

MANAGING  
THE WHITE HOUSE

*An Intimate Study of the Presidency*

RICHARD TANNER JOHNSON

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## CHAPTER ONE

### PRESIDENTIAL STYLE

THE orbits of advisers and agencies that revolve around the President do not, like the heavenly bodies, follow a strict and invariant course. To some extent their paths are determined by Constitution and custom; but, to an important degree, the President himself, as central occupant of the Executive galaxy, shapes the pattern of government.

This book examines the way in which successive Presidents, whether by intent or default, have left their imprint on government. Some, like Dwight D. Eisenhower, may have tried to rationalize the workload by establishing an elaborate staff system, but at the risk of becoming a prisoner of the staff machinery over which they preside. Others, like Franklin D. Roosevelt, may have striven to remain informed by playing aides off against one another, but at the price of exacerbated conflict and at the risk that aides might establish outside alliances to further their interests.

Since the time of George Washington political analysts have speculated about how well the President is managing. This reflects a general belief that the way a President organizes and relates to his close circle of advisers—and through them to the Executive branch—influences policy significantly.

This book will focus on the *process* of management and its *output*, that is, how six Presidents—Franklin D. Roosevelt,

Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon—have organized their office and how their approaches have affected results.<sup>1</sup>

In weighing the consequences of Presidential style, it is convenient to label the different patterns of management that Presidents have used—*formalistic*, *competitive*, and *collegial*. Each of these patterns of management endeavors, in different ways, to resolve the four fundamental dilemmas of decision making. The first has to do with the trade-off between optimality and “doability”—how far can one go in the direction of doing “best” without being “impractical”? The second stems from the mechanisms that screen out or embrace conflicting viewpoints and personalities—how much conflict can a workable decision process tolerate? The third concerns the distortion of information—how much desirable screening can occur in the staffing process without incurring undesirable distortion? The fourth involves the constraint of time—how elaborate can the decision process be without sacrificing responsiveness? The choice of one managerial pattern over another depends upon how the manager resolves these trade-offs.

The point of this undertaking is not just to label a particular approach but to explain why it worked in some instances and failed in others. To the extent that it worked, what were the subtle factors in a President's style that kept his system in balance? How did his staff system reflect and complement his personal preferences and values? Truman's staff funneled in the facts; he made the decision—an aspect of the job he relished. Johnson, on the other hand, sought consensus and struggled mightily to establish agreement among his advisers. Both Presidents sought to make good policy decisions, yet each shaped his decisional machinery differently, rewarded his aides differently—and got different results. In evaluating these results we shall discover that associated with each pattern of management are costs and benefits that predictably surface when a given

approach is used. In other words, given a particular style of management, we can anticipate the likely consequences of that style on the quality of decision making and implementation.

It should be stated at the outset that while each President may adopt a dominant pattern of management, his approach may vary from situation to situation. In addition, he must relate to subordinates of widely differing character, and this also may cause him to vary his managerial approach. He must deal with his own staff and personal advisers, and he must devise a way of working with important advisory groups that work closely with his office, like the Cabinet, the National Security Council, and the Council of Economic Advisors. Finally, he must strive to find some way to manage the giant Executive agencies like the Department of Defense (DOD) and Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). From these sources he must gather information and weigh it, make decisions, and pass his choices out again for implementation.

Each President distributes his energies differently, and like most people, he tries to use his experience and draws on what has worked for him before. While each President's approach is to some extent unique, there are striking similarities too.

