

Presidential Personality and Performance

Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George

Foreword by Fred I. Greenstein

1998

Presidential Management Styles and Models

Alexander L. George and Eric Stern

EVERY NEW PRESIDENT FACES the task of deciding how to structure and manage high-level foreign-policy-making in his administration. The task is a formidable one since responsibility for different aspects of national security and foreign policy is distributed over a number of departments and agencies. Relevant information, competence, and influence over policy is widely dispersed within the executive branch as well as outside of it. This imposes on the president and his assistants the task of mobilizing available information, expertise, and analytical resources for effective policymaking. In addition, the president and his closest associates have the responsibility for providing policy initiative and coherence throughout the executive branch.

To discharge these tasks effectively requires internal coordination within the government. Those parts of the executive branch that have some responsibility for and/or contribution to make to a particular policy problem must be encouraged to interact with each other in appropriate ways. Left to themselves, these various agencies, of course, would interact voluntarily and achieve some measure of "lateral coor-

Alexander George is the author of the first part of this chapter, taken from his *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980). He is coauthor with Eric Stern of the sections on Presidents Carter and Reagan, and Stern wrote the sections on Presidents Bush and Clinton.

Stern wishes to thank Lina Svedin for research assistance and Paul 't Hart for useful comments on the previous draft of the section on President Clinton.

dination" in formulating policy. But it is essential for the president (and each department or agency head) to ensure lateral coordination by institution of various procedures and mechanisms, such as ad hoc or standing interdepartmental committees, policy conferences, liaison arrangements, a system of clearances for policy or position papers, and so on.

However important lateral coordination is, it cannot be counted upon to produce the caliber of policy analysis, the level of consensus, and the procedures for implementation required for an effective and coherent foreign policy.

Moreover, lateral coordination may be weakened and distorted by patterns of organizational behavior and the phenomenon of "bureaucratic politics" that create impediments to and malfunctions of the policymaking process. Accordingly, all presidents have found it necessary to impose mechanisms for control and coordination of policy analysis and implementation from above—either from the White House itself or from the National Security Council (NSC)—or have fixed responsibility for achieving control and coordination with the State Department, or have adopted a combination of these mechanisms.

The traditional practice for seeking improvement in the performance of the foreign-policymaking system was to undertake *structural reorganization* of the agencies and the mechanisms for achieving their coordination and cooperation. Periodically—indeed, at least once in each presidential administration—the foreign-policymaking system was reorganized.¹ But the results of reorganizations have been so disappointing that the "organizational tinkering" approach has fallen into general disrepute. Instead, greater attention is being given to the *design and management of the processes of policymaking*.

Coupled with this shift in focus from organizational structure to process is a new awareness among specialists in organization and public administration that their past efforts to identify a single standardized model of policymaking that would be optimal for all presidents was misguided. Instead, it is now recognized that each president is likely to define his role in foreign-policymaking somewhat differently and to approach it with a different decisionmaking and management style. Hence, too, he will have a different notion as to the kind of policymaking system that he wishes to create around him, feels comfortable with, and can utilize. In brief, the present emphasis is on designing organizational structures to fit the operating styles of their key

individuals rather than attempting to persuade each new top executive to accept and adapt to a standardized organizational model that is considered to be theoretically the best.

As this implies, the first and foremost task that a new president faces is to learn to define his own role in the policymaking system; only then can he structure and manage the roles and relationships within the policymaking system of his secretary of state, the special assistant for national security affairs, the secretary of defense, and other cabinet members and agency heads with responsibilities for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

The president's basic choice is whether to give his secretary of state the primary role in the foreign-policymaking system or to centralize and manage that system from the White House itself. Still another model is that of a relatively decentralized system that is coordinated from the White House for the president by his special assistant for national security affairs.

A new president may receive advice on these matters from specialists in organization or in foreign policy, but in the last analysis his choices in these matters will be shaped by preferences of his own that stem from previous experience (if any) in executive roles and the extent to which he regards himself as knowledgeable and competent in foreign policy and national security matters. Finally, as all president-watchers have emphasized, the incumbent's personality will shape the formal structure of the policymaking system that he creates around himself and, even more, it will influence the ways in which he encourages and permits that formal structure to operate in practice. As a result, each president is likely to develop a policymaking system and a management style that contain distinctive and idiosyncratic elements.

Detailed comparison of past presidents from this standpoint suggests that a variety of personality characteristics are important, of which three can be briefly noted.² The first of these personality dimensions is "*cognitive style*." Cognitive psychologists have found it useful to view the human mind as a complex system for information processing. Every individual develops ways of storing, retrieving, evaluating, and using information. At the same time the individual develops a set of beliefs about the environment, about the attributes of other actors, and about various presumed causal relationships that help the person to explain and predict, as best he can (correctly or incorrectly), events

of interest to him. Beliefs of this kind structure, order, and simplify the individual's world; they serve as models of "reality." Such mental constructs play an important role in the individual's perception of what is occurring in his environment, in the acquisition and interpretation of new information, and in the formulation and evaluation of responses to new situations.

At the same time, individuals differ in their approaches to processing and evaluating information, and this is generally what is meant by "cognitive style." There is as yet no standardized approach to characterizing the dimensions of cognitive style. For present purposes, the term is used to refer to the way in which an executive such as the president defines his informational needs for purposes of making decisions. "Cognitive style" also refers to his preferred ways of acquiring information from those around him and making use of that information, and to his preferences regarding advisers and ways of using them in making his decisions.

Defined in these terms, as we shall note, an individual's cognitive style plays an important role in his preference for one management model as against others. Cognitive styles do vary among presidents, and it simply will not work to try to impose on a new president a policymaking system or a management model that is uncongenial to his cognitive style.³

A second personality dimension that influences a president's choice of a policymaking system is his *sense of efficacy and competence* as it relates to management and decisionmaking tasks. In other words, the types of skills that he possesses and the types of tasks that he feels particularly adept at doing and those that he feels poorly equipped to do will influence the way in which he defines his executive role.

A third personality dimension that will influence the president's selection of a policymaking model is his *general orientation toward political conflict* and, related to this, toward interpersonal conflict over policy among his advisers. Individuals occupying the White House have varied on this personality dimension, too. Thus, we find that some chief executives have viewed politics as a necessary, useful, and perhaps even enjoyable game while other presidents have regarded it as a dirty business that must be discouraged or at least ignored. The personal attitude toward conflict that a president brings into office is likely to determine his orientation to the phenomena of "cabinet politics" and "bureaucratic politics" within his administration as well as

to the larger, often interlinked game of politics surrounding the executive branch. Individuals with a pronounced distaste for "dirty politics" and for being exposed to face-to-face disagreements among advisers are likely to favor policymaking systems that attempt to curb these phenomena or at least shield them from direct exposure. They also are likely to prefer staff and advisory systems in which teamwork or formal analytical procedures are emphasized in lieu of partisan advocacy and debate.

Cognitive style, sense of efficacy, and orientation toward conflict (and of course, as noted earlier, the nature of any prior experience in executive roles and the level of personal competence and interest in foreign policy and national security affairs)—all these combine to determine how a new president will structure the policymaking system around him and how he will define his own role and that of others in it.

Three management models have been identified that characterize at least in general terms the approaches displayed by different presidents in recent times.⁴ These are the "formalistic," "competitive," and "collegial" models. The formalistic model is characterized by an orderly policymaking structure, one that provides well-defined procedures, hierarchical lines of communication, and a structured staff system. While the formalistic model seeks to benefit from the diverse views and judgments of participants in policymaking, it also discourages open conflict and bargaining among them.

The competitive model, in contrast, places a premium on encouraging a more open and uninhibited expression of diverse opinions, analysis, and advice. To this end the competitive model not only tolerates but may actually encourage organizational ambiguity, overlapping jurisdictions, and multiple channels of communication to and from the president.

The collegial model, in turn, attempts to achieve the essential advantages of each of the other two while avoiding their pitfalls. To this end, the president attempts to create a team of staff members and advisers who will work together to identify, analyze, and solve policy problems in ways that will incorporate and synthesize as much as possible divergent points of view. The collegial model attempts to benefit from diversity and competition within the policymaking system, but it also attempts to avoid narrow parochialism by encouraging cabinet officers and advisers to identify at least partly with the presidential perspective. And by encouraging collegial participation in group

problem-solving efforts, this approach attempts to avoid the worst excesses of infighting, bargaining, and compromise associated with the competitive model.

Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon employed one or another variant of the formalistic approach. Franklin D. Roosevelt employed the competitive model, and John F. Kennedy the collegial one. As for Lyndon B. Johnson, he began by trying to emulate Franklin Roosevelt's style and gradually moved toward a formalistic approach but one that exhibited such idiosyncratic features that we have decided not to offer a description of it here. Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Let us begin with Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose unusual policymaking system is the prototype for the competitive management model. A dominant feature of FDR's personality was his strong sense of political efficacy. He felt entirely at home in the presidency, acting in the belief that there was close to a perfect fit between his competence and skills and some of the most demanding role requirements of the office. Then, too, FDR viewed politics and the games that go with it as a useful and enjoyable game and not, as others before him (for example, William Taft and Herbert Hoover) as an unsavory, distasteful business to be discouraged or avoided. FDR not only felt comfortable in the presence of conflict and disagreement around him; he also saw that, properly managed, it could serve his informational and political needs. Instead of trying, as his predecessor had, to take the politics out of the policymaking process, Roosevelt deliberately exacerbated the competitive and conflicting aspects of cabinet politics and bureaucratic politics. He sought to increase both structural and functional ambiguities within the executive branch in order better to preside over it. For Roosevelt, exposure to conflict among advisers and cabinet heads did not stir up anxiety or depression; nor did he perceive it as threatening in a personal or political sense. Not only did he live comfortably with the political conflict and, at times, near-chaos around him, but also he manipulated the structure of relationships among subordinates in order to control and profit from their competition. What is noteworthy is that Roosevelt did not attempt to create a for-




FIGURE 6.1 The Competitive Model (FDR)

mal, centralized model of the policymaking process (as advocated, for example, in later Hoover Commission proposals for reorganization of governmental agencies); rather, he deliberately created "fuzzy lines of responsibility, no clear chains of command, overlapping jurisdictions" in order to promote "stimulating" inter-departmental conflict which could and did eventually land in his own lap.⁵

At the risk of simplification, it is possible to delineate some features of the distinctive communication network or patterns associated with FDR's competitive model (see Figure 6.1⁶).

Characteristic features of the competitive model (FDR): (1) the president deliberately encourages competition and conflict among advisers and cabinet heads by giving them overlapping assignments and ambiguous, conflicting jurisdictions in given policy areas; (2) there is relatively little communication or collaboration among advisers; (3) the president reaches down on occasion to communicate directly with subordinates of cabinet heads to get independent advice and information; (4) relevant information on important policy problems is forced up through the network to the president himself; competing advisers are forced to bring important policy problems to the president for resolution and decision; but (5) the president avoids risk of becoming overloaded or involved by operating this system selectively, on occasion (not depicted on the chart), he encourages or insists that subordinate officials settle things themselves and refuses to become identified with their policies or pet projects.

Harry S. Truman

Harry Truman adopted a different strategy for coping with the complex morass that governmental structure had become as a result of Roosevelt's style and administrative practices and the wartime expansion of agencies. Initially, Truman tried to tidy up the mess by clarifying and dividing up the jurisdictions. He also established the NSC in 1947 as a vehicle for providing orderly, balanced participation in foreign-policy-making deliberations. Truman tried to weaken the game of bureaucratic politics by strengthening each department head's control over his particular domain and by delegating presidential responsibility to him. New in the office, Truman took special pride in his ability to delegate responsibility and to back up those he trusted. He learned through experience, however, that to delegate too much or to delegate responsibility without providing clear guidance was to jeopardize the performance of his own responsibilities.

When faced with larger policy issues that required the participation of heads of several departments, Truman attempted to deal with them by playing the role of chairman of the board, hearing sundry expert opinions on each aspect of the problem, then making a synthesis of them and announcing the decision. Truman not only accepted the responsibility of making difficult decisions, but he also liked doing so, for it enabled him to satisfy himself—and, he hoped, others—that he had the personal qualities needed in the presidency. His sense of efficacy expressed itself in a willingness to make difficult decisions without experiencing undue stress. A modest man in many ways, Truman adjusted to the awesome responsibilities of the presidency suddenly thrust upon him by respecting the office and determining to become a good role player. By honoring the office and doing credit to it, he would do credit to himself. Included in this role conception was Truman's desire to put aside personal and political considerations as much as possible in the search for quality decisions that were in the national interest. He was willing to accept the political costs both to himself and to his party entailed in making controversial decisions, such as his policy of disengaging the United States from the Chinese Nationalists in 1949, his refusal to escalate the Korean War after the Chinese Communist intervention, his firing of General Douglas MacArthur, and his refusal to dismiss his loyal secretary of state, Dean Acheson, when he came under continuing attack. Truman's variant of




FIGURE 6.2 The Formalistic Model (Truman)

the formalistic model may be depicted, again in simplified terms, as in

Figure 6.2.

Characteristic features of the formalistic model (Truman): (1) specialized information and advice flows to the president from each of his cabinet heads and advisers; (2) the president tends to define the role of each cabinet head as a functional expert on some aspect of national security or foreign policy; each official briefs the president authoritatively on that aspect of a policy problem for which he has jurisdiction; (3) each adviser receives information and advice from his subordinate units; (4) the president does not encourage his advisers to communicate with each other or to engage in joint efforts at policy analysis and problem solving; (5) the president sticks to channels and seldom reaches down to bypass a cabinet head to get independent information/advice from one of his subordinates; and (6) the president takes responsibility for intellectual synthesis of specialized inputs on a policy problem received from advisers.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Dwight D. Eisenhower avoided personal involvement as much as possible in the bureaucratic politics aspects of policymaking within the executive branch and in less savory aspects of politics generally. At the same time, however, Eisenhower recognized that conflict and politics are inevitable and adapted to them by defining his own role as that of someone who could stand "above politics," moderate conflict, and promote unity. In doing so, Eisenhower expressed his special sense of

efficacy that led him (and others) to believe that he could make a distinctive and unique contribution by seeming to remain "above politics" and by emphasizing the shared values and virtues that should guide governmental affairs. This did not prevent him, however, from engaging in political maneuvers of his own when he perceived that his interests required it.⁷

Eisenhower did not attempt (as Nixon would later) to depoliticize and rationalize the formal policymaking process completely. Rather, Eisenhower's variant of the formalistic model encompassed advocacy and disagreement at lower levels of the policymaking system, even though he wanted subordinates eventually to achieve agreement, if possible, on recommendations for his consideration. Moreover, formal meetings of the large NSC were often preceded by less formal "warm-up" sessions with a smaller group of advisers that provided opportunities for genuine policy debate. The conventional depiction of Eisenhower's NSC system as an unimaginative, bureaucratic body laden with the preparation and presentation of cautiously formulated positions, therefore, is not justified.⁸

What these observations about Eisenhower's policy system reveal is that a formalistic management model need not be highly bureaucratized. Examples of the formalistic management model, which always seem bureaucratized on the surface, need to be examined much more closely in order to determine how they actually function. As is well known, policymaking in complex organizations usually proceeds on *two* tracks: the formal, visible, official track and the informal, less visible track. Even the most formalistic of policymaking systems is accompanied by some kind of informal track that is utilized by the participants—including sometimes the president himself—in an attempt to "work with" or "work around" the formal procedures.

In particular, a president's use of surrogates as "chiefs of staff" in a formalistic management model needs close examination to determine to what extent he actually restricts his own involvement in policymaking and remains unaware or uninterested in the important preliminaries of information processing. Thus, in Eisenhower's case, recent archival research reveals that two of his "chiefs of staff"—Governor Sherman Adams and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles—were by no means as powerful as has been thought. "Adams was not the all powerful domestic policy gate-guard he is said to have been. He did




FIGURE 6.3 The Formalistic Model (Eisenhower)

not keep important information from Eisenhower's attention, nor did he make important decisions solo. . . . In the case of Dulles . . . not even the most obsequious Lyndon Johnson courtier could have been more assiduous about testing the waters. . . . Dulles was in touch with the president daily, and was consistently responsive to Eisenhower's directives."⁹

With these important caveats in mind, we can proceed to examine how the visible structure of his formalistic model differed from Truman's. This can be seen by comparing the chart for Truman's system with that for Eisenhower's presented in Figure 6.3.

Characteristic features of the formalistic model (Eisenhower): similar to Truman's variant of the formalistic model with two important exceptions: (1) a "chief of staff" position is created to be utilized, when the president wishes, as a buffer between himself and cabinet heads and to arrange for preparation of formal recommendations to the president (Sherman Adams performed this role for Eisenhower on domestic policy matters; in practice, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles came to assume a similar, though informal, role for Eisenhower in foreign policy, though not in defense matters); and (2) again, unlike Truman's version of the formalistic model, in this one the president attempts to protect himself from being overloaded by urging

advisers/cabinet heads to analyze problems and resolve policy differences whenever possible at lower levels.

John F. Kennedy

John F. Kennedy felt much more at ease with the conflictual aspects of politics and policymaking than his predecessor, his sense of efficacy included confidence in his ability to manage and shape the interpersonal relations of those around him in a constructive fashion, and his cognitive style led him to participate much more actively and directly in the policymaking process than Eisenhower had or Nixon would later on. These personality characteristics contributed to forging a collegial style of policymaking based on teamwork and shared responsibility among talented advisers. Kennedy recognized the value of diversity and give-and-take among advisers, and he encouraged it. But Kennedy stopped well short of the extreme measures for stimulating competition that Roosevelt had employed. Rather than to risk introducing disorder and strife into the policymaking system, Kennedy used other strategies for keeping himself informed, properly advised, and "on top." He did not find personally congenial the highly formal procedures, the large meetings, and the relatively aloof presidential role characteristic of Eisenhower's system. Particularly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy employed a variety of devices for countering the narrowness of perspective of leading members of individual departments and agencies and for protecting himself from the risks of bureaucratic politics. Noteworthy is Kennedy's effort to restructure the roles and broaden the perspectives of top department and agency officials and to introduce a new set of norms to guide their participation in policymaking.

The kind of teamwork and group approach to problem solving that Kennedy strove to create—and achieved with notable success in the Cuban missile crisis at least—is often referred to as the "collegial" model to distinguish it both from the more competitive and the more formal systems of his predecessors. The sharp contrasts between Kennedy's collegial system and the competitive and formalistic models emerge by comparing Figure 6.4 with Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.

Characteristic features of the collegial model (JFK): (1) the president is at the center of a wheel with spokes connecting to individual advisers/cabinet heads; (2) advisers form a "collegial team" and en-




FIGURE 6.4 The Collegial Model (JFK)

gage in group problem-solving; (3) information flows into the collegial team from various points lower in the bureaucracy; (4) advisers do not perform as individual filters to the president; rather, the group of advisers functions as a "debate team" that considers information and policy options from the multiple, conflicting perspectives of the group members in an effort to obtain cross-fertilization and creative problem solving; (5) advisers are encouraged to act as generalists, concerned with all aspects of the policy problem, rather than as experts or functional specialists on only part of the policy problem; (6) discussion procedures are kept informal enough to encourage frank expression of views and judgments and to avoid impediments to in-

formation processing generated by status and power differences among members; and (7) the president occasionally gives overlapping assignments and occasionally reaches down to communicate directly with subordinates of cabinet heads in order to get more information and independent advice.

