Review Sheet One

POLI/INTL 361

Summer 2023

This is a take home exam.

Basic Requirements

* **Wednesday July 5 to Friday July 7** This will be a take home exam. I will place the exam in the Files folder in Canvas at 9:00 AM July 5. It will be due back to me (emailed) by midnight on July 7 (as July 7 becomes July 8).
* Type or write the exam.
* Either way, email me a file or pdf or even a jpeg of the written answers by the deadline
* 11- or 12-point font
* One-inch margins
* Double-spaced
* Please use your name is the name of the file you send me.  I’d be happiest if you named the file like this: Your name Exam 1 POLI or INTL 361 (so if it was my exam, it would be Newmann Exam 1 POLI 361)
* The exam is open notes (so you can use your notes, the assigned books, the review sheet, and the PPT slides)
* I do not expect any outside research on this at all
* Each question has a specific page number target.  You can go over the limit, not a problem, but don’t go too far over the limit. You don’t need to.
* I think three hours will be enough time for you to write the exam and do well. You can take more time of course, as much as you need. The point here is that I don't think you need to spend hours and hours.
* It might be helpful to read the questions, then review your notes, and the review sheet.  Maybe make an outline of the essay. And then start to write.
* As always, the review sheets should be very helpful. You can use the review sheets while you take the exam. It might be a good organizational tool.
* The PPT slides are also useful. They are my way of organizing the material, and they can serve that purpose for you too.
* Feel free to email me questions if you have them, but as usual, there are limits to how I can help you

The exam has two parts:

* Part 1: Short Answers: Choose 2 of 8: (*20 points each; roughly one half of a page*): Define the term and tell me why it’s important in the context of US foreign policy.
* Part 2: Essay: Choose 1 of 2: (*60 points; roughly 3-4 pages).* Each essay has several parts to it. Make sure to do all parts of the essay. There are choices even within the essay, so make sure you read the directions. A part of an essay may say “choose 3 of 5.” Don’t do all five.

And, important:

* Sharing this exam with anyone outside the class is a violation of the VCU Honor Code
* Working with another student in the class or anyone else while you take this exam is a violation of the VCU Honor Code
* As with any take home, the plagiarism rules that exist for research papers apply here. Your exams must be your written work. I will run this through the standard plagiarism programs as I do with all research papers.

This review looks big, but don't worry. If you have come to class and done all the reading, nothing here should be new to you. Also, though there are a lot of terms, obviously, not each one of them is the subject of an essay. These terms, in order, form an outline of everything we've done so far. A group of them might be the subject of an essay. Usually, you can't explain a single term without referring to the terms next to it. So, really, if you can say one or two things about each term and how it relates to the terms around it and fits into the larger scheme of nuclear weapons you're doing fine. Some terms, however, are filled with enough significance to be short answers/identifications on the test, but you'll be able to figure out which ones.

Terms with (\*) in front of them may not have been included in the lectures, but were discussed, at length, in the readings.

List of Terms

**Functions of Force** (or why do nations have weapons anyway?)

To achieve political goals

1. Defense
2. Deterrence
   * \*Goal
   * \*Method
   * \*Assumption of rationality
     + influencing an opponent’s decision process
     + Rational choice/cost-benefit analysis
   * \*Credibility of threat
   * communicating the threat
     + capability and will
   * Two types of deterrence
     + deterrence by denial
     + deterrence by punishment
   * \*Extended deterrence
   * Complications
     + Bounded Rationality
     + Irrationality?
     + \*If deterrence fails?
3. Compellence
   1. Goal
   2. Brute Force?
   3. Assumption of rationality
   4. Compellence is bargaining
   5. Entering the bargaining
4. Swaggering

**First Nuclear Age**

General Characteristics

1. Bipolarity
2. Rationality
3. Balance of Power
4. Deterrence
5. Arms Control

Conventional vs. nuclear

Atomic Bombs/Fission/A-Bombs

Manhattan Project

US arms race with Germany

Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Radioactive Fallout

Nuclear Bomb/Thermonuclear Bomb/Hydrogen Bomb/Fusion Bomb/H-Bomb

Nuclear Triad

1. Strategic Bombers
   1. B-52
   2. ALCMs
2. \*ICBMs
   1. \*Advantages of ICBM over bombers
   2. \*Silos
   3. \*Minuteman III
   4. \*MIRVs
3. \*SLBMs
   1. \*Advantages of SLBMs
   2. \*Navy wants a role in nuclear war plans and budget
   3. \*” invulnerability” of subs
4. Why create a Triad?
   1. \*Deterrence
   2. \*Increasing the probability that one leg will survive a first strike by the opponent
   3. \*First strike
   4. \*Second strike