#### THE FORMALISTIC APPROACH

Consider the similarities between the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations. Common to both was an emphasis on order. Both Presidents installed a procedural system of decision making; both tended to underplay their political role—the stress was on finding the best solution to national problems rather than on working out “compromise settlements” among conflicting views. This emphasis on order and analysis was reflected in their choice of advisers: figures like Sherman Adams and Henry A. Kissinger emerged as predominant—the stereotype

was analytical and dispassionate. Eisenhower and Nixon tended to discourage staff conflict; open expressions of interpersonal conflict such as competition, bargaining, and hostility were taboo. They sought to preserve substantive conflict by having both sides of an issue presented on paper. Because they had these preferences, each devised a structured decision process that centered upon the reasoned discussion of prepared briefs rather than upon the heat of debate. A formalized staff system collected information and funneled it to the top; complex problems were analyzed into their pros and cons.<sup>2</sup> Ultimately, the President weighed his decision on the merits.

It is noteworthy that the formalized approach, at least in its idealized form, aspires to make "the best" decision. Decisions are expected to stand on their merits; implementation is not stressed in the decision-making process. In this respect, the assumptions underlying this approach bear some resemblance to "decision making" in the economic context: the decision maker is seen as a single agent striving to optimize his goals in the face of given costs.<sup>3</sup> This approach assumes that an optimal solution exists and that it can be identified and implemented; decisions are made and action is taken with complete information on all the alternatives and their consequences.

Clearly, decision making in this rarefied atmosphere bears little resemblance to the Presidency. But the differences, in terms of the basic assumptions of the formalistic approach, are more in degree than in kind. Agreed, Presidential decisions are rarely, if ever, made on the criterion of technical rationality alone. But an interesting feature of this approach is the tendency for technical considerations to be emphasized and political considerations deemphasized. Eisenhower steadfastly urged his Cabinet members to "not compromise on principle."<sup>4</sup> The Nixon invasion of Cambodia may or may not have been justified in terms of technical military criteria, but there is general agreement that he underestimated the political reaction that followed. A later section on the Nixon White House will

provide fuller opportunity to examine the assumptions and consequences of the formalistic approach.

#### THE COMPETITIVE APPROACH

Against any standard of ordered decision making, the managerial approach of Franklin Roosevelt stands as the polar extreme. In passion, as well as administrative persuasion, Roosevelt sought involvement and controversy. He not only tolerated a great deal of conflict, he thrived on it. He sought aggressive advisers of divergent opinions—such as Harry L. Hopkins, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Harold L. Ickes—and pitted them against one another.<sup>5</sup> He delegated responsibility and authority in overlapping segments. The resulting clash generated heat, but also information. Roosevelt, pragmatic and opportunistic, sought above all to stay informed and to exploit prevailing political currents. His decision process, forged in the heat of debate, was preconditioned to withstand debate in Congress and the test of public exposure. Roosevelt may have overly sacrificed what was "best" for what was "doable"; but if the acceptance of his proposals was his criterion for success, acceptance is what he got to a greater extent than any President before or since.

Roosevelt exemplifies what will be termed the *competitive* pattern of management. His method of delegation left jurisdictional boundaries to be mapped out by conquest among his subordinates. It promoted conflict which often landed in his lap. He fully recognized the inherent conflicts of interest that surround the Presidency and assumed that, in most instances, the quarrels among his subordinates could not be resolved to the satisfaction of all disputants. Roosevelt thus sought to position himself as the arbitrator, as the "swing vote" in the decision-making process. In many respects his approach was well suited to the White House. The President must live with conflict; it is

woven into the fabric of the Presidency. Roosevelt sought to sharpen this conflict as a means of staying informed, promoting creativity, and providing a healthy, renewing jolt to the system. But competition also exacted its price. Intense competition among his subordinates at times drove them toward extreme and intransigent positions; aides were driven underground—withholding information or leaking tidbits to Congress or to the press in order to weaken adversaries or to limit the President's options.<sup>9</sup> The overlapping assignments which promoted conflict also fostered duplication of effort. A lesser President than Roosevelt might have become more the victim rather than the patron of power politics.