Richard M. Nixon

Richard Nixon strongly favored a formalistic model. As a number of observers have noted, several of Nixon's well-defined personality characteristics shaped his management style and approach to decisionmaking. During his earlier years, Nixon had developed a cognitive style that enabled him to cope with deeply rooted personal insecurities by adopting an extremely conscientious approach to decisionmaking. As described so well in his book *Six Crises*, the whole business of acquiring information, weighing alternatives, and deciding among them was, for Nixon, extremely stressful, requiring great self-control, hard work, and reliance upon himself. Dealing with difficult situations posed the necessity but also offered an opportunity for Nixon to prove himself over and over again. He experienced his greatest sense of self and of his efficacy when he had to confront and master difficult situations in which a great deal was at stake.¹⁰

Nixon's pronounced sense of aloneness and privacy, his thin-skinned sensitivity and vulnerability were not conducive to developing the kind of interpersonal relationships associated with a collegial model of management. Rather, as Richard T. Johnson notes, "Nixon, the private man with a preference for working alone, wanted machinery to staff out the options but provide plenty of time for reflection. . . . Similarly, "with his penchant for order," Nixon inevitably "favored men who offered order," who acceded to his demand for loyalty and shared his sense of banding together to help him cope with a hostile environment.¹¹

Nixon's preference for a highly formalistic system was reinforced by other personality characteristics. He was an extreme "conflict avoider"; somewhat paradoxically, although Nixon was quite at home with political conflict in the broader public arena, he had a pronounced distaste for being exposed to it face-to-face. Early in his administration, Nixon tried a version of multiple advocacy in which leading advisers would debate issues in his presence. But he quickly abandoned the experi-

ment and turned to structuring his staff to avoid overt manifestations of disagreement and to avoid being personally drawn into the squabbles of his staff.¹² Hence Nixon's need for a few staff aides immediately around him who were to serve as buffers and enable him to distance himself from the wear and tear of policymaking.

It is interesting that Eisenhower's "chief of staff" concept was carried much further in Nixon's variant of the formalistic model. The foreign-policymaking system that Henry Kissinger, the special assistant for national security affairs, developed during the first year of Nixon's administration is generally regarded as by far the most centralized and highly structured model yet employed by any president.¹³ Nixon was determined even more than Eisenhower had been to abolish bureaucratic and cabinet politics as completely as possible; but, more so than Eisenhower, Nixon also wanted to enhance and protect his personal control over high policy. To this end, a novel system of six special committees was set up operating out of the NSC, each of which was chaired by Kissinger. These included the Vietnam Special Studies Group, the Washington Special Actions Group (to deal with international crises), the Defense Programs Review Committee, the Verification Panel (to deal with strategic arms talks), the 40 Committee (to deal with covert actions), and the Senior Review Group (which dealt with all other types of policy issues).

Reporting to the Senior Review Group were six lower-level interdepartmental groups that were set up on a regional or functional basis (Middle East, Far East, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and Political-Military Affairs), each of which was headed by an assistant secretary of state. In addition, Kissinger could set up ad hoc working groups composed of specialists from various agencies and run by his own top staff aides.

Thus, not only did Kissinger's committee structure reach down into the departments and agencies, absorbing key personnel into various committees controlled by Kissinger or his staff aides, but also other committees that were created on an interdepartmental basis through chaired by assistant secretaries of state were given their assignments by Kissinger and reported to the Senior Review Group chaired by Kissinger. As a result, a novel, unconventional policymaking structure was created and superimposed upon the departments and largely superseded the traditional hierarchical policymaking system. Striking differences with Eisenhower's formalistic model can be noted (see Figure 6.5).




FIGURE 6.5 The Formalistic Model (Nixon)

Jimmy Carter

Comparing Jimmy Carter's publicly stated intentions with the evolution of his foreign policy management system during his four years in office yields somewhat ironic conclusions. Carter entered office with professed commitments to "cabinet government," intending to downgrade the role of national security adviser and to center foreign-policy-

making in the State Department.¹⁴ He left office with a significantly formalized system that had evolved into one of the most White House-centered in modern history.¹⁵

Carter's management style embraced distinctive elements of both the collegial and the formalistic models. As one observer noted, Carter's national security policymaking system "is an amalgamation selectively drawn from the experiences of his predecessors."¹⁶ Like Kennedy, Carter initially resisted a "chief of staff" system for organizing his work and contacts with others.¹⁷ Carter's preference was a communications structure in the wheel configuration with himself at the hub, affording maximal opportunity for direct contact with officials and advisers. This was in part a post-Watergate reaction to Nixon's tightly hierarchical management system. Again like Kennedy (and Roosevelt), Carter wished to be actively involved in the policymaking process and at earlier stages, before the system had produced options or a single recommended policy for his consideration.¹⁸

At the same time, Carter differed from Kennedy in preferring a formally structured NSC system and retaining elements of the "formal options" system developed by Kissinger for Nixon.¹⁹ Carter gradually restored the prestige of the NSC staff after the brief eclipse that occurred during the Gerald Ford administration when Kissinger was secretary of state, and he relied increasingly on its studies for help in making decisions.²⁰ Carter's preference for underpinning the collegial features of his management model with formalistic structure and procedures is not surprising given his naval training and experience as an engineer.²¹

In his somewhat technocratic approach to policymaking, experts and orderly study procedures played an essential role, and so the features of the collegial model that he valued had necessarily to be blended somehow with features of a formalistic model.²² In this mixed system, policymaking was not meant to be as highly centralized as in the Nixon administration. Carter not only allowed relatively liberal access to the Oval Office but also maintained a more decentralized advisory system than Nixon had. This reflected not only his personality and management style but also the lessons that he and others drew from the experience of his predecessors. He was determined not to become isolated in the White House.

One of Carter's main concerns at the outset was to set up his foreign policy machinery in a way that would avoid the extreme centraliza-

Spikes
the
above

and
formal

tion of power that Kissinger, as special assistant for national security affairs, had acquired during Nixon's first term and that led him to replace for all practical purposes the secretary of state. In Carter's administration, the special assistant (Zbigniew Brzezinski) was not meant to become as powerful or as public a figure as Kissinger had been. Instead Brzezinski was intended to be a behind-the-scenes source of intellectual insight, creativity, and a comprehensive strategic perspective.²³

Carter's intention was for his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, to be his chief diplomat and leading foreign policy spokesman and to be a key adviser.²⁴ In particular, Carter expected Vance to be a strong manager and team player who would not challenge the president's ambition to call the shots in the foreign policy realm. Despite some qualms, Carter apparently intended to rely on the State Department to play an important role in policy preparation.²⁵ In line with this concept and his general preference for organizational austerity, the number of committees in the NSC staff was reduced from what they had been in Nixon's administration, and Brzezinski did not chair all of the NSC committees as Kissinger had.²⁶ However, the committee he did chair, the Special Coordination Committee (SCC), over time became increasingly important at the expense of an alternative body, the Policy Review Committee (PRC), which was chaired at the cabinet secretary level.²⁷

In his attempt to inhibit the special assistant from becoming the dominant actor in the system and a virtual "chief of staff,"²⁸ Carter planned to rely on collegiality among his principal national security advisers—the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the special assistant, and the vice president—to achieve the necessary interaction and coordination.²⁹ Accordingly, the NSC organization under Carter was designed to be more modest than Nixon's in centrality, structure, staffing, and operations.

Although Carter's choice of organizational model was in part a response to the experiences of his predecessors, both his choice of this system and the functioning of the system in practice were also shaped to a considerable extent by his personality. Carter brought with him to the White House a cognitive style and sense of personal efficacy that gave him confidence in the possibility of mastering difficult problems and of finding comprehensive solutions for them.³⁰ This orientation was reflected, for example, in Carter's attraction to the idea of zero-based budgeting.³¹ The realm of foreign policy was no exception.³²

Ironically, this same sense of confidence may have inhibited Carter's ability to make best use of the advisory system he created. Several observers have noted that Carter exhibited an active leadership style in meetings that seemed designed to demonstrate his own mastery of the subject matter rather than to draw out the views of his colleagues.³³ This may also have encouraged anticipatory compliance on the part of cabinet members and aides. As Hamilton Jordan informed Carter in March 1980: "*A great premium is placed upon anticipating what you want instead of providing you with frank and hard analysis.*"³⁴ Furthermore, it has been suggested that Carter had great difficulty in accepting criticism from others and admitting his own mistakes, which may have inhibited him from learning from experience.³⁵

Carter's legendary appetite for written material initially aroused the approval of many observers.³⁶ However, this trait also had a downside that gradually became apparent.³⁷ Overloaded with detail that consumed time that might otherwise have been devoted to strategic reflection, Carter had a tendency to lose sight of the forest for the trees. According to C. Campbell, "He brought to his work a ponderous style that tended to ritualize consultation and caused him to devour factual information."³⁸ Attempts by aides to reduce Carter's reading burden met with resistance. Brzezinski writes, "Whenever I tried to relieve him of excessive detail, Carter would show real uneasiness, and I even felt some suspicion, that I was usurping his authority."³⁹

Despite public perceptions of a warm and extroverted personality, some insiders suggest that Carter tended to be rather shy and conflict averse on an interpersonal level.⁴⁰ According to Bob Berglund (Carter's secretary of agriculture), Carter "didn't really like to mix it up in a meeting. He didn't like to debate or listen to arguments; he was very uncomfortable in that area."⁴¹ Other observers note that Carter was particularly conflict averse regarding aides with whom he was personally unfamiliar and suggest that he was reluctant to sanction aides who did not perform well.⁴²

This trait could help to explain why Carter, like Nixon, apparently preferred many policy conflicts to be spelled out on paper rather than in oral deliberations. However, other commentators concede that Carter was somewhat averse to intense personalized conflict but argue that he enjoyed the give-and-take of substantive debate among his advisers. In fact, according to A. Moens, Carter actually encouraged competitive behavior in his aides and cabinet members in order to widen

his information base for policymaking.⁴³ Carter himself subsequently claimed: "The different strengths of Brzezinski and Vance matched the roles they played and also permitted the natural competition between the two organizations to stay alive. I appreciated those differences. In making the final decisions on foreign policy, I needed to weigh as many points of view as possible."⁴⁴

How then did the system that Jimmy Carter created function in practice, and what attempts were made to adjust the system during the course of his term? Although Carter did succeed to some extent in avoiding a highly centralized, "closed" system of foreign-policy-making, it must also be said that he was much less successful in avoiding the potential difficulties of the mixed formalistic-collegial model that he created. A number of weaknesses quickly became evident in the Carter system that seriously affected its performance. The collegial model requires close contact and continuing interaction between the president, his secretary of state, and the special adviser. A considerable degree of contact and sustained interaction among these officials were sustained during much of the Carter administration, through a wide range of official and unofficial forums for consultation.⁴⁵

However, their respective roles remained highly fluid and were not well defined.⁴⁶ For example, no clear arrangement for policy specialization and division of labor was maintained among these three principals. In contrast, the secretary of defense's role appears to have been more clearly defined; his participation in policymaking was noticeably less prone to responsibility conflicts with others.⁴⁷ In the absence of role definition and specialization, all three—the president, his secretary of state, and the special adviser—could and often did take an active posture in any important policy problem. A shared interest in major policy problems is to be expected in a collegial system, but some understandings must also be developed to regulate initiative, consultation, the articulation of disagreements, formulation of collective judgments, and relations with the mass media. Carter evidently counted on the fact that the three men knew and respected one another prior to his election to the presidency to make his collegial approach work. And, to be sure, for a time it seemed that the three men got along well. Yet more than a facade of cordiality is needed for effective policymaking in a collegial system.

Collegiality entails certain risks, and its preservation may exact a price. The evidence indicates that the preservation of cordiality in the early pe-

riod of the Carter administration was accompanied by a perhaps partly unconscious tendency to subordinate disagreements over policy among the three men that should have been articulated, confronted, and dealt with in a timely fashion.⁴⁸ Carter may have contributed to this tendency to seek concurrence by reacting negatively to diversity in his briefing materials during the first six weeks of his administration.⁴⁹

Another source of difficulties was Carter himself. He had a habit of suddenly taking the initiative or intervening in an important foreign policy matter, as in the case of his human rights initiative and the neutron bomb controversy,⁵⁰ leaving Vance and Brzezinski with the embarrassing and difficult task of making the best of it or of trying to modify the policy. Carter's colleagues and aides were greatly frustrated by their inability to curb this tendency to take over important matters, which also tended to deny them an adequate opportunity to advise Carter beforehand. According to Brzezinski's account, "At times, Carter's impatience produced circumstances in which he would make decisions ahead of the NSC coordinating process, prompting me to complain to him."⁵¹

Carter's style tended to leave the decisionmaking process open and the degree of policy maturity unclear. Closure became difficult to achieve as advocates were not provided with clear signals as to when to break off their advocacy on particular issues. According to Brzezinski, Carter was at times "like a sculptor who did not know when to throw away his chisel."⁵²

Another weakness of Carter's system quickly developed and proved difficult to cope with. Foreign policy became badly fragmented in the first year of Carter's administration. The hybrid system "put a heavy burden on the president's time and attention and called for unusual interpersonal skills, which Carter was unable to provide, in mediating differences and maintaining teamwork."⁵³ The situation was characterized by: (1) overactivism—the floating of many specific policy initiatives within a relatively short period of time; (2) a tendency to initiate attractive, desirable policies without sufficient attention to their feasibility; (3) poor conceptualization of overall foreign policy and, related to this, a failure to recognize that individual policies conflicted with each other; (4) a poor sense of strategy and tactics; (5) a badly designed and managed policymaking system.⁵⁴

These flaws cannot be attributed merely or even primarily to Carter's inexperience in foreign policy.⁵⁵ After all, his administration

included various high-level officials with considerable expertise and experience in foreign-policy-making. Part of the explanation has to do with important aspects of his personality, which may well seem attractive in and of themselves. Carter is a man of high moral principles, as exemplified by his sincere commitment to human rights.⁵⁶ He wanted to imbue U.S. foreign policy with renewed moral purpose; he was an activist in this respect and took genuine pleasure in his administration's ability to launch so many worthwhile policy initiatives so quickly—and he could see no harm in pushing ahead simultaneously with so many good initiatives.

What was needed to safeguard against an overloading of the foreign policy agenda and the fragmentation of foreign policy was a strong policy planning and coordinating mechanism, one that would alert Carter to this problem and assist him in dealing with difficult trade-offs among conflicting policy initiatives by establishing priorities and generally better integrating the various strands of foreign policy. Such a policy planning and coordinating mechanism, however, was lacking. The need to develop it somehow fell between the two pillars of Carter's mixed collegial-formalistic model. Neither the formalistic nor the collegial components of Carter's system provided the necessary planning/coordinating mechanisms and procedures.

An increasingly significant problem during the latter two-thirds of the administration was that Vance and Brzezinski did develop important disagreements over policy, particularly on matters having to do with assessment of Soviet intentions and strategy and tactics for dealing with the Soviet Union. The effort to preserve collegiality in the first eighteen months of the administration led both men to paper over their disagreements and to avoid the difficult but necessary task of coming to grips with these fundamental policy questions. But these matters could not be avoided indefinitely, and after jockeying and competing with each other to influence Carter's position, first one way and then the other, the controversy between Vance and Brzezinski spilled out into the open. Brzezinski began speaking out aggressively to undermine the positions taken by the secretary of state. Among other things, Brzezinski wanted the administration to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict, to "play the China card," in order to exert pressure on the Soviets. Vance opposed this effectively for some time. But Brzezinski continued his efforts and was successful in obtaining the president's approval for his trip to China. The special assistant's outspoken

disagreements with the secretary of state became so damaging that Vance finally went to the president in the summer of 1978 and prevailed upon him to restrain Brzezinski from airing his disagreements publicly. This situation resulted in Brzezinski's adopting a somewhat lower public profile for a time.⁵⁷

Yet a combination of institutional arrangements, personal chemistry, and the developing political context conspired to keep Brzezinski's star on the rise. The configuration of world events, especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the shah of Iran, tended to strengthen the hawkish Brzezinski's hand at the more dovish Vance's expense. Similarly, these situations kept the administration in a semi-permanent crisis mode during its final two years, which pushed formal interagency coordination toward the NSC's SCC, chaired by none other than Brzezinski. Buttressed by his positive personal relationship with Carter, Brzezinski became increasingly assertive, manipulating the process in order to pursue his policy agenda.⁵⁸

The conflict between Vance and Brzezinski ultimately came to a head as a result of the April 1980 decision to attempt a military rescue of the American hostages being held in Iran. The preliminary deliberations were held in Vance's absence, leading to a provisional decision by Carter to go ahead with the mission. Upon his return, Vance was granted an opportunity to present his case at a formal NSC meeting. In spite of Vance's pleas, Carter decided to go ahead with the ill-fated mission, a decision that prompted Vance to resign in protest.⁵⁹ Carter promptly appointed Senator Edmund Muskie as his replacement, primarily on the basis of his usefulness as a foreign policy spokesman. Muskie was unable to challenge seriously Brzezinski's position in the waning months of the administration.⁶⁰

There were other weaknesses in the management of Carter's foreign policy system. Under Brzezinski as special assistant, and given the character of his staff, the NSC did not function effectively in coordinating the various strands of foreign policy and helping Carter with his difficult task of managing the various contradictions and trade-offs between different foreign policy objectives. Neither Brzezinski himself nor his deputy, David Aaron (who apparently was selected in part for his ties to Vice President Walter Mondale), earned reputations for being good administrators or for defining their roles as high-level staff rather than as activists in making policy.⁶¹ In fact, both were much more interested in influencing policy than in managing the policy-

making process in a neutral, efficient manner. Moreover, many of the people Brzezinski brought onto the NSC staff to work with him were also eager to influence policy as best they could from the vantage point of the White House.

As a result, the fragmentation of foreign policy at the conceptual level,⁶² to which many critics have called attention, was reinforced by the administration's failure to develop an effective central coordinating mechanism for the organization and management of the policy-making process.⁶³ In an attempt to cope with these problems in mid-stream, Carter turned to the creation of special task forces for each major policy issue in order to centralize authority in the White House and to improve coordination of agency and departmental officials on behalf of presidential policy. Following the successful use of ad hoc task forces to direct efforts to secure ratification of the Panama Canal treaty and to deal with other major issues, in late 1978 Carter established an executive committee headed by Vice President Mondale to be responsible for dealing with the president's agenda and priorities. The committee endorsed a plan for forming task forces for all major presidential issues for 1979. Task forces were established on a dozen issues of high priority, including domestic as well as foreign policy issues.

Ronald Reagan

Delving into foreign policy management during the Ronald Reagan administration reveals a turbulent image of a system in search of a stable personnel mix and organizational equilibrium that would take more than six years and a major foreign policy scandal to achieve. During those six years the system was relatively decentralized, unmanaged, and characterized by chronic and exhausting extremes of personal, ideological, and bureaucratic conflict. These conditions generated an unusually high degree of senior staff turnover. In the course of an eight-year term Reagan appointed two secretaries of state, two secretaries of defense, and six national security advisers—a record indicative of serious difficulties in establishing and maintaining a sound foreign-policy-making system.