Effects of nuclear war

**Nuclear Strategy**

*The Absolute Weapon* (book, 1946)

Nuclear revolution/existential deterrence

\*Strategic Bombing

\*General Curtis LeMay

\*Strategic Air Command

\*Navy vs. Air Force on force planning

\* Massive Retaliation

\*nuclear weapons as first line of deterrence

\*To deter any Soviet behavior US doesn’t like

\*A bluff

\*Warfighting

\*Criticism of Massive Retaliation

\*Limited Nuclear war

\*Ending a nuclear war (war termination)

\*Countervalue vs. Counterforce targeting

\*Flexible Response

\*SIOP 62

\*Robert McNamara

\*Continued search for nuclear war options (how successful was this?)

\*Assured Destruction

\*Deterrence = Second strike capability

\*Minimum deterrent

\*The problem of making nuclear war less devastating – increases the probability of having a nuclear war

\*Survivable weapons

SLBMs

ICBM vulnerability

\*Damage Limitation and ABMs

\*NSDM 242

\*SS-20 and extended deterrence

\*SDI

\*Battle over targeting strategy in GHW Bush administration

\*Finally creating limited options

Gorbachev and START

**Arms Control**

Thousands of weapons but we don’t want to fight a nuclear war

Deterrence, but the security dilemma

Arms Races

action-reaction phenomenon

Secretary of defense Robert McNamara

Arms Control goals

managing the competition

By 1960s: Two Arms Races

offense-offense

offense-defense

ABMs

The impact of ABMs or missile defense on deterrence

how does it impact a second strike?

scenario for victory

the advantage of going first

Crisis stability

SALT 1972

Interim Agreement

launcher limits

essential equivalence

ABM Treaty

Ban on nationwide ABMs

Research allowed

Two test sites

National Technical Means of verification

Criticisms of SALT

End of the Cold War

START

Real reductions

\*New START

\*Obama and Republican Deal

\*Treaty in exchange for modernization of Triad

**Second Nuclear Age**

First vs. Second Nuclear Age Big Picture Comparison

1. Multipolarity
2. Rationality?
3. Asymmetry
4. Deterrence
   1. BMD
5. Arms Control
   1. Stability
   2. Non-Proliferation

**US, Russia, China**

*US and Russia*

What’s the same?

What’s different?

*US strategy*

Who the US deters?

Better warfighting capability

Modernization of the Triad

Arms Control with Russia

New START

The Big Change: National Missile Defense

Deterrence by Denial

\*Trump strategy

\*More warfighting

\*Sponge Theory and ICBM deployment

*Russia*

Loss of empire: tragedy

Using nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional inferiority

Ending No First Use Policy

Escalate to De-escalate

National Missile Defense

Renewing New START

Then suspension of New START by Russia after Russia invasion of Ukraine

*China*

Return to Great Power Status

Sino-Soviet Split

China’s First Bomb

Minimum Deterrence

NFU

Create a Triad

China’s view of US NMD

it is aimed at China, not North Korea

Requires China to build its arsenal

No arms control

Offense-defense arms race

Cyberattack to compensate for inferiority

**Non-Proliferation Basics**

Who has nuclear weapons?

“Nth Country Problem”

Nuclear haves’ decision: only we can have these weapons

winners of WW II

Perm 5 of UN Security Council

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Two Types of States

Nuclear weapons states and their responsibilities

Non-nuclear weapons states and their responsibilities

Nuclear Energy

Reactors can be used to develop a weapon

IAEA

Verification of treaty options

Safeguards Agreements with IAEA

Uranium enrichment (beyond energy reactor needs)

Problems

Those who never signed

Israel case: secretive program ignored by its allies (US, UK, France)

Those who violated the treaty

Options for what can be done to end proliferation

Missile Technology Control Regime

Nuclear Suppliers Group

**The Problem of Proliferation** (in India-Pakistan PPT and Lecture)

Three Questions

1. Why does a nation decide it wants nuclear weapons?
   1. Deterrence and assured retaliation
   2. Demonstrate power (swaggering)
   3. To bargain (compellence)
   4. asymmetric escalation – compensating for weakness
   5. catalytic – to ring in a third power
2. What can be done about it?
3. Does it matter? Is that just decided by politics?