#### THE COLLEGIAL APPROACH

The two patterns of management, formalistic and competitive, describe the extremes of a range of possibilities. The principal strength of the formalized approach is its emphasis on thorough staff work and its stress on finding the best possible solution to a problem. The risk of this approach is that it may insulate the decision maker. Staff members working in specialized assignments become parochial, "the funneling of information" is oftentimes accompanied by the distortion of information. The more staff layers information has to filter through, the greater the risks of such distortion. There is also a tendency for the formalistic pattern of management to react too slowly or to generate solutions that seem utopian and hard to implement. In contrast, as often employed, the competitive pattern of management focuses attention on the power dimensions of a problem—at times sacrificing its substantive merits. Result: more attention is given to the bargaining than to the analysis. Under such circumstances, there is a tendency toward short-run solutions that are strongly influenced by the immediate political climate.

The collegial pattern of management strives to avoid these pitfalls. The managerial thrust is toward building a team of colleagues who work together to staff out problems and generate solutions which, ideally, fuse the strongest elements of divergent points of view. By virtue of encouraging subordinates to work together, this approach recognizes the existence, and in fact the merit, of conflict. The emphasis, however, is not on the win-lose interplay among competing individuals or ideas but rather on treating conflicting viewpoints as a resource. The collegial approach has as its principal strength the potential of forging solutions that are both substantively sound and politically doable, having taken the strongest arguments of all sides into account. Its greatest limitation stems from its dependence on people working together. Considerable managerial skill and attention is required to build an effective team. Collective endeavor requires patience and takes time.

Of all recent Presidents, perhaps John Kennedy went the furthest on some occasions toward adopting the collegial pattern of management. In the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy incorporated conflict into his Executive Committee: he included representatives from the Department of Defense known for their commitment to "military solutions," as well as members who favored a diplomatic settlement. Unlike his mismanagement of the policy-making discussions leading to the Bay of Pigs, this time Kennedy did not attempt to stifle the expression of disagreement and debate among his advisers—in fact, he absented himself on several occasions so that it would be fully voiced.<sup>7</sup> He stressed solving the problem and emphasized the group's collective responsibility for coming up with sound recommendations. The resulting solution did not ignore conflict, but neither was it imprisoned by it. From the divergent views of Ex Comm's members, a composite plan was formulated which built upon the strengths of conflicting proposals and which in sum was better than any of the original plans.

These three managerial patterns—formalistic, competitive,

and collegial—describe a range of approaches a President might employ. Clearly the patterns are highly simplified; but each provides a net of a different mesh, so to speak, which we might cast into the murky waters of Presidential performance. These nets will permit us to consider different managerial approaches that have been used in the White House, and their consequences.

## CHAPTER TWO

### ROOSEVELT'S FEUDING FRATERNITY

ON NOVEMBER 2, 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was swept into office on a tide of national frustration. Seething beneath the sea of ballots was an angry, frightened America. At least thirteen million Americans (nearly one-fourth of the labor force) were walking the cold streets in search of work. Everywhere the system was breaking down. The economy, succumbing to grinding deflation, was depressing prices and wages. The burden of debt, incurred in better times, was becoming every day more intolerable: it was bankrupting the railroads, bankrupting local government, straining the banking and credit structure to the breaking point.

It was a strange, numbing crisis, worse than an invading army, for it was everywhere and nowhere; it was in the minds of men. For many Americans it was eroding their faith in a system—a faith that dwindled day by day along with their jobs and savings.

Inaugural Day dawned cold and cheerless. Almost all the nation's banks were closed. Chin outthrust, Roosevelt repeated the oath of office. Then, turning to the acres of grim faces on the Capitol lawn and the unseen millions before their radios at home, he delivered his stirring Inaugural. They had nothing to fear but fear itself. The vast crowd listened in almost dead

drama unfolds—its predictability in no way dulling the public's appetite for the plot. First, the candidate begins to distance himself from his original following in search of the political middle ground. His original supporters become as disenchanting as he is preoccupied with walking this political tightrope. The drama is televised before ninety million Americans who watch nightly for a slip, a contradiction, a foolish mistake. Public fascination will pursue him unmercifully—observing his habits, his quirks, his family life, his staff. Frank Mankiewicz, George McGovern's campaign manager, has said:

[Such intimate attention to campaign details] has had a pernicious influence . . . and has changed the whole style and substance of American [campaigns]. . . . All this inside stuff, because of [its appeal, causes] a lot of reporters, particularly the commentators, [to become] obsessed with reporting inside stuff and ignore the things the public is interested in. Almost from the beginning of [the McGovern] campaign, there [was] far more attention devoted to polls and fund-raising and staffing . . . than to what the candidate [was] actually doing and saying.<sup>1</sup>

Ostensibly, Mankiewicz's complaint seems reasonable. Campaigns *ought* to be on the issues. In fact, the public usually participates in heated debate over the positions of the candidates. But curiously, this occurs despite the citizens' foreknowledge that the candidate, once elected, is not likely to deliver on the promises he makes.

We may ask what lies at the root of this process, seemingly so rife with contradiction: candidates risking primaries that do not secure the hoped-for outcome at the convention, debate over convention platforms that are ignored once the convention is over, emotionalism over issues that no one expects much action on, candidates stressing their positions while commentators focus on the process of the campaign itself. But before we dismiss Americans as entirely crazy, we should note that the wear and tear of campaigns and the exposure to the grueling public spotlight have a way of unmasking a man. How the public sees

## CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSION

EVERY fourth year, Americans engage in a peculiar form of madness. Beginning in the early spring of election years, would-be Presidential candidates trace a path from New Hampshire west to Wisconsin. The madness begins within the ranks of the candidate's supporters, for if he is to brave the primary process, he must build a loyal following. He courts their support by reaffirming his commitment to their concerns and aspirations. In exchange, they make great sacrifices, enduring the hazards of weather, hecklers, and the press, catching bad meals on the run, sleeping infrequently—all in hopes of building a wave of victories that will carry their candidate to the White House.

The madness gathers momentum in the primaries and gradually the public at large becomes involved. Typically, party interest reaches its climax in time for the national convention. There the leading candidate discovers that despite his success in the primaries, he is not guaranteed the nomination. Now he encounters a whole new set of obstacles and must engage in a crasser form of politics: he must corral delegates, horse trade favors in return for their votes, wield power to intimidate dissidents, and execute deft compromises to build the winning coalition.

If the candidate wins his party's nomination, a quadrennial

a candidate's personal qualities may play a large part in winning or losing elections. Was Eisenhower elected on his politics or on the basis of his image as a sincere statesman and leader? Did John Kennedy defeat Richard Nixon on the issues, or did the Nixon-Kennedy debates simply convince many Americans that Kennedy was more real and sincere? Was McGovern really defeated by his controversial positions or by his fumbles early in the campaign over the Eagleton matter and his economic policies that cast doubt on his ability to choose and manage men?

Americans have a keen sense of what they seek in a President. A prime function of the campaign may well be to expose the man as much as his positions. Insofar as this is true, our efforts to come to grips with candidates as human beings have suffered from not making our inquiry explicit. To be sure, we can learn much about a candidate from the campaign. In many respects, the campaign is a kind of Presidential pentathlon. The candidate must reveal charismatic qualities to attract a following, he must organize and administer a large and complex organization, he must maintain financial solvency, he must bargain effectively on the convention floor, and he must periodically rise above it all as a statesman. But far more information on these attributes is at hand than that which surfaces by happenstance during the campaign itself. The preceding chapters suggest that much of what a President *will be* is strongly indicated by what he *has been*. Truman's reliance on his staff, his drive to "do right"—even his stubbornness—were visible in his handling of the wartime investigations of the Truman Committee. Eisenhower, the conciliating Supreme Commander in Europe who relied on his army staff, served in a similar fashion in the White House. Nixon, working in secrecy and in solitude on the Hiss case, behaved in much the same manner as President; his tightly organized campaign machinery—complete with Haldeman on the top of the pyramid—was a near-perfect prototype of what he later installed in the White House.