Mindful of and wishing to distance himself from the precedent of the turbulent latter years of the Carter administration, Reagan wished to significantly modify the structure of the policymaking system. Even

before taking office he indicated that he would reduce the scope and functions of the office of the adviser for national security affairs (NSA) in order to avoid a repetition of the damaging competitive relationship that had developed between Brzezinski and Vance in the Carter administration. Instead, he embraced the ideal of a State Department-centered foreign-policy-making system, trusting that coordination could be achieved through collegiality among his cabinet secretaries and through the good offices of a significantly downgraded national security adviser.⁶⁴ Thus Reagan proposed a synthesis of the formalistic and collegial models.⁶⁵

It is fair to say that this model did affect Reagan's appointments and initial allocations of responsibility. Reagan selected Richard Allen as national security adviser, a minor figure who had served briefly on the Kissinger NSC staff. Reagan sharply reduced Allen's access and policymaking prerogatives, directing him to focus on the task of policy coordination and to refrain from taking part in public diplomacy, policy advocacy, and operational matters. Allen was directed to report to the president via Edwin Meese III. Meese, a Reagan crony who, though lacking experience in foreign policy, had had a brief career spanning both domestic and foreign policy, was one of a "troika" of White House officials who would collectively (and by most accounts effectively) enact the chief of staff role during Reagan's first term.⁶⁶

For secretary of state, Reagan chose General Alexander Haig, another and more prominent veteran of the Nixon administration, where he had served as Kissinger's deputy and briefly as White House chief of staff.⁶⁷ Haig was promised the prime role in the foreign-policy-making process and the privilege of being chief foreign policy spokesman for the administration.⁶⁸ The secretary of defense post went to Caspar Weinberger, a longtime Washington hand and political ally of the president, known for his conservatism and his hawkish views. Reagan tapped William Casey—who had served in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II—for the CIA directorship, taking the relatively unusual step of granting Casey cabinet rank, a tacit indication that Reagan had an important role in mind for the agency.⁶⁹

Let us now turn our attention to the man who made these initial choices and set the stage for what would be an eight-year administration. Reagan's relatively unusual cognitive style is deserving of comment as it affected both his choice of management model and, subsequently, the functioning of that system. As depicted by several of his

Review
10/15/12

most authoritative biographers and former associates, Reagan comes across as both intelligent and intellectually lazy.⁷⁰ He was often impatient with detailed presentation of policy material. He preferred oral briefings, briefing films, and "mini-memos" to reading lengthy reports. These preferences and characteristics contrast vividly with Carter's insatiable appetite for reading and tendency to immerse himself in the details of policy problems. Despite much publicity regarding memory lapses, Reagan apparently could demonstrate a remarkable ability to absorb orally presented material.⁷¹

Often described as "incurious," Reagan tended to be strikingly passive in information acquisition.⁷² He generally asked few questions in deliberations. This passivity extended to consideration of policy options. Reagan generally accepted the options laid out by his advisers as given. Unlike Eisenhower, he rarely attempted to reshape options himself or question the way in which problems were framed.⁷³ Reagan was typically decisive when presented with clear choices, especially when they could be based on the bedrock of his convictions. Yet it seems that value conflicts raised by such choices tended to be suppressed and ignored rather than rigorously explored and resolved.⁷⁴

One insightful biographer suggests that Reagan's mode of thought was more narrative than analytical, his cognitive processes driven by experience, stories, and analogy rather than deductive logic.⁷⁵ Furthermore, he allegedly tended to be rather unselective and uncritical regarding the sources of the information on which he relied, making him vulnerable "to arguments short on facts and long on theatrical gimmicks." That account reports that Reagan exhibited a credulity bordering at times on gullibility.⁷⁶

Assessing Reagan's own sense of personal efficacy and competence is not an easy task. He appeared generally to enjoy the presidency, mastering the public aspects of the role to an extent unmatched by his recent peers. He drew great satisfaction from the positive response of his audiences. He was confident and active in his relationship with Congress, recalling Lyndon Johnson in his skill at face-to-face persuasion. Reagan has often been described as comfortable with decision.⁷⁷ In congressional testimony in 1987, George P. Shultz described Reagan as follows: "He is comfortable with himself. He is decisive, he steps up to things, and when he decides, he stays with it. And sometimes you wish he wouldn't, but anyway he does. He is very decisive and he's

very strong."⁷⁸ Reagan possessed a set of core convictions that often enabled him to be decisive, even without having mastered the nuts and bolts of an issue.⁷⁹

Yet, where those convictions were unable to provide guidance, Reagan could find himself confused and tentative. An astute observer suggests that: "The paradox of the Reagan presidency was that it depended entirely on Reagan for its ideological inspiration while he depended upon others for all aspects of governance except his core ideas and his powerful performances. In the many arenas of the office where ideology did not apply or the performances had no bearing, Reagan was at a loss."⁸⁰ Some commentators have focused on Reagan's limited experience in foreign affairs and apparent lack of motivation to take active steps to educate himself once in office.⁸¹ It is possible that his sense of personal efficacy was somewhat diminished in this area, particularly early in his tenure when he focused much of his attention on his domestic agenda.

As a manager, Reagan was confident about his ability to pick people, set broad objectives, and delegate authority.⁸² However, when this broad strategy ran into trouble he was quite reluctant about resorting to more hands-on types of management. In fact, he was so tentative that his management style could be characterized fairly as benign neglect, leaving colleagues frustrated at his reluctance to take steps to deal with personnel and organizational problems.⁸³

Some of this tentativeness was probably the result of Reagan's attitude toward interpersonal conflict. According to a number of commentators, Reagan had a low tolerance for conflict among his cabinet and staff members and hated confrontations.⁸⁴ He would go to great lengths to avoid conflict and try to develop a consensus, thus giving dissenters considerable leverage. When confronted with serious differences of opinion among his advisers, he often tried to split the difference in order to avoid offending anyone. This often produced delay in policy formulation and a susceptibility to unhappy and unstable compromise policies.⁸⁵ Reagan hated to fire people and preferred to let staff handle such unpleasant situations. In keeping with his distaste for confrontation, Reagan rarely made decisions on contested matters in meetings. He preferred to listen to the opposing views and make the decisions subsequently in private. In this he resembled Nixon. Perhaps in part because of his aversion to confrontation and his general tentativeness on issues

where his ideological impulses were conflicted or inapplicable, Reagan was allegedly vulnerable to being persuaded by the last adviser to have spoken with him alone before he made major decision.⁸⁶

Reagan's personal relationship to his advisers and staff is also worthy of note. On the one hand, Reagan possessed a surface-level warmth, chronic good humor, and a personal charisma that tended to inspire loyalty in his aides (and support from the general public). He could exhibit a genuine, though often fleeting empathy that was triggered, for example, in spontaneous personal encounters with others in dire straits. However, many observers suggest that these qualities masked a fundamental detachment from those around him.

While his style made him heavily dependent on his staff, Reagan apparently was not fully conscious of this dependence and tended to take his people for granted. In contrast to George Bush, who was highly solicitous of his colleagues and staff, Reagan came across as relatively self-absorbed, "unthoughtful" and oblivious to the personal needs and predicaments of those around him. This quality appears to have had a corrosive quality on loyalty to the president and on staff morale in general, contributing to the high turnover rate among senior staffers and officials.⁸⁷

Given this institutional design and this cast of characters, how did the system function in practice?⁸⁸ Despite Reagan's call for collegiality, serious conflict emerged in the system almost immediately as a result of personal and political rivalries. Secretary of State Haig's undisguised presidential ambitions (he had tested the waters in the early stages of the 1980 contest for the Republican nomination) could hardly have encouraged a benign view among the Meese-Deaver-Baker troika on the wisdom of allowing the secretary to place himself squarely astride the foreign-policy-making system in a way that might have overshadowed the White House. In the months that followed the inauguration, indications of conflict between Haig and Allen and their staffs began to appear in the media.⁸⁹

That conflict should develop among Reagan's foreign policy team was not surprising or unexpected. Reagan had entered the White House without a well-developed set of position papers on security matters and foreign policy, which candidates for the presidency usually prepare during their campaigns. Indeed, his campaign advisers had decided not to attempt to articulate specific positions in order not to expose the latent disagreements among his supporters. While all his

major foreign policy and security advisers shared the general view that a "tougher" posture toward the Soviet Union should be adopted and that U.S. military capabilities should be "strengthened," this so-called consensus was a shallow one, papering over major disagreements concerning the specific strategies and policies that should be adopted. Inevitably, therefore, intense competition set in among different factions within Reagan's administration to shape and control specific policies, a struggle that was to prove time consuming and costly.⁹⁰ This conflict rapidly reached levels of intensity that undermined rather than invigorated the policymaking process.

The administration soon became vulnerable to criticism that it was slow in formulating policy on key defense and diplomatic issues and lacked a coherent, consistent foreign policy. Though Haig was initially anointed by Reagan as his leading foreign policy adviser—his "vicar of foreign policy," as Haig referred to himself—the secretary of state found it difficult to take firm hold of the fragmented foreign policy apparatus. Operating from the State Department, Haig lacked the advantages that a position in the White House would have provided, and he could not count on its firm, consistent support. Haig's own more moderate foreign policy views and some of his early appointments to positions of influence in the department marked him in the eyes of those whose views were to the right of his in the Reagan entourage, in Congress, and among attentive opinion leaders. Secretary of Defense Weinberger and several of his associates in the Department of Defense were prominent members of this camp.

Even if Allen had been neutral in the policy competition that increasingly developed between Weinberger and Haig, he was ill equipped to play a role in the top-level foreign policy management system. Allen's office had been so downgraded in importance that he did not have direct access to the president as had his predecessors in previous administrations. With the passage of time it became increasingly evident that the task of coordinating the policymaking process at the White House level could not be managed effectively through the existing organizational arrangements. Visible evidence of feuding among leading foreign policy advisers damaged Reagan's standing at home and abroad.

Reagan himself contributed to the disappointing performance of his foreign-policy-making system during his first year in office. Not only did he attempt to delegate much of the foreign-policy-making burden

to Haig and his other associates (reminiscent of the heavy delegation of responsibility to subordinates that he had displayed as governor of California), but also he was relatively uninterested in foreign policy and gave higher priority during the first year and a half of his presidency to his economic policies. As we have already noted, Reagan counted on collegiality among his top-level advisers to smooth the working of his administration. But though collegiality was preserved and indeed played an important role in the workings of the inner White House circle composed of Meese, Deaver, and Baker, it did not spread outward to lubricate the interactions of the principal advisers in the foreign-policy-making system—Haig, Weinberger, and Allen.

What emerged, therefore, was not a well-designed, smoothly working system that, while centered in a strong secretary of state, was complemented by additional high-level coordination and linkage to the president himself through the national security adviser. Rather, it was a fragmented, competitive, inadequately managed system in which distrust was ever present and which gave rise repeatedly to damaging intra-administration conflicts over policy.⁹¹ Franklin Roosevelt's competitive system was designed to bring important issues up to the presidential level and to improve the quality of information and advice available to a president who was interested and actively involved in making the important decisions. In contrast, the competitive-conflictual features of Reagan's foreign policy machinery were the consequences of a poorly structured and inadequately managed system, one that did not engage the president's attention except sporadically, when international developments or intra-administration conflicts required his personal attention.

To his credit and that of his leading advisers, Reagan recognized well before the end of his first year in office that his foreign-policy-making system was not working and that it required reorganization and change of personnel. Early in 1982 Allen was replaced by William Clark, a close friend of Reagan and a former California Supreme Court justice whose foreign policy background consisted exclusively of a brief period as undersecretary of state under Haig.⁹² In addition, Reagan now strengthened the position of the national security adviser; Clark would henceforth deal directly with the president on a daily basis and no longer report to Meese. A determined effort was made to enable Clark to discharge more effectively the traditional role of customer-manager of the system.

During the first half of 1982 relations between Haig and Clark developed with a minimum of friction. Behind the scenes, however, lay still unresolved questions between the White House and the State Department as to the direction and control of foreign policy, a situation that was exacerbated by the clash of styles and personalities. With Secretary of State Haig's resignation in June 1982, it became evident that the new policy machinery created by the strengthening of the role of the adviser for national security affairs had not stabilized itself sufficiently to cope with new stresses that developed in connection with the president's trip to Europe and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, both of which occurred in June.

Thus, less than eighteen months after his inauguration, President Reagan was forced to replace both his national security adviser and his secretary of state, an unprecedented admission of failure to develop an effective foreign-policy-making system.

Insofar as personality clashes and differences of style had contributed to Haig's departure, there was every reason to expect that these impediments would disappear with the choice of George Shultz as his replacement. What was also clear by mid-1982 was that Reagan had significantly modified his initial preference for a State Department-centered foreign-policy-making system. Thus Shultz would not have the luxury of starting out as the anointed *primus inter pares* among Reagan's foreign policy advisers. Instead, he would have to seek a *modus vivendi* with the other advisers and the confidence of the president.

By October 1983 Clark, weary of the travails of the job of national security adviser, seized an opportunity to move into a cabinet post as secretary of the interior and was replaced by his deputy, Robert McFarlane.⁹³ Like Allen, McFarlane had previously served as an aide to Kissinger, whom he reportedly saw as a worthy role model.⁹⁴ However, it should be said that during the two years that McFarlane served as national security adviser, he gradually consolidated his position and performed the difficult task of mediating major policy conflicts between State and Defense with increasing effectiveness. McFarlane also made important progress in gaining the president's trust and his ear, and he moved in a slow but purposeful way to enhance his own power and prestige.⁹⁵

However, McFarlane found himself increasingly frustrated during the first year of Reagan's second term by the changes in White House

operations introduced by Donald T. Regan, who replaced James Baker as chief of staff after the election. Just when he was needed most to follow up on the opportunities created by the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting at Reykjavik in November 1985, McFarlane could put up with the frustrations of his position no longer, and he resigned. He was replaced by his deputy, Vice Admiral John Poindexter, a person who clearly lacked the broad experience, political sophistication, and reputation needed to cope with the difficult tasks that had faced all his predecessors in the position of national security adviser to President Reagan.

Before proceeding to note Poindexter's fate, let us make some additional observations regarding the weakness and vulnerability of Reagan's management style. The formalistic chief of staff model that Reagan adopted to structure the White House policymaking system differed in important respects from that of Eisenhower. While Eisenhower gave considerable prominence to the formal NSC system and to the role of his secretary of state in foreign policy, in practice he exercised quiet but firm leadership to ensure that the formal machinery and his cabinet officers were responsive to his own policy views and judgments on major issues. In striking contrast, Reagan distanced himself to a surprising and dangerous degree from both the substance and the process of foreign-policymaking. Unlike Reagan, Eisenhower defined the role of his national security adviser in such a way as to complement his own leadership role and style, and this enabled the special assistant to serve as an effective "custodian-manager" of the system. The result was that Eisenhower's White House achieved reasonably effective interagency coordination of policy with State, Defense, and other agencies. In contrast, in his first six years in office Reagan failed to develop a model of how the national security adviser, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense should work together to complement and compensate for, rather than to exacerbate the risks inherent in, his own modest involvement in foreign-policymaking. Moreover, Reagan's penchant for delegating responsibility to trusted advisers, a practice that had served him reasonably well in his first term, created substantial new problems when he replaced James Baker, a skillful and sophisticated political operator, with Donald Regan as chief of staff.⁹⁶

Nonetheless, in his first five years in office, despite the forced resignation of one secretary of state and a succession of four national security advisers, Reagan's extraordinary personal popularity and his

presidency remained unscathed, and he retained the possibility of finishing his second term with a defensible record in foreign policy. All this was placed in jeopardy with the revelation in the winter of 1986-1987 that the White House had been utilizing elements of the NSC staff to sell arms covertly to Iran in order to facilitate the release of American hostages in Lebanon, and that some of the proceeds of these sales were being diverted to the *contras* in Central America. National Security Adviser Admiral Poindexter and his subordinate Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, who together had orchestrated the covert activities, were quickly relieved of their duties. As details of the Iran-Contra affair emerged, attention quickly focused on the glaring weakness of Reagan's management style and the gross inadequacies of his foreign-policymaking system. These criticisms were sharply stated and documented in the report of the Tower Commission, which the president had appointed and charged with bringing out all the facts of the Iran-Contra scandal and with making recommendations for improving the NSC system.⁹⁷

Even before the Tower Commission issued its report, the president appointed Frank Carlucci, a person of stature and high-level government experience (most recently as deputy secretary of defense during 1981 and 1982), to replace Admiral Poindexter in late 1986.⁹⁸ The new national security adviser moved quickly to reorganize the staff and to replace many of its personnel. Ably assisting in this reform process was the newly appointed deputy national security adviser, Lieutenant General Colin Powell.⁹⁹

Another casualty was Reagan's White House chief of staff, Donald Regan, who had assumed that position after the president's reelection. Regan's style and performance had been the object of considerable criticism even before the Iran-Contra scandal. Though not centrally implicated, Regan was damaged by the affair, and the president reluctantly removed him shortly after the Tower Commission issued its report. CIA director William Casey might well have had to resign also were it not for his removal from the scene by a severe and ultimately fatal illness before all the facts regarding his involvement emerged.

Regan's replacement, former Senator Howard Baker, was widely regarded as an excellent choice for the position. Together with Frank Carlucci, Baker contributed to restoring confidence in the operations of the White House staff. The president himself emerged from a period of semi-seclusion and struggled to reassert his leadership. At the pres-

ident's order, and with Carlucci's assent, the NSC staff was directed to end its direct involvement in covert operations.¹⁰⁰

Yet this is not to say that Carlucci intended to accept a drastically diminished role for the national security adviser and his staff. Carlucci envisioned combining a prioritized custodian-manager role with the provision of policy advice:

My first responsibility is to be an honest broker. . . . Now, what right do I have to offer personal advice to the president? The president has every right to say to his staff: "What do *you* think I ought to do?" . . . There is nothing in the constitution or in any statute which says that the national security adviser or the staff cannot give the president independent advice if the president asks for it.¹⁰¹

Carlucci's NSC staff also retained an operative role with regard to so-called "special missions," which would come to include even a Carlucci visit to the Nicaraguan *contras*.¹⁰² Similarly, the NSC staff continued to operate back channels to communicate with the Soviets.

Some significant friction between Carlucci and Shultz would emerge by mid-1987 over such matters. Shultz also objected to what he perceived as Carlucci's bid to use the recommendations of the Tower Commission to strengthen the national security adviser's policy coordination role via a radical restructuring of the decisionmaking process in a document entitled NSDD 276. It was ultimately approved over Shultz's objections.¹⁰³ Furthermore, the long-standing conflict between Shultz and Weinberger over arms control and the U.S.-Soviet relationship continued to hamper policymaking in that area.

By the autumn of 1987 an arms control agreement on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) appeared to be in sight. Growing cooperation between Shultz and Carlucci and the president's growing confidence in Gorbachev and desire for an agreement left Weinberger out in the cold. Citing the ill health of his wife, Weinberger announced his resignation in October. Weinberger's departure triggered a major reshuffling of the national security team. Carlucci was given the defense portfolio and Colin Powell (who had developed a solid working relationship with Shultz) was promoted to national security adviser.

These moves ushered in a period of collegiality that would last through the end of the administration. Weinberger's departure put an end to the ideological and personal polarization that had weakened the administration's foreign-policy-making for almost seven years.

Furthermore, Colin Powell defined his national security adviser's role as serving "all of the NSC principals, not just the president."¹⁰⁴ Powell thus placed a heavy emphasis on maintaining collegiality: "By early 1988, national security assistant Powell was hosting intimate, 7:00 A.M. sessions every weekday morning in his White House office in which he and the secretaries of state and defense would briefly go over all the immediate national security issues of the upcoming day."¹⁰⁵ Though the new willingness to compromise was a refreshing change from the turmoil (to borrow Shultz's phrase) of the earlier phases of the administration, it may have had a downside as well. According to one assessment, the collegial system tended to produce policies that reflected the common denominator of the relevant agencies.¹⁰⁶

The new collegiality also resulted, however, in a consensus in favor of exploring cooperation with the Soviet Union on arms control and regional issues, which contributed to a number of high-profile outcomes widely regarded as positive. These included the INF agreement signed at the December 1987 Washington summit and ratified in time for the Moscow summit in May 1988; substantial movement toward a strategic arms limitation treaty (START); and progress on regional conflicts such as in Afghanistan (where a Soviet commitment to withdraw was achieved) and Namibia. Thus Reagan proved able or fortunate enough to put the crisis of public and personal confidence caused by the Iran-Contra affair behind him and end his administration on a note of harmony among his staff and achievement abroad.

Reflection on foreign-policy-making during the Reagan presidency reveals a number of surprises, ironies, and apparent paradoxes. A president uncomfortable with conflict and hoping for collegiality had to endure more than six years of bitter personal and policy conflict before achieving a collegial atmosphere in his foreign-policy-making system. A strong leader capable of captivating a nation with his vision was revealed as a weak manager who had great difficulty in placing his own house in order and maintaining discipline among his staff and an orderly foreign-policy-making process. An apparently inveterate anticommunist accused of "black and white thinking" and prone to referring to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" presided over what was probably the most fundamental and positive transformation of U.S.-Soviet relations during the postwar period.¹⁰⁷ Commonly seen as a prototypical conservative, Reagan proved capable of truly radical thinking when it came to nuclear weapons, as evidenced by his appar-

ently sincere desire to abolish nuclear arms and replace deterrence with strategic defense.¹⁰⁸

George Bush

To a greater extent than any of his predecessors since John F. Kennedy, George Bush succeeded in developing a foreign policy team in the literal sense of the term. This feat was accomplished and maintained through careful recruitment and active management on the part of the president. Bush's personal style and foreign policy management approach contrasted sharply with Reagan's in many respects, despite his "friendly take-over" of the reins of power as Reagan's anointed successor.

