efficient allocation. In interdependent-values setting, each bidder's
value for a bundle of goods depends on the profile of signals in the society.
So, bidders do not know their own values for goods. Therefore, bidders do not
know at what price to lower the quantity they demand to maximize their
utilities as the price increases. Perry and Reny
(2005) introduce strategies and show that these strategies, Perry-Reny strategies, constitute an efficient equilibrium in Ausubel's homogeneous goods auction, Ausubel
(2004). In this paper, I show that an extension of these Perry-Reny strategies for heterogeneous goods constitute an
efficient equilibrium in Ausubel's heterogeneous
goods auction, Ausubel (2006), when there are two
bidders with interdependent values and utilities are separable in goods. (Submitted for publication.)
Essay
3: Choice of Law Enforcement
I derive
preferences of people over equilibrium enforcement levels and show that it is
impossible to have agents with “completely opposite” preferences over the
enforcement level in the same society. (Submitted for publication.)
Essay 4: Private vs. Public Externalities and Enforcement
Law and
enforcement policy is among the key elements of a civil society that ensures
the achievement of a higher social welfare. I study socially optimal law and
enforcement policy making under two different environments. In the first
environment, private externalities, an activity a person engages harms equally
likely everyone in the society. In the second environment, public
externalities, it harms the whole society. I show that social welfare functions
of these two problems are the same under certain conditions. Polinsky and Shavell (1984) show
that the optimal level of punishment in equilibrium is such that expected level
of punishment is less than the harm it causes. I generalize their result to
public and private externality environments where all agents are either risk
neutral or risk averse with respect to uncertainties in harms they face. On the
other hand, by allowing private and public externality acts in the same
environment, I show that even though contribution of agents to the public harm
is greater than the harm they may cause by choosing private externalities, the
punishment level of a private externality may be greater than the punishment
level of public externality if agents are sufficiently risk averse. This result
shows the limitation of a result in Shavell (1992),
and also shows that the distinction between private and public externalities is
important.