It is not sufficient to argue that the past determines the pres-

ent. The toughest question remains "How?" What the previous chapters suggest is that we can, in fact, go considerably beyond the conventional wisdom in answering this question, not only in predicting the personal traits which a candidate will carry with him into the White House, but how these together with his prior administrative experience will shape the way in which he organizes his staff. Given his management approach, we can predict how his system will function and what its strengths and weaknesses are likely to be.

It has been useful to think in terms of three approaches to management—formalistic, competitive, and collegial. Clearly, these labels oversimplify. But our intent has not been to confine complex behavior to simple boxes; rather it has been to describe these three patterns of management and to demonstrate their usefulness. To the extent that a manager adopts one of these patterns, he will incur costs and reap benefits predictably associated with it.

Three of the six presidents discussed utilized the formalistic approach. (Lyndon Johnson is a possible fourth and will be discussed separately.) We have been able to find some interesting similarities among them. Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon shared a common emphasis on structure. The Truman Presidency saw the creation of such entities as the National Security Council and the Council of Economic Advisors; Eisenhower embellished these institutions with interlocking subordinate staffs; Nixon built the same institutions into his decision-making machinery, adding the largest NSC staff in history and an entirely new entity, the Domestic Policy Council. In each administration the President publicly emphasized his desire to make the "best" decision. Each employed his staff to preserve his time for the "big decisions."

Perhaps the most remarkable similarity among these three Presidents' administrations is the extent to which each fell victim to the same shortcomings. For example, all were embarrassed by scandals. A number of Truman's staff were convicted;



Eisenhower lost Talbott and Sherman Adams and was humiliated by the Dixon-Yates affair; Nixon has had to answer to perhaps the most far-reaching scandal in the nation's history, involving a long parade of horrors beginning with ITT and the Watergate. Each at one time or another made suboptimal decisions when their staff machinery insulated them too much: Truman in deciding to invade North Korea, Eisenhower in his handling of the Suez crisis and Little Rock, and Nixon in responding to the Haynsworth defeat and the Watergate break-in. They also shared in common the problem of having their intentions thwarted by covert bargaining among their advisers. Eisenhower's Cabinet members negotiated interagency compromises "out of court"; Clark Clifford has described his quiet struggle against Steelman "for Truman's mind"; and the inner workings of Nixon's domestic staff attest to similar difficulties. One point repeatedly reinforced by these observations is that the later a President interjects himself into the decision process, the more he limits the breadth of information available to him. The President's options are correspondingly reduced.

As we have seen, there is no effective substitute for the President's involvement. Eisenhower's system worked best when he was personally involved and committed—as in "The Chances for Peace" speech and the "Open Skies" proposal. Nixon's finest hours have occurred on the foreign policy front, where Kissinger's smooth-running policy analysis machinery has been accompanied by the President's own close attention and scrutiny.

In further comparing the Presidents who have used the formalistic approach, we can also note similarities in their personalities. First, each tended to be somewhat uncomfortable in managing people. Truman's shyness and sense of inadequacy led him into a "deference trap" with strong-minded subordinates such as Henry Wallace, Jimmy Byrnes, and Douglas MacArthur. Eisenhower steadfastly sought to keep "personalities" out of decisions and even refused to take part in selecting his

Cabinet. Nixon has likewise received wide attention for "depersonalizing" the Presidency. A second personal characteristic of these Presidents, perhaps less true of Truman, was their common belief that a well-designed management system should guard against, or at least compensate for, the human factor. Each wanted to hedge against human error—which is reasonable enough—but Eisenhower and Nixon, in particular, sought to *eradicate* it through "systematization" rather than recognize and allow for it on an individual-by-individual basis. A third similarity was the remarkable degree to which each tended to avoid interpersonal conflict. Each used his staff to screen out unpleasant encounters.