Bush chose to assemble a team and develop an organizational framework that would suit his own mode of operation and demonstrate that his was not simply a third Reagan administration, minus Reagan himself. Despite the fact that Reagan left a generally highly regarded set of foreign policy advisers in place at the time of the transition, resignations were requested without exception.¹⁰⁹ In moves more reminiscent of a transition from opposition, Secretary of State George Shultz, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, and National Security Adviser Colin Powell were set aside in favor of a new team with close ties to the president.

Intent on developing a more collegial atmosphere than the confrontational climate of the previous administration, Bush set out to create what might be called a kinder, gentler, foreign policy process. He began by tapping longtime friends and colleagues who would be comfortable working with him and with each other in implementing his key foreign policy initiatives and national security policies. Bush's long public service and emphasis on cultivating personal relationships provided him with a valuable asset: a network of talented, experienced, and loyal individuals. Bush was able to draw on this network in selecting members of his cabinet and staff, as well as for ad hoc consultation on particular policy matters.

Before discussing the key members of this team and the functioning of Bush's foreign policy system, let us pause to consider Bush's personality and style. Bush took office with a marked sense of personal efficacy in the realm of foreign policy.¹¹⁰ As one keen observer noted: "In dramatic contrast to the detached, chairmanlike Reagan, Bush was

knowledgeable and very interested in foreign policy and both willing and able to be at the center of discussions on that topic."¹¹¹ Bush clearly wished to keep his hands on the policymaking process, preferring early and sustained involvement rather than being presented with options to check off.¹¹² As a result, he has been described as "more decisive than Jimmy Carter and more in charge than Ronald Reagan."¹¹³

A good part of Bush's sense of efficacy probably stemmed from his long years of on-the-job training; few presidents have had such intensive foreign policy credentials when taking office. Bush's experience as ambassador to the United Nations during the Nixon administration, as envoy to China and director of the CIA during the Ford administration, and as Reagan's vice president are worthy of mention in this regard.¹¹⁴ Some commentators have suggested that Bush's sense of efficacy may have at times resulted in overconfidence and excessive reliance on his own knowledge and instincts. For example, it has been alleged that Bush relied heavily on his own knowledge of the Middle East (and consultation with foreign leaders), engaging in only cursory consultation with academic or departmental experts during the Gulf War.¹¹⁵ However, this alleged tendency does not show up clearly in the realm of U.S.-Soviet relations, where Bush did in fact consult regularly with Soviet experts inside and outside of government.¹¹⁶

The conventional wisdom on Bush's cognitive style emphasizes his pragmatic approach to decisionmaking. One astute observer describes him as "a problem solver rather than a visionary, a doer rather than a dreamer."¹¹⁷ Bush's consensus building stands in sharp contrast to Reagan's more ideologically driven approach. Bush, we are told, was more comfortable with plain facts than with grand theories. Lacking a clear compass or strategic vision ("that vision thing"), his political course tended to be buffered by the winds of expediency.¹¹⁸ Bush is often described as cautious rather than bold, as conciliatory rather than confrontational.

Yet this image seems incomplete. Bush's behavior in office suggests that hot cognitions may well have displaced cool calculation on occasion. A limited set of strongly held principles, or perhaps, strong historically driven analogies, may have taken over and driven his thinking. This appears to be the case in the Persian Gulf crisis, where Saddam Hussein's aggression apparently triggered strong associations with the Munich analogy and Bush's own combat experience as a naval aviator in World War II.¹¹⁹ Alternatively, it has been suggested

that lasting and intensive criticism (such as the legacy of the "wimp factor" from the election campaign and of a Panama policy perceived as ineffectual and indecisive) served as a catalyst for aggressive behavior.¹²⁰

Once he was convinced and engaged on an issue, Bush could display a considerable degree of stubbornness.¹²¹ This trait comes across clearly in the case of the Tower nomination. Bush refused to withdraw his nomination of John Tower for secretary of defense, despite mounting evidence that a potentially costly early defeat in Congress was imminent. Tower was ultimately rejected by the Senate on the grounds that his history of heavy drinking would pose a risk to national security in such a sensitive post.¹²²

Similarly, the conventional image of Bush (held especially prior to the Gulf War) as "more reactive than proactive, more adrift than imaginative"¹²³ neglects part of the Bush legacy. While the "new world order" rhetoric remained underspecified and perhaps overambitious throughout the end of his tenure, Bush did set an important precedent in his collaboration with the newly unblocked United Nations Security Council during the Gulf War. The humanitarian military intervention in Somalia in the twilight days of his administration, also conducted under UN auspices, should be seen as another milestone in the history of international cooperative action.¹²⁴ Still, the inability of the administration, regional institutions, and the international security community to engage constructively in managing the dissolution of Yugoslavia was a setback to the vision of a new world order.

A number of commentators have suggested that Bush had a tendency to allow personal relationships (of both positive and negative affect) to color his thinking on policy issues.¹²⁵ Bush's personal antipathy to Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein and his tendency to view their defiance as insults to himself and his office almost certainly contributed to the decisions to intervene in Panama and to escalate the Persian Gulf crisis.¹²⁶ Similarly, Bush's reluctance to diversify the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union/Russia by distancing himself somewhat from Gorbachev (with whom he had a warm relationship) and establishing better ties to Boris Yeltsin (whose "earthy" style of-fended Bush's sensibilities) lends itself to being understood in these terms.¹²⁷

Like Roosevelt and Reagan, Bush favored acquiring information through conversation. His telephone was constantly in use as he em-

played his broad network of foreign and domestic contacts to gather information on the policy issues before him. Not a reader by nature, he generally preferred oral briefings and policy memos to long reports. Still, from time to time he would study intensively when facing a major challenge. For example, Bush reportedly geared up for the Malta summit with an intensive program of readings, seminars, and informal consultations. Brent Scowcroft provided some twenty memos, and "tutorials were held in the Oval Office and at Camp David by government specialists, outside experts, and former officials."¹²⁸

The balance of available evidence suggests that Bush's personality is characterized by a moderate to high tolerance of interpersonal conflict. In contrast to the reclusive Nixon or the somewhat passive and har-mony-seeking Reagan, Bush reportedly enjoyed the give-and-take of heated debate over policy issues.¹²⁹ In his own words, his approach was to "get good strong experienced people, encourage them to express their views openly, encourage them not to hold back."¹³⁰

However, it is important to distinguish between the different stages of the decision process when assessing Bush's tolerance of dissent and free communication. Bush was most tolerant of dissent in the earlier brainstorming stages of a decision, where he often used his advisers as sounding boards. However, as presidential commitment to a line of action increased and choices were made, tolerance for dissent tended to give way to the expectation that his advisers would behave as team players taking direction from their captain.¹³¹ Once a presidential decision had been made, Bush expected his advisers to be good soldiers: "I want them to be frank; I want them to fight hard for their position. And then, when I make the call, I'd like to have the feeling that they'd be able to support the president."¹³²

This expectation raises an important issue: What happens if the president commits prematurely to a course of action, *before* key advisers have had an opportunity for frank debate on the character of the problem and the merits of alternative options? Clearly, this would place advisers in a difficult situation, one in which norms of candor and a robust, deliberative process would be in danger of being undermined by presidential expectations of solidarity and support. This issue will be taken up in more detail later.

Bush has been accused of valuing loyalty over expertise in his key personnel choices.¹³³ In fact, when it came to his foreign policy national security team, Bush was largely spared such trade-offs. For the most

part, Bush was able to fill his key positions with individuals who were both "professionals *and* buddies" (emphasis added).¹³⁴ For national security adviser, Bush chose a friend who actually had prior experience in that role: Brent Scowcroft. Scowcroft, a retired Air Force general, had served with distinction as national security adviser during the Ford administration and on several presidential commissions, including the Tower Commission.¹³⁵ Experienced White House and congressional hand Richard Cheney was named secretary of defense following the Tower nomination defeat. Cheney had served as Ford's chief of staff and as the senior Republican on the House Select Committee that investigated the Iran-Contra affair. Longtime friend and political confidant James Baker III was appointed secretary of state. Baker had served as undersecretary of commerce in the Ford administration and as chief of staff and secretary of the treasury in the Reagan administration. Baker's experience profile suggested strength in international economic policy; although "[c]onspicuously absent from Baker's resume was any direct experience in U.S.-Soviet relations or other traditional major foreign policy issues."¹³⁶ However, Bush's own strength in these areas (as well as Scowcroft's) compensated for this potential weakness. Other members of Bush's inner circle included Vice President Dan Quayle, Chief of Staff John H. Sununu, Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates (later CIA director), and ultimately Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Working with this cast of characters, how did Bush choose to structure his foreign policy process and how did the system function in practice? The Bush system appears to be the best example of a predominantly collegial system since the Kennedy administration.¹³⁷ Like Kennedy, who had made himself accessible to staff and cabinet (see Figure 6.4), Bush placed himself at the center of an information network in the wheel configuration. Interestingly, the lines of communication in this network were strong not only along the spokes between the president and his individual advisers but also along the circumference (among the advisers themselves). It is this feature that leads us to emphasize the team quality of Bush's management system.

As Richard T. Johnson has noted, maintaining a collegial policy group demands a great deal of a leader. Bush appears to have been well equipped temperamentally to meet this challenge. In marked contrast to his predecessor, Bush was consistently solicitous of the egos and feelings of his subordinates. In particular, he tried to demon-

strate his continued faith in them following setbacks in their areas of responsibility or when they came out on the losing side of disagreements over policy.¹³⁸ Despite the otherwise relatively centralized White House operation under Chief of Staff Sununu,¹³⁹ these officials retained direct and easy access to the president. Access to the president lubricated the policy process, while Bush's hands-on style helped to keep potential conflicts from festering. These arrangements and dispositions help to explain how Bush was able to keep his national security team intact throughout his entire term, a dramatic achievement in comparison with the high turnover that plagued the Reagan administration.

It has been suggested that the relatively homogeneous and cohesive Bush advisory group may have been prone to premature concurrence seeking, a tendency exacerbated by Bush's penchant for ad hoc informal consultation.¹⁴⁰

James Pfiffner suggests that Bush did not make use of any systematic strategy, such as multiple advocacy, formal options, or structured group deliberations, in order to guard against premature concurrence seeking: "Aside from occasional consultations with outside and governmental Middle East specialists, Bush dealt primarily with members of his war council. And even then, at crucial decision points he neglected to consult Cheney, Baker or Powell at different times (for example, the decisions to make the liberation of Kuwait U.S. policy, the decision to double U.S. forces, and the decision to offer the Baker trip to Iraq)."¹⁴¹

This raises a more general issue. Were Bush's advisers sufficiently diverse in their views and candid in the expression of those views to expose the president to a broad range of opinion on major policy issues? In the case of the Gulf War, the record suggests that Bush's advisers were in fact divided. Powell and Baker apparently favored giving sanctions (the strangulation option) more time to work before taking military action. Although several commentators maintain that Powell had insufficient opportunity to make the case for sanctions in formal settings, it seems certain that Baker (privileged by his close friendship with the president) would have had the opportunity and the "idiosyncrasy credit" to make his views known privately to the president.

In the realm of U.S.-Soviet/Russian relations, President Bush was regularly presented with a diversity of views on the prospects for reform and of particular leaders (Gorbachev and Yeltsin) and on appropriate U.S. arms control postures. At times these differences were aired

publicly, such as when Cheney predicted in April 1989 that Gorbachev would ultimately fail, just when the administration was increasing its commitment to a working relationship with Gorbachev.¹⁴² More often, the conflict was largely behind the scenes. Close examination reveals a series of relatively civil, though substantively serious, disagreements between key advisers over issues such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, START, and whether U.S. policy should focus exclusively on Gorbachev or diversify and forge links with Yeltsin. Interestingly, the alliances tended to shift across issues, a fact that helped to maintain lines of communication and inhibit the development of antagonistic factions.¹⁴³

Especially striking was the constructive relationship between Secretary of State Baker and National Security Adviser Scowcroft. In contrast to the bitter rivalry that has been all too common in relationships between secretaries of state and national security advisers, the two men appear to have worked together in a relatively smooth fashion despite differences at times over policy issues. A number of factors help to explain this cooperation. Both officials enjoyed close relationships with and virtually unlimited access to the president, which provided balance and stability.¹⁴⁴ Scowcroft's relatively low-key style reduced the potential for friction, as did Baker's commitment to being "the White House's man at State, rather than State's man at the White House."¹⁴⁵ Finally, deliberate efforts were made to create secondary channels of communication through senior aides. For example, Baker reportedly selected Lawrence Eagleburger as a deputy in part for his close relationship with Scowcroft.¹⁴⁶

Although closer consideration of Scowcroft's performance in his second tour of duty as national security adviser is not possible here, his general role in Bush's foreign policy management system should be described. A number of commentators have suggested that Scowcroft's role in the Bush administration differed markedly in several respects from his role in the Ford administration. He apparently took on a time-consuming role as personal counselor to the president, no doubt at Bush's instance, and this may at times have eroded his ability to act as custodian-manager of the policy process. Because he engaged in considerable public as well as private policy advocacy, it may have been more difficult for him to perform credibly as an honest broker mediating among the other advisers.¹⁴⁷

The emphasis on collegiality up to this point of the analysis does not imply that Bush's policymaking system did not at times exhibit features of the other models. A revamped system of formal policy coordination was created by Scowcroft shortly after his appointment, in line with the Tower Commission's findings. The system consisted of three levels: the NSC ("Principals Committee") chaired by Scowcroft in the president's absence, the Deputies Committee chaired by Scowcroft's deputy national security adviser, and twelve midlevel policy coordination committees.¹⁴⁸ However, the tendency among senior officials to set aside formal policy development tracks in favor of a more collegial, less structured, and less formal mode of operation undermined the effectiveness of these arrangements. General disappointment with the early (and much publicized) formal review of U.S.-Soviet policy (NSR-3) may also have contributed to the turning away from these formal structures.¹⁴⁹

Bush preferred to rely on multiple channels for policy information and development. These included informal small advisory groups, formal bodies such as the NSC system just described, and wide-ranging consultations in person and on the telephone with members of his network, including foreign leaders. In this, as well as in an alleged penchant for compartmentalizing information on sensitive issues and springing surprises on aides, his style and system recall some aspects of FDR's style, but they did not develop the conflictual features of Roosevelt's competitive model.¹⁵⁰

Bill Clinton

In our discussion of the Bill Clinton management style and organizational model as it appears at the start of his second term, we must emphasize that our analysis is tentative, as the information base regarding these matters is still both limited in scope and contradictory. What information is available is likely to be tainted by political motivations and affected by the inclination of the mass media to focus on less flattering aspects of the foreign-policy-making process and the behavior of the principal players.

As we shall see, Clinton created an organizational model that seemed to be an uneasy blend of collegiality and formalism explicitly designed, at least initially, to limit the extent of presidential engage-

ment in foreign-policy-making—and allow him to focus on his domestic agenda. Over the course of a turbulent first term, he would change these priorities and in so doing significantly alter the mode of operation of his advisory system and improve its performance.

Like many of the presidents we have discussed here, Clinton drew selectively on the experiences of his predecessors in constructing his foreign-policy-making system. Following the example of his early political role model, John F. Kennedy, Clinton wished to create a system that would encourage open communication and broad participation among his advisers. At the same time, Clinton desired a system that would systematize policy analysis and ensure that those units of the government with a stake in a particular issue would have a chance to air their concerns and bring their expertise to bear. The latter priority was in part a reaction to charges that a handful of top Bush administration officials tended at times to make important policy decisions while bypassing departmental and agency expertise.

Another central lesson was drawn from the latter part of the Carter administration, specifically regarding the negative consequences of excessive rivalry between the secretary of state and the national security adviser. The Carter experience, though more than a decade in the past, was quite vivid and salient for Clinton and his advisers for two very good reasons. First, the Carter administration was the last Democratic tenure of the White House and as such a natural source of vicarious experience for a new Democratic president. Second, and perhaps more important, one of the coheads of the transition team was Warren Christopher, who had bitter firsthand experience of the increasingly open and destructive infighting between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance while serving as Vance's deputy.¹⁵¹

Clinton held Christopher in particularly high esteem as a fellow lawyer and an elder statesman of experience, integrity, and political judgment. Furthermore, though of humble origins like Clinton himself, Christopher offered a link to the foreign policy establishment, a potentially valuable asset to an "outsider" president. While serving as Vance's deputy, Christopher played a major role in overseeing the prolonged negotiations with Iran over the hostage crisis and earned a reputation for unflappable calm, caution, and patience.¹⁵² Because he was mindful of the importance of a good working relationship between the secretary of state and the national security adviser, Clinton selected Anthony Lake for the other major foreign policy position. Lake, who

had figured prominently in the Clinton campaign, offered a relatively unusual combination of academic credentials (postgraduate work at Cambridge and most recently a professorship at Mount Holyoke College) and governmental experience. Lake's academic qualifications, it was hoped, would provide conceptual sophistication and strategic vision to the foreign policy mix.¹⁵³ Unlike Kissinger (for whom Lake had worked during the Vietnam era) and Brzezinski, Lake was reputed to have a relatively low-key personality and to be a good team player. This expectation was reinforced by the fact that he enjoyed a cordial relationship with Christopher dating back to Lake's service as director of policy planning in the Carter administration State Department.¹⁵⁴ A self-avowed neo-Wilsonian who had devoted a substantial portion of his academic career to the study of Africa, Lake reportedly intended to shift a traditionally Eurocentric foreign policy toward a greater emphasis on North-South relations and the promotion of democracy. Since he had coauthored a well-known book criticizing the U.S. foreign-policy-making process,¹⁵⁵ his views on the role of the NSA were on the record. Lake seemed slated for a largely behind-the-scenes role as a custodian-manager of the policy process.

Clinton tapped Les Aspin as secretary of defense. Aspin, a veteran congressman and former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, had a deserved reputation as a defense intellectual promising to combine an open and creative approach to defense policymaking, with deep knowledge of weapons systems, arms control, and legislative politics. One keen observer described Aspin as an "idea machine of staggering proportions," suggesting that Aspin would be an activist defense secretary in the Robert McNamara mode.¹⁵⁶ Clinton felt that Aspin's qualifications made him well prepared to take on the daunting task of rethinking U.S. defense policy in the post-Cold War world.