**India and Pakistan**

Did not sign the NPT

Non-proliferation failure

Partition, Rivalry, War

(You don’t need to know all the details; just that the two nations were born into rivalry)

Kashmir Division as a source of conflict

1960s shifts in balance of power

Sino-Indian War 1962

1964 Chinese A-bomb

China allies with Pakistan in two wars

1965 India v. Pakistan

1971 Indian v. Pakistan

US sides with Pakistan

1968 NPT: “Atomic Collusion”

1974 Smiling Buddha test (Pokhran I)

Pakistan accelerates its program after 1971 loss to India

Chinese help

AQ Khan

Compensating for India conventional superiority

“Turn of a Screw Programs”

May 1998 Indian tests

May 1998 Pakistani tests

Indian Nuclear Doctrine

Triad

NFU

Minimum Deterrence

Deterring Pakistan and China

The Triad so far?

US-India nuclear cooperation

Pakistani Nuclear Strategy

Triad?

No NFU

Minimum deterrence

Deterrence of nuclear and conventional war (compensation for inferiority)

Battlefield use during conventional war

The “Triad” so far?

The three questions in the context of India and Pakistan

**Outliers**

*South Africa*: Dismantling a program out of racism and pressure from allies

*Taiwan:* Dismantling a program as allies pressure them to end the program

Geopolitical changes

US opening to mainland China

*Israel*

Did not sign NPT

May have had capability in early to mid-1960s

Refuses to state whether it has nuclear weapons

Strategy: Deterrence of rivals in the region

Regional Triad

Ability to hit all its rivals in the region

Faces no sanctions from US and allies because it is an ally of the US

**Iraq and Iran**

Signed the NPT and violated it

Rivalries in the neighborhood

*Iraq: The use of force*

Iraq’s strategy

deterrence of regional rival and global rivals

involved in an arms race

demonstrating power

regime survival

Saddam Hussein determination to build a nuclear weapon

Iran-Iraq War

June 1981: Osiraq Reactor: Israel’s form of non-proliferation

1990-91 War

Iraqi surrender agreement

Disarmament

IAEA inspections

Iraq doesn’t always cooperate

Operation Desert Fox

Aftermath

Iraq’s nuclear program destroyed, but no one knew that outside of Iraq

Saddam Hussein’s efforts to convince the world it was still close to nuclear weapons

to deter the US

Lies told to Saddam Hussein

Post-9/11

GW Bush administration targeted Iraq

Belief that Iraq has nuclear weapons and will use them

Undeterrable

Irrational

March 2003: Regime Change

*Iran: Sanctions, Negotiations, and Force*

Iranian strategy

Deterrence of neighbors

Asymmetric escalation

Regional power

Arms race

US overthrow of Iranian government 1953

Iranian Revolution

US hostages

Support for terrorism: Hezbollah

Beirut 1983

Decision and Detection

HEU

E3 Negotiations

UNSC Sanctions

P5+1

The deal

Stuxnet/Olympic Games

JCPOA

US withdrawal from JCPOA

New Sanctions

12 Demands

Iranian response

Choices

Deal that delinks nuclear weapons from other Iranian foreign policy issues

OR

Comprehensive change in Iranian foreign policy

*North Korea*

Korea at the intersection of great power interests

Division of Korean Peninsula

Korean War

Cold War politics

Belief in reunification

\*The nature of the regimes

\*North Korean: Hermit Kingdom

\*Family-rules Communist regime

\*Kim Il-sung

\*Kim Jong-un

South Korea: Authoritarian Capitalist, then democracy in 1980s

Why would North Korea build a bomb

* \*Regime Survival
* Demonstration of Power
* Deterrence of Rivals
  + ROK, Japan, US
* Asymmetric Escalation
* \*Catalytic
* \*Self-reliance (“juche”): independence

\*Desire for US recognition as a path to survival

\*The North Korean nightmare

Why they began in the 1970s

The South Korean program: motivation and end of program

The tactical maneuver

North Korea has goals: nothing to bargain with except threat

\*Signing NPT

\*Safeguards agreement, IAEA inspections and decision to withdraw

\*Agreed Framework: The Deal: 1994

\*Why ROK, Japan, and US are reluctant to use force

\*South Korean Sunshine Policy: Begins 1998

\*North Korea admits violations 2002

\*Six Party Talks

\*What North Korea learned from US invasion of Iraq

\*US goal: CVID

\*North Korea detonates a bomb

\*Hwasong 14: ICBM that can hit the US (Date of first test)

\*Ability to threaten US directly

\*Does the US have a credible option for the use of force?

\*ROK response

\*THAAD

Japan response

\*China response

\*US: Trump policy: “Maximum Pressure” “Fire and Fury”

\*Then Concessions

\*Singapore and Hanoi Summits

\*Singapore Agreement: Denuclearization

Compared to JCPOA

North Korean Dyad

\*North Korean strategy (2013 Law)

\*Deterrence

\*Retaliation

\*NFU that really isn’t NFU

Has North Korea ever paid a price for provocative action?

Can proliferation be stopped?

ROK and Japan next steps

Deterrence