Lyndon Johnson remains an intriguing exception to many of our generalizations about management style. While LBJ tended toward the formalistic approach, his personality simply overshadowed it. This is not to say that he did not share characteristics with the other Presidents who chose this approach. He exhibited a preference for a structured decision process, he preferred to evaluate alternatives rather than participate in creating them, and like Eisenhower and Nixon, he was unhappy when conflict erupted within his own administrative family. But here the similarities end. Johnson's personality shaped a system that was, above all, idiosyncratic. His reward system, in particular, was not in the remotest sense geared to keeping his Administration running smoothly. Instead, his ways of rewarding and punishing aides seem to have been conditioned almost entirely by personal needs; that his impact was disruptive appears to have been secondary to his requirement for the exercise of control. This corrupted his system, resulted in the resignation of many talented subordinates, and caused many who remained to abdicate to his whims at the expense of honest counsel.

It is fascinating to note that while the Presidents using the formalistic approach had similar shortcomings, these same problems were almost entirely absent in the Roosevelt and Kennedy

Presidencies. Roosevelt's competitive system and Kennedy's collegial approach were strongest where the formalistic approach was weakest. There were few scandals and little of the behind-the-scenes shenanigans among aides that the President knew nothing about. Both FDR and JFK had a higher tolerance of interpersonal conflict. Both immersed themselves in the information process and derived satisfaction from reaching down and *shaping* the options—not just selecting from among those presented to them. The price they paid was that the personal demands on their time and attention were enormous. And because they were so intimately a part of the system, their Administrations tended to fail when they failed. Roosevelt's approach, in particular, was greatly dependent on his ability to forge workable solutions. His approach generated creative ideas, but the overlapping delegations of authority and conflicting personalities required his constant attention. During the war years, he could not do this, and consequently his chaotic system spawned inefficiency.

Kennedy's collegial approach did not demand as much Presidential centrality. Relationships were more cordial, delegations less conflicting, and the team shared collective responsibility. But the driving force behind the process was Kennedy's own commitment to identifying "all alternatives." When he performed this policing function, his system worked admirably; when he did not, teamwork tended toward myopic unanimity and mutual support. (This tendency became pronounced when Lyndon Johnson inherited Kennedy's team of advisers.) But even under Kennedy's stewardship, the decision-making process leading to the Bay of Pigs gives testimony to the vulnerability of his approach. In contrast to Eisenhower, Kennedy had created no self-sustaining system; when Kennedy faltered, so did his system. When his personal resources became overcommitted, when he ceased to badger his aides to ensure that all alternatives got a full hearing, his Administration stumbled. Thus we note an important trade-off between the various ap-

proaches. More fluid systems are more responsive, but they are also more dependent on the decision maker. The price of this dependence is exacted in the drain upon the decision maker's personal resources; his capacities determine his system's capacities. Those who use the competitive or collegial approaches must avoid becoming overextended. They must allocate their energies carefully.

Kennedy's system worked best within the closed environment of the White House. When functioning smoothly, it probably did a better job than either the formalistic or competitive modes. Kennedy's teamwork generated creative alternatives and staffed them out. It was more responsive than the formalistic approach, and it enlisted the President earlier in the decision process and consequently gave him more influence in shaping the options. Like the competitive approach, Kennedy's collegial system did not ignore conflict, but unlike Roosevelt, Kennedy was able to tap this energy and use it for solving the problem while avoiding wasteful friction and interpersonal strife.

In discussing the pros and cons of the three managerial approaches, we are implicitly stating criteria against which a decision-making process can be judged. One criterion is the degree to which the decision-making machinery screens and distorts information; a second is the extent to which the decision maker is exposed to both substantive and interpersonal conflict; a third is the overall responsiveness of the decision process; and a fourth is the thoroughness with which alternatives are staffed out and decisions are weighed. With these four criteria in mind, the following table gives the costs and benefits of the three managerial patterns discussed.