Another potentially key player on the Clinton foreign-policy-making team was Vice President Al Gore. Though vice presidents have traditionally been delegated funeral duty and have not uncommonly been excluded from the inner circle on foreign policy matters, Gore enjoyed a privileged position. Gore, known as a "policy wonk," had during his Senate career and preparations for his own bids for the presidency, developed several policy specialties that seemed likely to prove relevant to the Clinton administration. Like Aspin, Gore had mastered the arcane minutiae of arms control, an area in which Clinton's own experi-

ence was limited. Gore's main focus in recent years had been the global environment, an area emphasized in the campaign and one likely to be a higher priority for the Clinton administration than for the Bush team. Not to be underestimated either was the importance of the personal rapport and friendship that reportedly developed between Clinton and Gore in part during their celebrated bus tours together during the grueling presidential campaign.¹⁵⁷

Clinton's choice of organizational model reflects a number of competing priorities deriving from his view of the experience of his predecessors, his personality and preferences, and the contemporary political context.¹⁵⁸ At the same time, Clinton reportedly planned to delegate a considerable amount of the day-to-day management of foreign policy to his advisers. This, he hoped, would enable him to focus on the most important issues—initially defined as including Russia, the Middle East, and the global economy—and reserve much of his energy and efforts for his ambitious domestic policy agenda.¹⁵⁹

Thus in contrast to Kennedy, who set up a collegial system in order to be more closely and personally involved in the policymaking process, Clinton apparently intended to set up a collegial system geared toward a relatively low level of presidential engagement.¹⁶⁰ According to one early report: "Clinton has essentially delegated foreign-policy formulation to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Defense Secretary Les Aspin, the national security adviser, W. Anthony Lake, and Mr. Lake's deputy, Samuel R. Berger. On domestic policy issues, Mr. Clinton is personally absorbed in the give and take. But on foreign policy, he has basically asked these aides to work out solutions and submit them to him to be approved or rejected."¹⁶¹

Clinton planned to depend on these officials to bring important matters to his attention, to brief him on their progress, and to strictly ration his own participation in foreign-policy-making, in keeping with his campaign promises.¹⁶² In turn, his role would be to set the broad guidelines for major policies and to make the final decisions.¹⁶³

This planned mode of operation led Clinton to concentrate a considerable degree of responsibility in the hands of the national security adviser, a choice often associated with a formalistic model. Lake apparently was intended to be a virtual chief of staff for foreign policy (although not by any means an all-powerful one) and a surrogate manager of the policy process.¹⁶⁴ He was assigned a central role as a liaison between the president and the foreign policy team, including

control over much of the paper flow to Clinton on foreign policy matters. In a mid-1993 interview Lake described a difficult balancing act between gatekeeping and burdening the president: "I really wanted to avoid becoming the guard-all shield between the President and the rest of the foreign policy community, but at the time make sure he wasn't being buried in all kinds of different memos and meetings. That's not what the President wants in any case."¹⁶⁵

Lake was one of a handful of officials included in the daily morning CIA briefing to the president.¹⁶⁶ Immediately afterward he met privately with Clinton for consultations on pressing foreign policy issues. Clinton himself often did not attend top-level interagency meetings on foreign policy even on issues such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. Instead the president relied on Lake and others to keep him informed of developments. Lake was given the responsibility for chairing the bi-weekly interagency "principals meetings" on high-priority issues. Lake's deputy, longtime Clinton friend and fellow lawyer Samuel Berger, chaired the parallel "deputies committee," which met four or more times per week to develop options to be presented to the principals, reinforcing the strategic positioning of the White House national security contingent.¹⁶⁷ All in all, it seems fair to say that Lake's position was at the hub of the information network.¹⁶⁸

It is important to say, however, that Lake seemed unlikely to exploit this privileged position and close access to the president in order to marginalize the State Department. A former foreign service officer himself, Lake had long advocated increasing the influence of career diplomats in the policymaking process.¹⁶⁹ His long-standing concern with maintaining the integrity of the policy process also made him appear unlikely to try to take unfair advantage of his strategic position.¹⁷⁰ In addition, Lake's good personal relationship with Christopher made the prospects for a good working relationship between the secretary of state and the NSA better than is often the case.

Clinton placed particular emphasis on trying to preempt a perennial source of friction between the State Department and the White House by making it clear that Secretary of State Christopher was intended to be the chief spokesman for the administration on foreign policy issues. Thus Lake's powerful "inside" position was to be balanced in part by Christopher's undisputed "outside" prerogatives. This is not to say that Christopher was not meant to be a key inside player as well. In fact, Christopher reportedly was one of Clinton's most trusted advisers.

ers, weighing in not only on foreign policy but also on domestic issues.¹⁷¹ Lake's access to Clinton was thus also balanced by daily communication between the president and Christopher.

Proceeding from the premise that regular communication among the three leading foreign policy officials promised to promote cooperative relations, a regular Wednesday lunch meeting was instituted. This was meant to provide an opportunity for these principals to exchange ideas informally over sandwiches and keep each other informed on major developments. Early reports asserted that the watchwords for the policymaking system were to be secrecy, efficiency, and consensus.¹⁷²

Let us now turn to the personal qualities and preferences of the leading man in this cast of players. We will begin by discussing Clinton's cognitive style. Most observers seem to agree that Clinton possesses an agile and sophisticated mind.¹⁷³ Like Jimmy Carter before him (and like his vice president, Al Gore), Clinton likes to delve deeply into the details of policies that interest him. In other words, he too is a policy wonk.¹⁷⁴ These skills were already on public display during the transition, when Clinton received rave reviews for the much-publicized Arkansas economic "summit and teach-in," where he demonstrated an impressive command of theoretical and applied economics and the ability to direct an orchestra of nationally renowned academic specialists and leading industrialists.

A lawyer by training, Clinton reportedly enjoys the give-and-take of policy deliberations and debate. He is often described as a good listener and an open-minded participant in policy discussions. He is able to see and argue both sides of complex and difficult issues. Allegedly, he is uncomfortable with a quick consensus among his advisers and prone to take the devil's advocate role himself if no one else does. Without the energy and critical examination typical of an argumentative discussion, he is unsure that the issue has been sufficiently probed. He apparently feels most comfortable in making a decision and promoting a policy after he has gone through this process and "internalized" the issue.¹⁷⁵ This may be a time-consuming and exhausting ordeal for Clinton and his aides. Critics have suggested that as a result of this style, Clinton's decision meetings tend to resemble academic seminars or "bull sessions."¹⁷⁶

Observers differ to some extent in their assessment of the degree to which Clinton is able to integrate the complexities that emerge from his own study (he is reputedly a voracious reader)¹⁷⁷ and from his ses-

sions with experts from within and outside the administration. Some argue that Clinton has an unusual capacity to forge a robust and sophisticated position out of the sometimes chaotic process of deliberation and consultation and suggest that he is "the Great Synthesizer."¹⁷⁸ Others contend that he has difficulty in making up his mind and bringing the deliberative process to closure.¹⁷⁹ Similarly, there is disagreement over the extent to which Clinton is able to master his enthusiasm and boldness and prioritize in order to focus on a limited number of central issues.¹⁸⁰

Clinton seems to have a relatively mixed reaction to conflict. As already noted, he thrives on intellectual conflict—encouraging and deriving satisfaction from policy debate. At the same time, he seems moderately uncomfortable with personal conflict and confrontation.¹⁸¹ It has often been suggested that he has a strong need to be liked and that he does not like to say no.¹⁸² For example, he reportedly hates to fire subordinates and tends to rally to the support of those responsible for major fiascos.¹⁸³ With his apparently unusually empathetic personality, Clinton has a tendency to take the views and concerns of his discussion partners to heart.¹⁸⁴ In fact, he tends to incorporate the best arguments of his critics into his repertoire and concede their merit in discussions with his advisers.¹⁸⁵ Clinton's political opponents have lampooned this tendency, labeling him the "Me-Too President." These behaviors and traits have led some observers to conclude that Clinton is a political charameleon, empathizing intensely (but ephemerally) with each of his audiences and discussion partners in turn.¹⁸⁶

When it comes to political persuasion and the exercise of power, Clinton seems more at home with the carrot than the stick.¹⁸⁷ This is not to say that Clinton is possessed of a particularly placid disposition. In fact, when under stress, Clinton is given to short-lived, highly intense fits of rage that may be triggered by even the most minor provocation. These episodes are a common enough feature of the Clintonian landscape to have been dubbed "earthquakes" or "morning vents" by aides. These seem to be primarily a mechanism for venting frustration.¹⁸⁸ Once the storm has passed, the episodes apparently leave few lasting traces. Clinton himself professes an inability to hold a grudge, a potential liability in politics: "I don't hate anyone. I forget the people I'm supposed to hate."¹⁸⁹

Clinton clearly possesses a strong sense of personal political efficacy in general. He is drawn to taking bold positions, to addressing issues

that others have not dared to tackle. In the domestic arena this orientation led him to take on controversial problems such as deficit reduction, health care reform, and welfare reform. It may have also contributed to his vocal criticism during the campaign of what he characterized as overly timid Bush administration policies with regard to trouble spots such as Haiti and Bosnia or human rights violations in China. This boldness of campaign rhetoric carries with it the risk of creating expectations that may not always be easy to fulfill once the successful candidate is in power, as the Clinton team would discover during the frustrating first eighteen months of the administration.¹⁹⁸

Yet Clinton's confidence level in the realm of foreign policy was not quite as high as in other policy areas. At the outset, at least, Clinton did not see himself as having mastered the details of foreign-policy-making. Given that Clinton's background and experience as governor of Arkansas and within the Democratic Party organization were clearly tilted in favor of domestic issues,¹⁹⁹ that his campaign stressed Bush's neglect of domestic problems in favor of foreign policy, and that he had declared his intention to focus on the economy "like a laser beam," it is difficult to avoid the impression that Clinton at times saw his responsibility for foreign policy as a burden of office rather than an area of passionate interest and a primary focus of endeavor.

A number of observers have suggested that Clinton has a strong sense of political mission dating back to his youth. In a letter explaining his decisions regarding the Vietnam draft, he discusses his desire to maintain his viability within the system and his expectation of a political career.¹⁹² This sense of mission helps to explain his attraction to bold political projects. It may also help to explain the pragmatism that many see as a hallmark of the Clinton administration. His basic sense of morality and purpose may help him to rationalize political expediency in the short run. The imperatives of his political ideals (defined at a high level of abstraction) give way to the imperatives of deal making. Thus Clinton is able to practice the maxim that "politics is the art of the possible" secure in the assurance that his was the best possible policy (or else he would not have chosen it).¹⁹³ In other words, Clinton seems able to compromise his policies without compromising his self-image.

Other personality traits worthy of mention are Clinton's unusual levels of energy, endurance, and ability to tolerate stress. He has been

known to describe himself as "almost compulsively overactive."¹⁹⁴ Clinton expects a lot of himself and his aides, at times driving himself to the point of exhaustion.¹⁹⁵

Furthermore, he demonstrated in the campaigns and throughout much of a stormy first term an impressive ability to maintain his composure in the face of biting and sustained criticism and allegations of financial and sexual misconduct. As a result, he does appear to have earned another of his nicknames, "the Comeback Kid." Similarly, at least one relatively credible inside account suggests that Clinton rises to the occasion in crisis situations, where he displays calm, determination, and decisiveness even in the face of hard choices and heavy stress.¹⁹⁶

Finally, according to several commentators, Clinton characteristically demonstrates a *laissez-faire* approach to managing his advisers and staff.¹⁹⁷ Clinton's inclination is to focus his attention on gathering bright, talented, and pleasant¹⁹⁸ people around him and on engaging challenging policy problems head-on. He tends to pay less attention to how the work is organized and to whether the policymaking system is functioning properly. In fact, he apparently thrives on an atmosphere of "creative chaos."¹⁹⁹ This suggests that Clinton may be dependent on the effectiveness of surrogate "chiefs of staff" to keep an eye on these questions for him. To the extent that they fail him in this regard, serious problems are to be expected.

Now let us turn to a brief examination of how the Clinton foreign-policy-making system has functioned in practice. The early performance of Clinton and his advisers was heavily criticized by the mass media and the academic and public affairs communities.²⁰⁰ Clinton himself was painted as insufficiently attentive, chronically indecisive, imprudent in his speech, and either unwilling or unable to shoulder the mantle of leadership in foreign policy. His advisers were vilified as bland, incompetent, impractically idealistic, or morally bankrupt. The system as a whole was derided as ponderous and inefficient, a "government by committee" turning out a foreign policy characterized by hypocrisy, fits and starts, proliferating initiatives, and inadequate follow-through, and an inability to exercise leadership at home or abroad. Derogatory comparisons with the Carter administration were common.

The administration itself conceded that the handling of some issues did not always live up to the standards of consensus, efficiency, and

secrecy the team set for itself and that serious coordination difficulties had emerged at times. Spokespersons admitted that policymaking on particular issues such as Bosnia and Somalia may have got off to a poor start. However, they claimed that the administration quietly succeeded in managing the most important issues and relationships, such as foreign trade policy (including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] and the North America Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], and relations with the major European and Asian trading partners), nuclear nonproliferation policy, and promoting democratization and stability in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union. They asserted that perceptions of inadequacy derived more from failures of communication and public relations than from fundamental weaknesses of personnel, management, organization, or "vision." In response to allegations of a lack of strategic vision, friendly observers pointed to the concept of "democratic enlargement" (launched by Lake in 1993) as a conceptual and strategic foundation of the administration's foreign policy and providing an integrative perspective for dealing with geo-economic as well as more traditional types of security issues.²⁰¹

Several adjustments to the system intended to redress these perceived difficulties were made early on. As it became clear that Christopher was achieving mixed success in speaking for the administration on foreign policy issues, some of this responsibility was delegated to others, such as David Gergen, who was brought aboard in May 1993. Gergen, a well known journalist who had served in several Republican administrations, had a reputation as a seasoned Washington hand skilled in dealing with the White House press corps.²⁰² Gergen was first instructed to work closely with Lake in order to communicate more effectively the administration's message to the media.²⁰³ Lake himself began to take and maintain a more public profile later that year, granting interviews, making speeches, and publishing articles explaining the administration's policy and policymaking process.²⁰⁴

Apparently Lake and Gergen developed personal conflicts²⁰⁵ that led to Gergen's reassignment to support Christopher instead as part of a late 1994 reshuffle of the White House staff. This shake-up also included the replacement of Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty, who was widely regarded as ineffective, by former Office of Management and Budget director Leon Panetta.²⁰⁶ Gergen's influence gradually waned and he eventually left the administration. The energetic and experi-

enced Panetta, however, brought a new level of organizational discipline and legislative insight to the White House staff, especially on the domestic side.²⁰⁷ Some accounts suggest that Panetta also tightened up aspects of the White House operation relevant to foreign-policymaking, including improved management of the president's schedule, facilitation of direct communications with foreign leaders, and oversight of the paper flow.

An important question raised by the way in which Clinton chose to organize the foreign-policymaking process is whether a significantly collegial foreign policy system can function effectively with a president who wishes to maintain a relatively high degree of detachment from the policy process. Collegial systems generally have been seen as a way of immersing the president in the policymaking process as well as a means of bringing the collective experience of the advisers to bear on policy issues, rather than compartmentalizing responsibility. Yet, as we have noted, collegial systems require a great deal of management and "maintenance" in order to keep the lines of communication clear and to prevent substantive conflict from spilling over into personal conflict or into the public domain. Rules of the game must be established in order to delineate appropriate dissent from obstructionism and political gamesmanship. Finally, collegial systems may lead to the opposite problem—an unwillingness to confront differences of opinion squarely—and, as a result, a tendency to compromise by adopting policies that represent the least common denominator and to postpone difficult decisions that threaten the comfortable atmosphere.

A number of indications suggest that a sincere desire among the principals to avoid the severe conflict and bureaucratic warfare of the late Carter administration may have resulted in a tendency to fall into the trap of the early Carter administration—the repression of disagreement.²⁰⁸ A large number of early press reports alleged excessive tendencies toward consensus. Lake himself asserted in an October 1993 interview that such a problem might have existed: "I think when people work well together, you can take the edge off the options." He vowed to be more alert to the risks of "groupthink," alluding explicitly to Irving Janis's well known concept.²⁰⁹

One early fiasco, apparently the result of a combination of disorganization, honeymoon optimism, and a tendency toward consensus seeking, was the souring of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Specifically, the decision in question had to do with whether U.S.

forces should make retaliatory strikes and participate in the efforts to arrest Somalian strongman Mohammed Farah Aidid following a June 5, 1993, attack that resulted in the deaths of two dozen Pakistani UN peacekeepers. After this incident the Clinton administration abandoned the strict constraints on the duration and scope of the U.S. intervention imposed by the Bush administration. This fateful decision to change the rules of engagement for U.S. forces in Somalia was taken on the basis of only the most cursory and, it would turn out, overly optimistic deliberations. Sadly, in developments all too reminiscent of the Reagan administration's misadventure in Lebanon, the new policy led to the U.S. forces' being perceived as having taken sides in the Somali conflict rather than as impartial peacekeepers and providers of humanitarian aid. After an ambush in which eighteen elite U.S. soldiers were killed and the body of a dead American soldier publicly desecrated before the eyes (and television cameras) of the international press corps, a policy review was undertaken. "According to at least one account, this tragedy had a profound impact on Lake, leading him to offer Clinton his resignation and disposing the national security assistant against sending U.S. peacekeepers to Rwanda in 1994."²¹⁰ The Somalia policy review led to the withdrawal of the U.S. contingent in Somalia a half year later.²¹¹

The tendency toward consensus seeking that contributed to the Somalia fiasco clearly did not extend to all policy questions. A rash of uncoordinated statements by senior officials and Clinton himself indicated that significant conflicts over policy were occurring over trouble spots such as Bosnia and policy dilemmas such as China policy. In the Bosnia case, an activist faction reportedly including National Security Adviser Lake, Vice President Gore, Defense Secretary Aspin and UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright was in favor of vigorous measures such as the use of force (particularly air power) and terminating the arms embargo that placed the Bosnian government at a disadvantage.²¹² Others, most notably Warren Christopher and Bush administration holdover Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Colin Powell, argued forcefully against a more aggressive U.S. policy, the former emphasizing the need for continued negotiation and consensual multilateralism, and the latter the risks entailed in heightened military engagement.²¹³ How was this early conflict handled? A compromise of sorts was worked out and accepted by Clinton. The administration continued advocating an activist posture (at this point entailing the possible use of air strikes

and selective lifting of the weapons embargo) but refrained from proceeding unilaterally pending the emergence of a broader consensus among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and with other key actors such as Russia. The approach to coalition building was tentative rather than forceful, and the resistance of the Europeans in conjunction with the strong disapproval of the Russians resulted in a relatively modest policy not altogether unlike that of the Bush administration. This policy would remain in place—with relatively minor adjustments—until a number of contextual developments and staff changes enabled the adoption of a more activist policy.

One such staff change was the replacement of Powell by Polish-born General John M. Shalikashvili in October 1993. Shalikashvili did not share Powell's highly restrictive conception of the role of military force in the pursuit of foreign policy and humanitarian aims. Another such change was the solicited resignation in December 1993 of the controversial secretary of defense, Aspin, whose "academic" and disorganized style had not gone over well at the Pentagon. Aspin was replaced by his deputy, William Perry, who, it would turn out, was disposed toward a more muscular U.S. internationalism.²¹⁴ These staff changes, particularly Powell's departure, contributed to a noticeable shift in the balance of factional power in favor of interventionism on Bosnia and other similar issues.

Another contentious issue during much of the first term was China policy. For one thing, the Clinton program emphasized the elevation of economic issues to the level of national security. As a result, promoting trade with China—a developing market of enormous potential—was an important priority. Second, issues of weapons proliferation (particularly the spread of technologies of mass destruction such as chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles) were slated for high-priority treatment. China stood out on this issue as a major arms exporter in its own right and one of the only states in the world with significant influence over North Korea—an unpredictable "rogue state" on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons. Finally, the Clinton rhetoric emphasized the imperative of taking the moral high ground and elevating the status of human rights issues in foreign-policy-making. Clinton had criticized Bush for "coddling" China in the wake of the violent 1989 crackdown against the Tiananmen Square demonstrators. These difficult value trade-offs resulted in a turbulent policymaking process.

The issue was first brought to a head by the need to decide whether or not to renew China's most favored nation (MFN) status in June 1993. As the deadline approached, a policy compromise was worked out. The MFN status was renewed for another year. At the same time, a "strong" message was sent to the Chinese leadership that the status would not be renewed in 1994 unless significant progress was made on human rights issues. This effectively put off the decision for a year, but did not resolve the value conflict. As the next deadline approached, most observers agreed that the Chinese had not modified their policies in order to address the U.S. concerns. As a result, a difficult choice had to be made. In the end, the status was again renewed, leading many observers to surmise that the administration had compromised principle for pragmatism.

These early policy choices suggest that Clinton's own inclinations toward policy compromise and procrastination may have been reinforced by the collegial aspects of the policymaking system. In both of these cases an inability to face up to difficult choices seems to have resulted in situations in which the administration ended up squandering credibility by going public with ambitious rhetoric that it did not have the will and backing (on the part of key domestic and foreign constituencies) to sustain.

These problems seemed to be evident in the handling of the protracted crises over the North Korean nuclear program and the Haitian junta's coup against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In both cases, the administration went public with relatively bold rhetoric and was seen—at least for a time—as having been forced to retreat. Interestingly enough, former president Jimmy Carter appears as a central figure in both of these cases. In the former case, Clinton and his advisers initially and publicly declared that nuclear weapons in North Korea should not be tolerated under any circumstances and seemed to imply that the United States would be prepared to take drastic action if the North Koreans allowed their participation in the nonproliferation treaty "safeguards system" to lapse. Faced with apparent North Korean intransigence, the U.S. rhetoric and the apparent risk of military confrontation continued to escalate. The North Korean government defied U.S. pressure with impunity while the administration remained largely passive, which raised questions about its credibility. The impasse was broken to a considerable extent by a mediation effort by Carter. Carter's mission paved the way for a controversial agreement

signed in October of 1994 under which the North Koreans agreed to freeze their nuclear program and *eventually* (the accord envisioned a five-year transition period) place their nuclear sites under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The agreement also included a commitment to phasing out North Korean reactors capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. In exchange the United States and its allies (most notably South Korea, which was intended to foot most of the bill) offered economic and technical inducements, including assistance in building safer light-water reactors less suited for military purposes. The accord diffused a potentially dangerous situation, but how well its complex reciprocal arrangements would be implemented remained to be seen. Relations with North Korea would remain turbulent throughout the first term, marred by a series of military incidents and scares.²¹⁵

The administration's early policy on Haiti for the first eighteen months seemed to be cut from the same cloth of retrenchment and policy patience. A first highly visible retreat took place regarding an aspect of the Haiti problem with potentially explosive domestic implications. During the campaign, Clinton criticized Bush for indifference to the plight of the Haitian refugees. Already during the transition, Clinton and his advisers shifted their tone and began to use language obviously intended to deter Haitian refugees from trying to reach the United States.²¹⁶ The new administration rapidly settled into a mode characterized by aggressive rhetoric in support of the exiled President Aristide, patient negotiation with the junta, and an intensification of the economic sanctions in place against Haiti—a posture that would be maintained for more than a year.

However, the patience of President Clinton and his advisers came to an end in the second half of 1994 and the Haiti crisis was brought to a head. During the summer of 1994 a familiar pattern emerged. The State Department representatives (led by Warren Christopher and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott) pushed for a firm ultimatum to the Haitian junta and an invasion should they fail to yield. Defense Secretary William Perry opposed those options, arguing that the economic sanctions should be allowed more time to work and that more positive inducements should be offered. Despite lukewarm public and congressional support for a U.S. intervention, the administration chose to escalate its combination of threats and inducements designed to convince the junta to step aside during the late summer and early

autumn. By mid-September, all preparations for an invasion were in place and it appeared that Clinton would follow in the footsteps of Reagan in Grenada and Bush in Panama and use force to change the government of a small neighboring country. In a last-ditch attempt to gather public support, Clinton made an impassioned speech castigating the junta for their heinous crimes against human rights. In the eleventh hour, however, at Lake's initiative (and reportedly over State Department opposition) Jimmy Carter was drafted once again as a crisis intermediary in what appeared to be a rapidly escalating situation. This time, Carter was accompanied by former chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn. The crisis envoys succeeded in brokering an agreement that enabled the U.S. troops to land unopposed. By mid-October U.S. forces were firmly in control of the island, the junta leaders had departed, and Aristide was in charge once again. In this case, the administrator's patient approach apparently paid off—although, as in the case of Bosnia, at the cost of the human suffering that took place in the meantime and diminished accountability for those responsible for human rights abuses. The policy also entailed U.S. acceptance of a considerable degree of responsibility for Haiti's future, a responsibility that some feared might lead to "another Somalia"—a nightmare scenario that fortunately has not materialized.

As the administration approached the midterm congressional elections, the political context and presidential preferences began to change. The Clinton team's domestic agenda—including health care and welfare reform—became increasingly blocked as a more conservative mood emerged in the country. At the same time, the revamped and restaffed foreign policy operation had a number of successes in addition to the Haiti and North Korea agreements, including the Israel-Jordan peace agreement, the apparently successful deterrence of Saddam Hussein (who had once again massed troops near the Kuwait border), and improvements in U.S.-Russian relations marked by such actions as Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltic states.

These achievements reportedly stemmed at least in part from a new more hands-on and proactive presidential attitude with regard to foreign affairs. According to several accounts, Clinton had been devoting more of his time and effort to foreign affairs during much of 1994. Several explanations have been offered for this shift. One focuses on some of the early fiascoes, such as Somalia, which convinced the president

that he had to be more personally involved in foreign-policy-making. Another focuses on the increasingly gridlocked domestic situation, suggesting that foreign policy problems may have seemed more tractable and satisfying to work with than their domestic counterparts. The Republican congressional victories in the 1994 midterm elections (and subsequently in the 1996 elections) suggested that the difficult domestic legislative situation was likely to persist.

Other accounts suggest that a key factor in the administrator's successes was National Security Adviser Lake's adoption of a more assertive role during this period, which allegedly helped to steady the tiller guiding Clinton foreign policy. Lake, despite some chronic minor health problems and the deterioration of his marriage (both thought to have been exacerbated by the stressful demands of his position) shifted the balance of his role from policy broker toward policy advocate during this period. As a result Lake became, as one journalist would later describe him, "Clinton's chief gatekeeper, confidant, loyalist, and propagandist on foreign policy."²¹⁷ This more active role would persist throughout the rest of Clinton's first term and would have important implications for administration policy with regard to NATO expansion as well as several of the policy success stories already mentioned. According to J. De Parle, Lake led a faction within the administration in favor of expanding NATO in order to extend protection to several former Warsaw Pact nations—a policy opposed vehemently by other officials daunted by persistent and vocal Russian opposition.²¹⁸

A number of analyses point to Vice President Gore as another source of decisiveness and stability within the foreign-policy-making system to a far greater extent than has generally been the case for occupants of his position. Along with Lake and longtime Clinton friend Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Gore came to play an important role in shaping U.S.-Russian relations in general (meeting regularly with Boris Yeltsin's prime minister, Viktor S. Chernomyrdin) and on arms control issues in particular. According to several accounts, Gore also played an important role as monitor and troubleshooter for the policy-making system at large—acting to break logjams and to help keep the president on track. However, in so doing, Gore generally acted in the mode of high-leverage advocate as opposed to honest broker.²¹⁹

Did these changes in the mode of operation of the foreign policy system affect the handling of troublesome issues such as China policy

and Bosnia? The available evidence suggests that it did. Clinton and his team eventually made progress in resolving the difficult tensions between security, trade, and human rights considerations in the relationship with China by committing to a policy of "engagement." This entailed maintaining China's MFN status and curbing inclinations to allow human rights questions to sour the U.S.-China relationship. This is not to say that the bilateral relationship was problem-free. Serious tensions between China and Taiwan over indications that the latter was moving toward formal independence erupted in the early months of 1996 and threatened to entangle the United States in a potentially dangerous conflict. The Clinton administration ultimately made use of a stick and carrot strategy, moving U.S. naval vessels to the vicinity when a crisis punctuated by provocative Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait developed. At the same time, the United States sent strong signals that the "one China" policy in place since the Nixon administration would not be changed. The crisis de-escalated after relatively cordial consultations between Lake and his Chinese counterparts, which took place in Virginia in early March. It is noteworthy that Lake, in this case, engaged in the kind of direct statesmanship for which he had previously criticized his predecessors Kissinger and Brzezinski.²²⁰

This "new look" extended to management of the Bosnia situation as well. Internally, the Perry-Shalikhavili team succeeded in modifying the Weinberger-Powell line, thus facilitating the use of limited force in "unconventional" missions in support of diplomacy. Following a series of highly publicized atrocities against civilians in Bosnia, including the fall of the UN safe haven at Srebrenica, it became possible for a more determined Clinton national security team led by Lake to secure European support for (and Russia's reluctant acceptance of) a more coercive policy toward the Bosnian Serbs. This tougher policy came to include a campaign of air strikes in September 1995. Strongarm diplomacy spearheaded by, among others, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke resulted in the Dayton Agreement of November 21, 1995, and U.S. participation not only in air support, but also in ground operations in Bosnia under NATO auspices.

To sum up this necessarily brief and preliminary assessment, we find that the Clinton foreign-policy-making system suffered through a difficult and uneven early phase characterized by chronic presidential inattention, inadequate coordination, tendencies toward consensus

seeking on some issues and toward poorly managed policy conflict on others, which persisted through most of the first two years of the administration. The period immediately preceding and following the midterm election marked the emergence of new phase of presidential attentiveness, significantly more effective, organized, and proactive management of the policy process, and the development of mechanisms (including the more active policy advocacy role of the national security adviser) for coping with policy conflict within the advisory system and creating a more stable basis for policy formulation and implementation.

Clinton's reelection in November 1996, ironically enough, on a record that emphasized foreign policy achievement and continuity, led to a radical restructuring of the foreign-policy-making system. Secretary of State Christopher, who reportedly had been considering leaving government since at least December 1994, left the team. Clinton appointed Madeleine Albright to replace him. Albright had already established herself as an important player in her role as ambassador to the United Nations. Like Lake, the new secretary of state had an academic as well as a policy background, having been a college professor prior to her government service. Like Shalikhavili, she was foreign born—a refugee from Czechoslovakia for whom the Munich and Yalta agreements were major formative experiences. Albright, the first woman secretary of state in U.S. history, was reportedly chosen for her ability to communicate and "sell" U.S. policy (which was not, as some observers argued, Christopher's strong suit) as well as for an unusual combination of toughness and inclination toward team play. These qualities, it was hoped, would enable her to take direction from the increasingly confident President Clinton and maintain collegiality with the other principals. This is not to say that Albright lacks convictions; she is known as a fervent believer in the U.S. mission in the world as a champion of the oppressed (as indicated by her strong support for U.S. intervention in Bosnia and Rwanda) and of human rights.²²¹

In a gesture toward a bipartisan foreign policy reminiscent of Kennedy's appointment of the liberal Republican Robert S. McNamara, Clinton (reportedly at the urging of Vice President Gore) tapped maverick Republican Senator William S. Cohen to replace William Perry as secretary of defense. Cohen, a mainstream Republican on most issues and a chronic critic of the first Clinton administration's defense policies, had demonstrated his independence by occasionally

breaking ranks with his party to criticize what he viewed as gross misconduct in cases such as Watergate and the Iran-Contra scandal. Unlike McNamara, who was a former Fortune 500 executive, Cohen has had very limited management experience, raising concern regarding his ability to master the Pentagon bureaucracy.²² Another question, more poignant in light of the failure of the Gergen experiment in bipartisanship, is whether the others would be able to accept the prickly Cohen as a full member of the team.

In another dramatic postelection move, National Security Adviser Lake, a pivotal player during most of the first-term team, was nominated to the CIA directorship, slated to replace John Deutch. Press accounts suggested that Lake had been worn down by the demands of the NSA position and lacked the stamina to continue. Lake's poor personal relationship with Madeleine Albright (whom Lake had reportedly treated brusquely when she was ambassador to the United Nations) and deteriorating relations with his own deputy (and close Clinton friend), Sandy Berger, may also have contributed to Clinton's decision to move Lake out of the White House.²³ Some observers questioned whether the new post, viewed by most observers as a demotion, would capitalize on Lake's strategic talents and academic bent, traits that may have been more suited to his previous position. Similarly, his ability to take charge of the large and macho CIA bureaucracy and see the CIA through the travails of the post-Cold War era was called into question. However, others pointed to Lake's relationship with the president and record of support for covert operations as assets that might serve him in good stead in the new position. Although he was initially seen as a safe bet in the confirmation process, Lake met unexpectedly fierce resistance, leading him to withdraw his name from consideration and retire, for the time being at least, from public life.

Lake was replaced by his former deputy, Samuel L. Berger, a longtime Clinton confidant known for his diplomatic skills, which often came into use in lubricating the relationships among the principals during the first term. The manner in which Berger defines and exercises his role is likely to be an important determinant of the new team's performance and the degree of and nature of policy conflict to be expected within the system. Similarly, the replacement of Chief of Staff Panetta by his former deputy, Erskine Bowles, raises some questions as to whether friction will emerge over the extent of the White House chief of staff's prerogatives in the realm of foreign policy.

Experience suggests that it may take some time for the new team and its leader to find its equilibrium despite the fact that most of the players—the main exception being Defense Secretary Cohen—were drawn from within the first Clinton administration. Coordination difficulties and role conflicts are to be expected as the members of the new team adjust to their new roles and new modes of interaction. The heavy emphasis on collegiality in Clinton's second-term appointments presents the risk that some of the early problems with conformity and consensus seeking may reemerge as a result of the shake-up. Ironically, Clinton's own more hands-on role may make this more likely. On the other hand, the fact that many of the players know the president and each other well should serve to mitigate this risk. It thus remains to be seen whether the advisory system equilibrium, so painstakingly achieved during the first term, can be rapidly developed and maintained by the new Clinton team.²⁴

Conclusion

Each of the three management models—competitive, formalistic, and collegial—tends to have certain advantages and to incur certain risks. These are discussed in some detail by Richard T. Johnson with respect to each of the six presidents he studied (see Table 6.1).²⁵

In addition, Johnson makes a number of useful suggestions for reducing the shortcomings and risks of each of these three management models:

For example, a President who adopts the formalistic approach might choose [as Eisenhower did on occasion] to establish more fluid machinery or reach further down the information channels when facing a decision of particular importance to his Administration. [Similarly] a Chief Executive who adopts the competitive style might commission [as FDR did on occasion] formal study groups to ensure careful staff work on complex policy questions. . . . A President who chooses the collegial approach might utilize [as Kennedy did on occasion] a more formalistic structure for routine matters in order to concentrate his energies on the more sensitive policy areas.²⁶

In concluding this discussion of the different management styles generally favored by different presidents, we should remind ourselves once again that our depiction of the communication structures associated with each of them necessarily oversimplifies the more complex

TABLE 6.1 Three Management Models

Benefits	Formalistic Approach	Costs
Orderly decision process enforces more thorough analysis.	The hierarchy which screens information may also distort it. Tendency of the screening process to wash out or distort political pressures and public sentiments.	
Conserves the decisionmaker's time and attention for the big decision.		Tendency to respond slowly or inappropriately in crisis.
Emphasizes the optimal.		
	Competitive Approach	
Places the decisionmaker in the mainstream of the information network.	Places large demands on decisionmaker's time and attention.	
Tends to generate solutions that are politically feasible and bureaucratically doable.	Exposes decisionmaker to partial or biased information. Decision process may overly sacrifice optimality for doability.	
Generates creative ideas, partially as a result of the "stimulus" of competition, but also because this unstructured kind of information network is more open to ideas from the outside.	Tendency to aggravate staff competition with the risk that aides may pursue their own interests at the expense of the decisionmaker.	
		Wear and tear on aides fosters attrition and high turnover.
	Collegial Approach	
Seeks to achieve both optimality and doability.	Places substantial demands on the decisionmaker's time and attention.	
Involves the decisionmaker in the information network but somewhat eases the demands upon him by stressing teamwork over competition.	Requires unusual interpersonal skill in dealing with subordinates, mediating differences, and maintaining teamwork among colleagues.	
		Risk that "teamwork" will degenerate into a closed system of mutual support.

SOURCE: Richard T. Johnson, *Managing the White House* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Reproduced with minor changes and additions in *The Stanford Business School Alumni Bulletin*, Fall 1973.

reality and working of each system.²²⁷ To some extent, elements of two or even all three models may be present in different mixes, with different emphases, in the policymaking system of each president. As has been evident in the foregoing accounts, the typology offered by Richard Johnson has been useful only as a starting point for characterizing each president's management style. In addition, it has been necessary to provide a detailed analysis of the ways in which each president has organized, managed, and used an information and advisory system.

Over the years, as the foreign policy activities in which the U.S. government is engaged have multiplied, the organizational arrangements for dealing with them within the executive branch have proliferated. To some extent, the sheer magnitude and complexity of the foreign policy enterprise forces every modern president to rely at least to some extent on formalistic procedures. It would be difficult in the modern era for even so gifted a politician and leader as Franklin Roosevelt to rely heavily on a competitive model. Of particular importance, therefore, are studies of variants of formalistic models that, in addition, attempt to make use of elements of the competitive and/or collegial models as well.

Finally, although each of these three management models has certain advantages and disadvantages, the effort to improve their performance by introducing modification of one kind or another encounters serious limits. The search for improvement in policymaking systems must go beyond general management models of this kind to more discriminating ways of improving information processing. Three procedures for widening the range of information, options, and judgment available to a president have often been recommended. They are the "devil's advocate," the "formal options system," and "multiple advocacy."²²⁸

Notes

1. For a history and critical analysis of these efforts at reorganization, see I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), chapter 2. Nonetheless, as Destler and other students of the problem recognize, organization design and structural parameters do affect foreign policy performance. For a sophisticated discussion, see Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); see particularly chapter 1, "The Argument:

Organization Matters." For a more general discussion applying not merely to foreign policy but the presidency as whole, see Stephen Hess, *Organizing the Presidency* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976).

2. The following paragraphs draw on A. L. George, "Adaptation to Stress in Political Decision-making," in George V. Coelho, David A. Hamburg, and John E. Adams, eds., *Coping and Adaptation* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

3. This general point is emphasized repeatedly also by Graham Allison in his study for the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. For example: "The critical variable affecting which mechanisms [of centralized management] are used is the president: his personal preferences and style. . . . It follows, therefore, that efforts to legislate structure for high-level centralized management cannot succeed." Graham T. Allison, ed., *Adequacy of Current Organization: Defense and Arms Control*, vol. 4, Appendices, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, June 1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 35; see also pp. 10, 58.

4. These three management styles are described and evaluated in Richard T. Johnson, *Managing the White House* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). See particularly chapters 1 and 8. A useful discussion of the evolution of the modern presidency and of the styles of different presidents is provided by Stephen Hess, *Organizing the Presidency* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976).

5. Richard Ferno, *The President's Cabinet* (New York: Vintage Books, Knopf, 1959), pp. 44-46. See also Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt*, vol. 2, *The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), chapters 32-34, and Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley, 1960), chapter 7.

6. The following figures (with the exception of the one describing Nixon's variant of the formalistic model) are taken directly, with minor adaptations, from John Q. Johnson, "Communication Structures Among Presidential Advisers" (seminar paper, Stanford University, September 1975). The seminal work on communication networks is that of Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups," *Journal of Acoustic Society of America* 22 (1950): 725-730. A summary of early work of this kind appears in Murray Glazer and Robert Glaser, "Techniques for the Study of Group Structure and Behavior," *Psychological Bulletin* 58 (1961): 2-27.

7. Recently available archival materials at the Eisenhower Library evidently necessitate a substantial revision of the conventional image of Eisenhower as an apolitical military man, one who was generally uninformed about and not very attentive to his executive responsibilities, one who was prone to overdelegate his responsibilities, and one who was naive about the art of governing. What emerges, rather, is a different executive style that Fred Greenstein refers to as Eisenhower's "invisible hand" mode of leadership in which he sought actively to secure his goals by indirection (Fred I. Greenstein, "Presidential Activism Eisenhower Style: A Reassessment Based on Archival Evidence" [paper delivered to the 1979 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, January 1979]).

8. *Ibid.*, p. 9. See also Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977), and Murray Kempton, "The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower," *Esquire* (September 1967).

9. Greenstein, "Presidential Activism Eisenhower Style," p. 10.

10. See, for example, James David Barber, *The Presidential Character* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), and Johnson, *Managing the White House*, pp. 199-229.

11. Johnson, *Managing the White House*, pp. 210-211.

12. *Ibid.*

13. For a particularly detailed account of the structure, evolution, and performance of Nixon's NSC, see Chester Crocker, "The Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council System, 1969-1972: A Study in Foreign Policy Management," vol. 6, Appendices, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, June 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 79-99.

14. I. Destler, L. Gelb, and A. Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 217.

15. Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his memoirs (*Power and Principle* [London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1983, p. 74]), goes so far as to assert that "Carter's was perhaps formally the most centralized [decisionmaking system] of all in the post-war era."

16. Don Bonafede, "Brzezinski—Stepping Out of His Backstage Role," *National Journal*, October 15, 1977, p. 1598. See also Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at Large: Brzezinski," *New Yorker*, May 1978, and Marilyn Berger, "Vance and Brzezinski: Peaceful Coexistence or Guerrilla War," *New York Times Magazine*, February 13, 1977.