Listing the costs of each of the managerial approaches raises the question, "How can a decision maker possibly offset them?" Personality permitting, a President might seek ways to hedge against his system's shortcomings. For example, a President who adopts the formalistic approach might choose to establish

	BENEFITS	COSTS
Formalistic Approach	Orderly decision process enforces more thorough analysis. Conserves the decision maker's time and attention for the big decisions. Emphasizes the optimal.	The hierarchy which screens information may also distort it. Tendency of the screening process to wash out or distort political pressures and public sentiments. Tendency to respond slowly or inappropriately in crisis.
Competitive Approach	Places the decision maker in the mainstream of the information network. Tends to generate solutions that are politically feasible and bureaucratically doable. Generates creative ideas, partially as a result of the "stimulus" of competition, but also because this unstructured kind of information network is more open to ideas from the outside.	Places large demands on decision maker's time and attention. Exposes decision maker to partial or biased information. Decision process may overly sacrifice optimality for doability. Tendency to aggravate staff competition with the risk that aides may pursue their own interests at the expense of the decision maker. Wear and tear on aides fosters attrition and high turnover.
Collegial Approach	Seeks to achieve both optimality and doability. Involves the decision maker in the information network but somewhat eases the demands upon him by stressing teamwork over competition.	Places substantial demands on the decision maker's time and attention. Requires unusual interpersonal skills in dealing with subordinates, mediating differences, and maintaining teamwork among colleagues.

more fluid decisional machinery or reach further down the information channels when facing a decision of particular importance to his Administration. A Chief Executive who adopts the competitive style might commission formal study groups to en-

sure careful staff work on complex policy questions and thereby augment his ad hoc decision process. (Interestingly, Roosevelt adopted this expedient in establishing the Brownlow Commission to study and recommend ways to modernize his Executive Office.) A President who chooses the collegial approach might utilize a more formalistic structure for routine matters in order to concentrate his energies on the more sensitive policy areas.

However an Executive chooses to manage, his managerial approach sets a process in motion that not only "makes decisions" but also affects (a) the quality of those decisions and (b) how the decisions are implemented. We have noted strikingly dissimilar results as different Presidents with differing styles have dealt with the bureaucracy and Congress. FDR encountered many obstacles in using the competitive approach to coordinate his wartime agencies. Kennedy seemed also to be employing a competitive pattern in his dealings with the Department of State; his success, like Roosevelt's, was questionable. In contrast, Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon, utilizing the formalistic approach, achieved at least a semblance of control. It can be argued, of course, that the bureaucracy remained unmanageable and that the formalistic hierarchy simply concealed this fact. It would seem, however, that Johnson, using formalistic means, squeezed some measure of performance from the agencies. In the same vein, Kennedy, adopting a formalistic approach in delegating the management of the Department of Defense to McNamara, seems to have been well rewarded.

If the elaborate formalistic machinery is well suited to monitoring the bureaucracy, it seems equally clear that it is ill-suited to dealing with Congress. Whereas Roosevelt's and Johnson's competitive tactics were successful on the Hill, the formalistic techniques of Eisenhower, Truman, and Nixon were demonstrably ineffective. The competitive approach embraces conflict, acknowledges the importance of interpersonal confrontation, gives salience to bargaining, and employs secrecy and the hint of patronage to achieve its effects. In these re-

spects, this approach appears ideally suited to the Congressional milieu. Insofar as Congress is concerned, there appears to be no substitute for bargaining. Kennedy's teamwork fell flat when applied to Congress. Fundamentally, his approach depended upon collective effort and shared purposes; these values seemed misplaced in the highly pluralistic and contentious setting under the Capitol dome.

These observations suggest that each of the patterns of management has its place in the various facets of the Presidency. Clearly, it would be the rare President who could use all three effectively. But to the extent that awareness of these requirements brings us closer to meeting them, we have come a considerable distance.

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