17. As criticism mounted, Carter ultimately retreated on this point and formally assigned Hamilton Jordan to the chief of staff role in 1978. Jordan occupied that post until the campaign for the 1980 election got under way, when Jack Watson took over the position. See J. Burke, *The Institutional Presidency* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 136, and James Pfiffner, "The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (Winter 1993), p. 78. A Moens (*Foreign Policy Under Carter*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 34-35) argues with some justification that despite the formal title, Jordan was never allocated responsibility for the core functions associated with the chief of staff role, namely, controlling the paper flow to the president, access, and the presidential schedule.

18. See Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, p. 120.

19. For example, Burke (*The Institutional Presidency*, p. 123) describes Carter's use of decision memoranda in which the president was offered boxes to check in order to indicate his policy preferences.

20. Bonafede, "Brzezinski."

21. Several commentators suggest that the training Carter received in the Navy through his participation in Admiral Hyman George Rickover's famous nuclear submarine program may provide clues to the development of his problem-solving style. See, e.g., C. Campbell, *Managing the Presidency* (Pitts-

burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), p. 166. For a more detailed treatment of Carter's naval career, see B. Glad, *Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White Horse* (New York: Norton, 1980), pp. 58-68.

22. Glad (*Jimmy Carter*, p. 483), characterizes Carter's problem-solving style as "mechanical," referring to his systematic approach, his proclivity for lists, and his reductionist-analytic approach.

23. Burton Ira Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), p. 37.

24. Former secretary of state Cyrus Vance, in his memoirs (*Hard Choices* [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983], p. 34), describes his understanding with Carter regarding the division of labor within the system: "First, that it be made clear that I would be the president's spokesman on foreign policy; second, that I had no objection to Brzezinski's offering Carter independent policy advice . . . but that I must be able to present to him my own unfiltered views before he made any foreign policy decision."

25. Brzezinski (*Power and Principle*, p. 63) argues that Carter sought personal control and balance among his chief foreign policy officials: "I knew full well that Carter would not wish me to be another Kissinger. At the same time, I also felt confident that he would not let Vance become another Dulles. He wanted to be the decision maker and, even more important, to be perceived as one." Kaufman (*The Presidency of James E. Carter*, p. 38), basing his argument on Carter's memoirs, suggests that Carter was suspicious of what he perceived as an overly elitist, bureaucratized, and tradition-bound State Department and intended to use the "intellectual ferment" of the NSC staff as a counterweight.

26. According to Presidential Directive/NSC-2, two major NSC committees were established: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) chaired by the relevant cabinet secretary, and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) chaired by National Security Adviser Brzezinski. The former was intended to cover issues with interagency implications in foreign policy, defense policy, intelligence, and economic issues. The latter was given a mandate for oversight of matters such as covert operations, arms control, and crisis management. For the declassified text of NSC-2, see the documentation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, *The National Security Adviser: Role and Accountability* (April 17, 1980, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 49.

27. For a description of the NSC under Carter, see Bonafede, "Brzezinski," and Lawrence J. Korb, "The Structure and Process of the National Security Council System in the First Year of the Carter Administration" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 22-25 February 1978). See also the Senate Foreign Relations Committee materials cited earlier.

28. Brzezinski did control much of the paper flow to the president on national security matters, a traditional prerogative of a chief of staff. Destler, Gelb, and Lake (*Our Own Worst Enemy*, pp. 218, 221) contend that this arrangement provided Brzezinski with a major structural advantage in policy conflicts. See also Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 61-63.

29. Vice President Walter Mondale reportedly received the same daily intelligence briefings as the other three principals (Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski)

and came to play an important role in assessing the domestic political consequences of alternative foreign policy postures. Carter was apparently reluctant to think in such terms; Mondale filled the gap. See also Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 34, and Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter*, p. 66, for treatments of Mondale's role.

30. For a remarkably incisive set of observations regarding aspects of Carter's personality and outlook that adversely affected the organization of his advisory system and his performance generally, see the series of articles published by his former speechwriter, James Fallows, "The Passionless Presidency," *Atlantic Monthly* (May and June 1979); Jimmy Carter's Theory of Governing," *The Wilson Quarterly* 1 (Winter 1977). For an in-depth, thoroughly researched critical appraisal of Carter's personality and career, see Glad, *Jimmy Carter*.

31. Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter*, p. 10.

32. Destler, Gelb, and Lake (*Our Own Worst Enemy*, p. 215) state that Carter's high levels of interest and activism in foreign affairs were one of the great surprises of the early part of his presidency.

33. See, e.g., Fallows, "The Passionless Presidency," p. 35, and Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, pp. 119-120. See also Moens, *Foreign Policy Under Carter*, p. 48.

34. Cited in Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter*, p. 34.

35. Glad, *Jimmy Carter*, pp. 501, 504.

36. Barber, *The Presidential Character*, pp. 430-433.

37. According to Moens (*Foreign Policy Under Carter*, p. 35), Carter consumed an average of three to four hundred pages of written material per day, a prodigious achievement given the other demands of a modern presidential schedule.

38. Campbell, *Managing the Presidency*, p. 60.

39. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 71.

40. Glad (*Jimmy Carter*, pp. 497-498) notes that "Carter's warmth towards others can be turned on and off like a spigot—sometimes without apparent reason" and emphasizes his fundamental detachment from other people.

41. Cited in Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, p. 120.

42. See Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, pp. 137-139. Brzezinski's account undermines the proposition that Carter was reluctant to sanction his aides and colleagues. Brzezinski (*Power and Principle*, p. 18) reports that "[Carter] never thanked me for anything, nor did he ever rebuke me sharply (which he did occasionally to every one of his senior officials, including Vance and Brown)." It is interesting to note that this description of Carter's style echoes Carter's description of his early role model, Admiral Rickover (cited in Barber, *The Presidential Character*, p. 408).

43. Moens, *Foreign Policy Under Carter*, pp. 36-37.

44. Cited in Moens, *Foreign Policy Under Carter*, p. 37.

45. The so-called VBB (Vance, Brzezinski, and Brown) Thursday afternoon lunches and the Friday morning breakfast meetings (which included Carter) were particularly important informal forums for consultation and coordination.

46. This appears to be an example of "a recurring problem of the Carter presidency: weak or conflicting delegation of authority" (Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter*, p. 25).

47. According to Brzezinski (*Power and Principle*, p. 45), more serious conflicts between Brown and Vance developed during the latter part of the administration, conflicts that were not ameliorated by Vance's resignation and subsequent replacement by Muskie. Vance does not emphasize such conflicts in his own memoirs. For an overview of Brown's role in the foreign policy process, see Moens, *Foreign Policy Under Carter*, pp. 43-44.

48. One of the main theses of Moens's *Foreign Policy Under Carter* (pp. 40, 170) is that multiple advocacy flourished during the early days of the Carter administration due to insufficient diversity of views and proposed options on many key foreign policy issues. In a recent study, for example, B. Jentleson ("Discrepant Response to Falling Dictators: Presidential Belief Systems and the Mediating Effects of the Senior Advisory Process," *Political Psychology* 11 (1990), p. 367) found that despite differences over nuances Vance and Brzezinski were basically united in their support for the shah of Iran through late 1978.

49. In a February 1977 memo to Brzezinski, Carter complained of the diversity and fragmentation of foreign policy briefings: "Get together and from now on give me one coordinated briefing book, collected from the myriad sources" (emphasis in original, cited in Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter*, p. 39).

50. Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter*, pp. 95-96.

51. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 71.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 522. According to Destler, Gelb, and Lake (*Our Own Worst Enemy*, p. 219), "Carter's determination to make detailed decisions himself without reference to any overarching strategy—and his willingness to remake and remake them—meant that no single subordinate would have his constant backing" (emphasis added).

53. Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, p. 119.

54. See, for example, Stanley Hoffman, "The Hell of Good Intentions," *Foreign Policy* 29 (Winter 1977-1978), Thomas L. Hughes, "Carter and the Management of Contradictions," *Foreign Policy* 31 (Summer 1978), and Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter*, pp. 28, 94, 97.

55. Some scholars are inclined to accord more importance to the inexperience factor. Campbell (*Managing the Presidency*, p. 59) asserts that "deep bureaucratic dissatisfaction with the administration developed as it became clear that Carter and his most trusted aides were hobbled by inexperience. This defect—lack of familiarity with the Washington scene—presented the administration with very painful learning experiences in virtually all its significant initiatives."

56. Carter was fond of quoting Reinhold Niebuhr: "The sad duty of politics is to establish justice in a sinful world" (cited in Glad, *Jimmy Carter*, p. 478).

57. See Destler, Gelb, and Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy*, p. 221.

58. Burke (*The Institutional Presidency*, p. 127) cites examples of Brzezinski's manipulation of such forums to include or exclude participants from other de-

partments virtually at will. See also Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter*, p. 128.

59. See Vance, *Hard Choices*, pp. 409-412, for his account of these events. For analyses of the decisionmaking process that led to the raid, see the early twin case studies by S. Smith: "Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission," *British Journal of Political Science* 15 (1985), and "Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission," *International Affairs* 61 (1985). See also B. Glad, "Personality, Political, and Group Process Variables in Foreign Policy Decision Making: Jimmy Carter's Handling of the Iranian Hostage Crisis," *International Political Science Review* 10 (1989).

60. Destler, Gelb, and Lake (*Our Own Worst Enemy*, p. 224) report that during this period Carter made remarks such as "Zbig, we won't let the State Department push us around." Muskie was prone to finding himself out of the loop even on major initiatives such as PD-59, a massive procurement program designed to enhance U.S. counterforce potential vis-à-vis the USSR, announced in July 1980 (Kaufman, *The Presidency of James E. Carter*, pp. 186, 192).

61. David Aaron had served as Senator Mondale's foreign policy adviser before coming to the NSC (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 58).

62. For a review of the debate concerning the degree of conceptual coherence in foreign policy exhibited by the Carter administration, see Jerel A. Rosati, "Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Leaders: Addressing the Controversy over the Carter Administration," *Political Psychology* 9 (1988), pp. 471-495. Rosati argues that "the Carter Administration initially had an optimistic worldview which was shared by the principal policymakers, but a dramatic reversal of its collective image took place over time, reflecting the continuity and change in the images of the individual policymakers" (p. 471).

63. Not surprisingly, Brzezinski himself is adamant in his rejection of these criticisms. See his *Power and Principle*, pp. 56, 526.

64. See J. Prados, *Keeper of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1991), pp. 447-459, for an account of Reagan's approach to foreign policymaking, institutional changes, and profiles of key players. See also H. Smith, *The Power Game: How Washington Works* (New York: Ballantine, 1988), pp. 558-561.

65. Burke, in *The Institutional Presidency*, labeled his chapter on Reagan "The Travails of Collegial Formalism." See also Bruce Buchanan, "Constrained Diversity: The Organizational Demands of the Presidency," in J. Pfiffner, ed., *The Managerial Presidency* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991), pp. 85-103.

66. The other two were White House Chief of Staff James Baker and presidential aide Michael Deaver. For an analysis of the workings of the troika, see J. Pfiffner, "The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 23:1 (1993), pp. 86-87.

67. According to Lou Cannon (*President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991], p. 73), recommendations from Richard Nixon heavily influenced Reagan's appointments and approach to foreign policy management during the transition and early period of his administration.

68. Prados, *Keeper of the Keys*, p. 450.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 453.
70. See, e.g., Martin Anderson's *Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988) and Lou Cannon's *President Reagan*, p. 55.
71. Surprisingly, Anderson (*Revolution*, p. 51) suggests that Reagan literally possessed a photographic memory, a useful talent for public speaking. It is thought-provoking that Reagan recently disclosed that he had been diagnosed as suffering from Alzheimer's disease. One is led to wonder whether some of his absent-mindedness in the latter part of his administration was the result of early effects of this condition.
72. B. Rockman, "The Style and Organization of the Reagan Presidency," in C. O. Jones, ed., *The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1988), p. 8.
73. Fred I. Greenstein, "Ronald Reagan: Another Hidden-Hand Ike?" *PS Political Science and Politics* (March 1990), p. 12.
74. Cannon, *President Reagan*, pp. 35, 761.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 128, 152, 180. See also Smith, *The Power Game*, p. 584.
77. As Anderson puts it (*Revolution*, p. 286), Reagan "doesn't fret and doesn't change his mind."
78. George Shultz, *Turnmoil and Triumph* (New York: Scribners, 1993), p. 920.
79. Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 276-279, and Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 281.
80. Cannon, *President Reagan*, pp. 9, 373.
81. K. Mulcahey and C. Crabbe, "Presidential Management of National Security Policy Making, 1947-1987," in J. Pfiffner, ed., *The Managerial Presidency*, p. 262. Mulcahey and Crabbe (p. 262) assert, perhaps unfairly, that Reagan was "the least prepared of any recent chief executive in the realm of foreign affairs."
82. Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 161.
83. For example, George Shultz confesses in his memoirs, *Turnmoil and Triumph*, his frustration with Reagan's "unwillingness to come to grips with the debilitating acrimony among his national security advisers."
84. See, e.g., Smith, *The Power Game*, p. 572. Cannon (*President Reagan*, pp. 176, 210) suggests that Reagan's distaste for conflict among his family of staff may derive from his childhood experiences as the child of an alcoholic.
85. Cannon, *President Reagan*, p. 308.
86. Several accounts suggest that advisers regularly engaged in Machiavellian maneuvers in order to capture eleventh-hour consultations with the president, in order to get the last word in on a contested issue. See, e.g., Smith, *The Power Game*, p. 576, and Prados, *Keepers of the Keys*, p. 481.
87. The rash of "kiss and tell" memoirs that appeared during the administration is indicative of this phenomenon.
88. The following account of the Reagan system in practice draws heavily on a previously published article by A. L. George entitled "The President and the Management of Foreign Policy: Styles and Models," in C. W. Kegley and E. R. Wittkopf, eds., *Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), especially pp. 121-125.
89. Allen's gradual adoption of a more prominent public role probably contributed to bringing this conflict out in the open. See B. Patterson Jr., *The Ring of Power: The White House Staff and Its Expanding Role in Government* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), p. 125.
90. See Smith, *The Power Game*, pp. 559, 567-586, for an illustrative account of the factional tug-of-war over the Reagan administration's policy regarding the SALT II agreements.
91. For a discussion of the negative consequences of such "undermanaged" systems, see S. Kernell, "The Evolution of the White House Staff," in J. Pfiffner, ed., *The Managerial Presidency*, p. 51.
92. Prados, *Keeper of the Keys*, p. 462.
93. Reagan's tendency to promote deputies when the NSA position became vacant was pronounced; he did it three times.
94. McFarlane's attempt to emulate Kissinger's success in establishing a relationship with the People's Republic of China by covertly seeking a rapprochement with Iran would have dire consequences for the administration. See, e.g., Smith, *The Power Game*, p. 589.
95. See the major article in the *New York Times Magazine* by Leslie H. Gelb, "Taking Charge: The Rising Power of National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane," *New York Times*, May 26, 1985, and Prados, *Keeper of the Keys*, pp. 481-496.
96. For a more extensive and systematic comparison of the Reagan and Eisenhower foreign policy management styles, see Fred I. Greenstein, "Ronald Reagan: Another Hidden-Hand Ike?"
97. For an authoritative account of the Iran-Contra Affair, see T. Draper, *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1991). Iran-Contra is also extensively treated in Lou Cannon's *President Reagan*. See also United States, President's Special Review Board, *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), and Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsel, 1993).
98. See Prados, *Keeper of the Keys*, pp. 538-540, for an account of Carlucci's career and a summary of the changes he brought to the NSC staff.
99. Powell, who had known Carlucci since a brief fellowship at the Office of Management and Budget during the 1970s, had previously been serving as Weinberger's military aide at the Defense Department (Prados, *Keeper of the Keys*, p. 543).
100. Prados, *Keeper of the Keys*, p. 540.
101. Quoted in Patterson, *The Ring of Power*, p. 104, emphasis in original.
102. Prados, *Keeper of the Keys*, p. 540.

103. For Shultz's account of these matters, see *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 902-903, 906-908, 924.
104. Prados, *Keeper of the Keys*, p. 544.
105. Patterson, *The Ring of Power*, p. 95. See also Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 1080-1081.
106. Prados (*Keeper of the Keys*, pp. 544-545) argues, for example, that the administration's involvement in what came to be known as the "tanker war" in the Gulf, which resulted in the twin tragedies of the Iraqi attack on the USS *Stark* that left thirty-five U.S. crewmen dead and the USS *Vincennes's* accidental downing of an Iranian passenger aircraft that killed 290 passengers, was the result of poorly specified objectives and rules of engagement.
107. For a rather pessimistic early assessment of Reagan's personality, cognitive style, and capacity for subtlety and change, see Glad, "Black and White Thinking." For accounts written from the vantage point of the early 1990s emphasizing Reagan's personal dynamism and relatively greater degree of cognitive openness, see Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 1135-1136, and Cannon, *President Reagan*, passim. See also B. Glad and J. Garrison, "Ronald Reagan and the INF Treaty: Whatever Happened to the 'Evil Empire'?" (paper presented at the Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Cambridge, Mass., July 1993).
108. This capacity for strategic radicalism, which shocked the nuclear weapons establishment on a number of occasions, was most clearly revealed in the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") and at the Reykjavik summit. See Cannon, *President Reagan*, for useful accounts of these developments.
109. James P. Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," *Public Administration Review* (January-February 1990), p. 65.
110. It is an interesting question whether that sense of confidence extended to other policy realms to the same extent. Perhaps Bush's early reliance on the Cabinet Council and working-group system set up by Special Assistant for Domestic and Economic Affairs Roger Porter and subsequent reliance on White House Chief of Staff Sumnu reflected a somewhat lesser sense of efficacy than that exhibited in foreign policy issues. See Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, pp. 162-163.
111. D. Oberdorfer, *The Turn* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), p. 332.
112. Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, p. 162.
113. L. Berman and B. Jentleson, "Bush and the Post-Cold War World," in C. Campbell and B. Rockman, eds., *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991), p. 99.
114. For a detailed, if rather friendly, account of Bush's service in these posts, see F. Green's *George Bush: An Intimate Portrait* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1989), chapters 9, 12, and 14. Kerry Mullins and Aaron Wildavsky ("The Procedural Presidency of George Bush," *Political Science Quarterly* 107:1 [Spring 1992]) make the rather bold claim that Bush's emphasis on consensus and his contextually driven worldview inhibited him from learning in a cumulative fashion from his prior government experience.
115. See J. T. Preston and M. D. Young, "An Approach to Understanding Decision Making: The Bush Administration, The Gulf Crisis, Management Style, and Worldview," p. 25 (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, April 1-4, 1992). See also A. R. Hybel, *Power Over Rationality: The Bush Administration and the Gulf Crisis* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), p. 8.
116. See M. Beschloss and S. Talbot, *At the Highest Levels* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993) for accounts of these consultations.
117. Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," p. 66; Beschloss and Talbot (*At the Highest Levels*, p. 4) make similar observations.
118. B. Rockman, "The Leadership Style of George Bush," in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals*, pp. 29, 31. See also Mullins and Wildavsky, "The Procedural Presidency," p. 63.
119. Many scholars emphasize the importance of the "Munich analogy" in the minds of Bush and his key advisers. See, e.g., Preston and Young, "An Approach to Understanding Decision Making," p. 22, and Hybel, *Power over Rationality*, p. 8-9. For accounts of Bush's war record, see F. Green, *George Bush*, chapter 3, and J. Hyam, *Flight of the Avengeer: George Bush at War* (New York: Berkeley Books, 1992).
120. Mullins and Wildavsky ("The Procedural Presidency," p. 35) suggest that "sustained criticism alluding to personal weakness seems to spur Bush to more aggressive behavior."
121. F. Green, *George Bush*, p. 77.
122. Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," p. 69.
123. Berman and Jentleson, "Bush and the Post-Cold War World," p. 94.
124. For an assessment of the Gulf War's impact on the United Nations and the prospects for collective security, see D. Puchala, "The President, the Gulf War, and the United Nations," in Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner, and Raymond A. Moore, eds., *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993). See also A. George, "The Gulf War's Possible Impact on the International System," in S. Renshon, ed., *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
125. B. Woodward (*The Commanders*, New York: Pocket Star Books, p. 59) notes Bush's reputation for grudges and vindictive political actions, suggesting that even Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was afraid of crossing Bush. See also Beschloss and Talbot, *At the Highest Levels*, pp. 127, 166, and Mullins and Wildavsky, "The Procedural Presidency," p. 36.
126. B. Glad ("Figuring out Saddam Hussein," in Whicker, Pfiffner, and Moore, eds., *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War*) suggests that Bush's propensity to demonize Saddam Hussein may have had negative effects on the prospects for managing the Gulf crisis toward outcomes short of war. Another clue to Bush's willingness to use force in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives may be found in his choice of presidential role model. Apparently Bush looked to Theodore Roosevelt as his inspirational "hero." According to Berman and Jentleson ("Bush and the Post-Cold War World," pp. 98-99), Bush placed a portrait of Roosevelt in the Cabinet room and no fewer than two sculptures of the former Rough Rider in the oval office.
127. Mullins and Wildavsky ("The Procedural Presidency," pp. 36-37) make a parallel argument emphasizing Bush's alternative modes of dealing with in-

siders and outsiders. Bush, they suggest, negotiates with insiders and deals harshly with outsiders. Accordingly, Bush tended to be indulgent toward the Chinese leadership (defined as insiders as a result of relationships forged during Bush's service in China) after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. In contrast, he was initially suspicious of Gorbachev (first an outsider). As a personal relationship developed between the two, Gorbachev was placed in the insider category. Though they do not make this point, the long suspicion of Yeltsin as an outsider fits nicely with this perspective.

128. Briefers included Henry Rowen, Arnold Horelick, Stephen Meyer, Alan Greenspan, Robert Zoellick, Richard Nixon, James Schlesinger, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Beschloss and Talbot, *At the Highest Levels*, pp. 43, 139–141.

129. See, for example, Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, p. 162, and Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," p. 67.

130. Quoted in Pfiffner, "Establishing the Bush Presidency," p. 67. See also Green, *George Bush*, p. 254.

131. Emphasizing this facet of Bush's personality, Preston and Young ("An Approach to Understanding Decision Making," p. 38) find him to be a group leader with a low tolerance for conflict, on the basis of their analysis of decisionmaking during the Gulf War.

132. *Ibid.*

133. Preston and Young, "An Approach to Understanding Decision Making," p. 38.

134. According to Berman and Jentleson ("Bush and the Post-Cold War World," pp. 99–101), "Bush's principal foreign policy appointees have two characteristics in common: (1) They are all professionals, with substantial previous foreign policy or other relevant government experience, and (2) they are all long-time friends or associates of George Bush." For short biographies of the Bush cabinet and White House staff, see *President Bush: The Challenge Ahead* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1989).

135. In fact, according to I. Destler ("A Job That Doesn't Work," *Foreign Policy* 38 [Spring 1980], p. 86), Scowcroft's first performance, including his working relationship with Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, was so strong as to serve as the role model for the position.

136. *President Bush: The Challenge Ahead*, p. 71.

137. It is interesting to note that a broader assessment of the Bush policy system (including economic and domestic policy realms in addition to foreign policy) would probably lead to attribution of a collegial-formalist synthesis along the lines of the Carter model. For example, the Cabinet Councils and issue-specific task forces were reportedly major features of Bush policymaking in these issue areas.

138. According to Burke (*The Institutional Presidency*, p. 175), "Bush's attempts at showing continued personal trust in aides who have suffered setbacks or who are perceived to be in disfavor has [sic] reinforced a sense of collegiality and reduced the temptation to engage in bureaucratic politics and court intrigue." Burke points to Bush gestures such as inviting Baker to Camp

David during the latter stages of the Gulf War, in order to counter press reports of an NSC advantage vis-à-vis the State Department.

139. For an analysis of Sununu's dominating style as Bush's chief of staff, see James P. Pfiffner, "The President's Chief of Staff," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 23:1 (1993), pp. 90–98. Sununu was ultimately replaced by the less autocratic Sam Skinner, who had been serving as secretary of transportation.

140. C. Campbell ("The White House and the Cabinet Under the 'Let's Deal Presidency,'" in Campbell and Rockman, eds., *The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals*, pp. 208–210) argues that Bush's foreign policy process was insufficiently collective and suggests that consultation on key decisions was often incomplete. Examples he cites include the missed opportunity of the coup attempt against Manuel Noriega, the invasion of Panama, and post-Tiananmen Square China policy. Furthermore, he submits that an inadequately structured interagency coordination process resulted in a missed opportunity to deter Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait in the first place. He alleges that Baker's focus on U.S.-Soviet relations and Scowcroft's preoccupation with his role as personal adviser to the president contributed to delaying a hardening of U.S. policy toward Iraq, which might have headed off the invasion of Kuwait.

141. J. Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War," in Whicker, Pfiffner, and Moore, eds., *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War*, pp. 7–8. He asserts that Bush's key advisers included Scowcroft, Cheney, Baker, and Powell, as well as Gates, Sumnu, and Quayle.

142. According to Beschloss and Talbot (*At the Highest Levels*, pp. 54–55), the damage control effort was managed by close coordination between Secretary of State Baker and National Security Adviser Scowcroft. In fact, they quote Baker's immediate reaction in a phone call to Scowcroft: "Dump on Dick with all possible alacrity."

143. *Ibid.*, passim. See also Oberdorfer, *The Turn*.

144. In fact, Bush maintained an overall balance in his reliance on these two leading foreign policy advisers. While he relied heavily on Scowcroft's counsel with regard to the Gulf War, the realm of U.S.-Soviet (and post-Soviet) relations reveals a more evenly balanced picture. When Baker and Scowcroft disagreed, Bush did not consistently side with either of them.

145. K. Mulcahey, quoted in Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, p. 170. Baker's alleged White House orientation was not cost free. This posture was apparently maintained by heavy reliance on a small circle of appointees at State which created friction with the career service.

146. Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, p. 168–171, and Beschloss and Talbot, *At the Highest Levels*, p. 27.

147. For these critiques, see Campbell, "The White House and the Cabinet," p. 207–208, and Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, pp. 169–170.

148. See Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, p. 170.

149. Beschloss and Talbot, *At the Highest Levels*, pp. 43–45.

150. Woodward, *The Commanders*, p. 25; Campbell, "The White House and Cabinet," p. 208, and Burke, *The Institutional Presidency*, p. 168.

151. See B. Woodward, *The Agenda* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 59.
 152. Woodward, *The Agenda*, p. 59.
 153. Lake served for a brief period in the early 1970s as one of Kissinger's assistants on the NSC staff. Lake ultimately resigned in protest against the bombing of Cambodia.

154. Lake also seemed likely to get along with Defense Secretary Les Aspin, whom he had known since his days as a junior foreign service officer in Vietnam. In fact, Lake also had close ties to Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff and Undersecretary of State Frank Wisner dating from that period. See L. H. Gelb, "Chris' and Aspin and Lake," *New York Times*, January 13, 1993.

155. Destler, Gelb, and Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy*.

156. Gelb, "Chris' and Aspin and Lake."
 157. For an overview of the organizational changes with an emphasis on the implications for the State Department see D. Newsom, "The Clinton Administration and the Foreign Service," *Foreign Service Journal* (April 1993), pp. 24-27.

158. See, e.g., T. Friedman, "Clinton Keeping Foreign Policy on a Back Burner," *New York Times*, February 8, 1993, p. A9.

159. M. Elliott et al., "Dammed Yankees," *Newsweek*, October 25, 1993, p. 24.
 160. A. Moens ("Clinton's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process," preliminary draft of a paper, May 1995, p. 8) suggests that relatively little effort was devoted to reflection on the design of Clinton's foreign policy advisory system. In our view, this is somewhat misleading. It may be true that Clinton generally tends to be somewhat insensitive to matters of organization, as noted by F. Greenstein ("Political Style and Political Leadership: The Case of Bill Clinton," in S. Renshon, ed., *The Clinton Presidency: Campaigning, Governing, and the Psychology of Leadership* [Boulder: Westview Press, 1995], p. 141). However, the evidence suggests that Clinton's system was the product of several relatively deliberate design choices, as we have outlined.

161. Friedman, "Clinton Keeping Foreign Policy on a Back Burner," p. A9.

162. E. Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 28. See also D. Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 120, 124.

163. It is noteworthy that Hillary Rodham Clinton, by all accounts one of Clinton's closest advisers on domestic policy, apparently is uninterested in foreign policy and is reportedly not a key player (Elliott et al., "Dammed Yankees," p. 24).

164. Available accounts of the Clinton administration foreign-policy-making process do not emphasize the role of White House Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty, who apparently devoted most of his energies to the domestic realm.

165. G. Hill, "Security: Official Guides U.S. Aims at Conference," *New York Times*, July 5, 1993, p. 5.

166. Other regular participants in the CIA briefing included Vice President Gore and Deputy National Security Adviser Samuel Berger. Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty attended sporadically.

167. L. Gelb, "Where's Bill?" *New York Times*, March 11, 1993; Friedman, "Clinton Keeping Foreign Policy on a Back Burner," p. A9.

168. According to the view of one White House official quoted anonymously in the *New York Times* (July 5, 1993, p. 5), "there's no question who's driving foreign policy in terms of the decisionmaking process. That would be Mr. Lake." See also J. De Parle, "The Man Inside Clinton's Foreign Policy," *New York Times Magazine*, August 20, 1995, pp. 32-39, 46, 55, 57.

169. S. A. Holmes, "Choice for National Security Adviser Has a Long Awaited Chance to Lead," *New York Times*, January 3, 1993, p. 10.

170. An NSC staff member interviewed by Eric Stern in 1993 suggested that the concern with an orderly process exhibited by Lake and the other foreign policy officials bordered on the obsessive.

171. *New York Times*, June 1, 1993, p. 3.

172. *New York Times*, July 5, 1993, p. 5.

173. P. Suedfeld's "President Clinton's Policy Dilemmas: A Cognitive Analysis," *Political Psychology* 15:2 (1994), an impressionistic analysis of the media commentary on Clinton's cognitive style, finds a consensus that he exhibits a high degree of cognitive complexity (differentiation). Ironically, Suedfeld's own systematic content analysis of Clinton's statements resulted in findings of rather low levels of complexity. Furthermore, the findings did not reflect the usual pattern of increased complexity as a political leader moves from the campaign to the governing context. See also P. Suedfeld and M. Wallace, "President Clinton as a Cognitive Manager," in Renshon, ed., *The Clinton Presidency*, pp. 215-233.

174. A major asset in such policy work (and in politics) is Clinton's good memory for facts, figures, and people. For example, Jim Moore (*Clinton: Young Man in a Hurry* [Fort Worth, Texas: The Summit Group, 1992], p. 43) makes the seemingly extravagant claim that Clinton remembers virtually everyone who has ever assisted him in a political campaign by name and personality. While this may be something of an exaggeration, this skill undoubtedly helped Clinton greatly in his political career.

175. M. Duffy, "The State of Bill Clinton," *Time*, February 7, 1994, pp. 28-29.

176. Stanley Hoffman, quoted in the *New York Times*, June 1, 1993, p. 3. In fact, Clinton has experience from the academic realm; he taught law at the University of Arkansas for several years in the early 1970s (Moore, *Clinton*, pp. 39-41). The latter phrase is Colin Powell's (*An American Journey*, New York: Random House, 1995, p. 576).

177. T. Friedman and E. Sciolino, "Clinton and Foreign Issues: Spasms of Attention," *New York Times* (international edition), March 22, 1993.

178. This characterization was suggested by a presidential aide quoted in S. Blumenthal, "The Education of a President," *New Yorker*, January 24, 1994, p. 37.

179. This seems to be the basic thrust of Woodward's account in *The Agenda*, for example.

180. The presidential scholar Fred Greenstein ("The Two Leadership Styles of William Jefferson Clinton," *Political Psychology* 15:2 [1994], pp. 351-352) resolves these competing images by suggesting that Clinton alternates between two modes of leadership: "a no holds barred style of striving for numerous policy outcomes with little attention to establishing priorities or accommodating to political realities, and a more measured, pragmatic style of focusing on

a limited number of goals and attending closely to the politics of selling his program." Greenstein suggests that clear external feedback of the impending failure of the former mode seems to trigger a retrenchment to the latter.

181. M. Hermann ("Presidential Leadership Style, Advisory Systems, and Policy Making," *Political Psychology* 15:2 [1994], pp. 369-370) suggests that Clinton appears to be extremely sensitive to the political context and uncomfortable with confrontation.

182. S. Renshon ("A Preliminary Assessment of the Clinton Presidency: Character, Leadership, and Performance," *Political Psychology* 15:2 [1994], p. 381) lists a number of commentators emphasizing this aspect, which he argues is exaggerated.

183. Woodward, *The Agenda*, pp. 78, 175.

184. It is possible that this empathy may have developed in part as a result of Clinton's experience as a child living with an alcoholic parent (see, e.g., Moore, *Clinton*, p. 24). Such children learn to be unusually sensitive to the moods of the drinker and others in their attempts to avoid triggering unpleasant episodes. See, e.g., S. Brown, *Safe Passage: Recovery for Adult Children of Alcoholics* (New York: J. Wiley and Sons, 1992), p. 27.

185. Woodward, *The Agenda*, p. 277.

186. For a persuasive and psychologically sensitive account emphasizing this point, see M. Kelley, "The President's Past," *New York Times Magazine*, July 21, 1994. See also Woodward, *The Agenda*, pp. 185-186.

187. Woodward, *The Agenda*, p. 297.

188. *Ibid.*, e.g., pp. 55, 161, 255, 278, 280. See also S. Renshon, "A Preliminary Assessment," p. 381.

189. Quoted in Woodward, *The Agenda*, p. 324.

190. Moens, "Clinton's Foreign Policy," p. 3.

191. Clinton did exhibit a high level of interest in foreign affairs as a young man. His undergraduate major at Georgetown University was "International government studies" and he worked part time as a staffer on Senator William Fulbright's Senate Foreign Relations Committee while in college (Moore, *Clinton*, pp. 27, 30).

192. Kelley, "The President's Past," p. 26.

193. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26; Hermann, "Presidential Leadership Style," p. 373.

194. Quoted in Moore, *Clinton*, p. 35.

195. Woodward, *The Agenda*, p. 34.

196. Colin Powell's *An American Journey* provides several approving examples of Clinton's composure in crisis situations.

197. Greenstein (*The Two Leadership Styles*, p. 356) goes so far as to suggest that "insensitivity to organization" is one of Clinton's most fundamental leadership shortcomings. See also Greenstein, "Political Style," pp. 141-142, and Woodward, *The Agenda*, e.g., pp. 38, 210, 324, 328.

198. According to Renshon ("A Preliminary Assessment," p. 389), "Clinton relies heavily on 'chemistry' (which can be translated as 'They get along with me and I with them') as a major basis for selecting many advisers."
199. Duffy, "The State of Bill Clinton," p. 26.

200. See, e.g., L. Berman and E. Goldman, "Clinton's Foreign Policy at Midterm," in C. Campbell and B. Rockman, eds., *The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1996), p. 291.

201. For an overview of the design and implementation of the enlargement metapolicy, see Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement," pp. 111-127.

202. For a profile of Gergen, see M. Kelley, "David Gergen: The Master of the Game," *New York Times Magazine*, October 31, 1993.

203. Elliott et al., "Damned Yankees," p. 24.

204. See, e.g., T. Friedman, "Clinton's Foreign Policy: Top Adviser Speaks Up," *New York Times*, October 31, 1993, and De Parle, "The Man Inside Clinton's Foreign Policy."

205. Woodward, *The Agenda*, p. 320.

206. E. Sciolino, "State Department Awaits Gergen with Trepidation," *New York Times*, June 29, 1994, p. A8.

207. Drew, *On the Edge*, p. 423. See also G. Church, "Taking His Show on the Road: Clinton's New Success in Juggling Foreign Policy Problems Is More Than Good Luck," *Time*, October 31, 1994 (retrieved from Pathfinder database).

208. Renshon ("A Preliminary Assessment," p. 389) suggests that a combination of Clinton's domineering personality and his tendency to pick his staff on the basis of "chemistry" may make the Clinton team susceptible to "concurrency seeking." However, other factors seemed to mitigate this alleged danger during the early part of the administration. First, Clinton by most accounts did not adopt a domineering leadership style in foreign-policy-making. Second, Clinton is commonly described as a good listener who enjoys and encourages debate. These factors would seem to make conformity based on directive leadership less likely.

209. Friedman, "Clinton's Foreign Policy."

210. Powell, *An American Journey*, pp. 583-588.

211. J. Hirsch and R. B. Oakely, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington D.C.: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

212. Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement," p. 119.

213. Clinton and Powell apparently developed a good working relationship relatively quickly, and, as a result, Powell became a far more influential player than might have been expected in light of his association with the previous two administrations (E. Schmitt and T. Friedman, "Clinton and Powell Discover That They Need Each Other," *New York Times*, June 4, 1993, pp. A1, A15. See also Powell, *An American Journey*, pp. 578-588.

214. Perry became Clinton's choice after his initial nominee, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, withdrew his candidacy under heavy media pressure. For an interesting psychological analysis of the Inman incident, see M. Feinberg and J. Tarrant, *Why Smart People Do Dumb Things* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 101-108.

215. The most spectacular of these incidents was the stranding of a North Korean submarine in South Korean territory in September 1996. For an account of the repercussions of this incident, see S. Myers, "U.S. Reports Foes in

Korea Willing to Discuss Peace," *New York Times*, December 31, 1996, p. 1. For an overview, see S. Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," *Foreign Policy* 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 57-75.

216. Clinton's change of heart on this issue may have been facilitated by an experience he had as governor of Arkansas. According to Moore (Clinton, pp. 60-63), one of the causes of his defeat in the election of 1980 was antirefugee sentiment aroused by the placement of Cuban detainees from the Mariel boat lift in Arkansas, a sentiment aggravated by the detainees' rioting and escapes from the camps and by federal government announcements of further placements in Arkansas in the months before the election. Brinkley ("Democratic Enlargement," p. 120) emphasizes the role of domestic constituencies such as the Cuban-Americans in Florida and the congressional Black Caucus in pressing for a resolution to the Haiti problem.

217. De Parle, "The Man Inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy," p. 37.

218. *Ibid.*

219. For accounts of Gore's role, see Drew, *On the Edge*, pp. 28, 68, and D. Broder, "Gore Sets a New Standard for the Vice Presidency," *International Herald Tribune*, August 27, 1996, pp. 1, 6.

220. P. Tyler, "Beijing Steps Up Military Pressure," *New York Times*, March 7, 1996, p. 1, and T. Friedman, "Foreign Affairs, Help Wanted: Deal Makers," *New York Times*, March 24, 1996, p. 15. See also T. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 1996), pp. 45-52.

221. For profiles of Albright, see, e.g., J. McCreary, "Mix and Match: In Search of Good Chemistry, Clinton Picks a Team for Personalities Rather Than Policies," *Time*, December 16, 1996, pp. 29-31; N. Gibbs, "The Many Lives of Madeleine Albright," *Time*, February 17, 1997, pp. 31-37; and "Albright: A Strong Foreign Policy Voice," *CQ*, December 7, 1996, p. 3346.

222. "Cohen: Mainstream Republican for Defense," *CQ*, December 7, 1996, p. 3345. See also McCreary, "Mix and Match," p. 30.

223. Elaine Scioliano, "Nominee for Top CIA Post Braces for Senate Show-down," *New York Times*, March 8, 1997, p. 8.

224. See E. Stern, "Probing the Plausibility of Newgroup Syndrome," in E. Stern and B. Sundelius, eds., *Beyond Groupthink* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 153-189.

225. Johnson, *Managing the White House*, chapter 8; reproduced with minor changes and additions in *The Stanford Business School Alumni Bulletin*, Fall 1973.

226. Johnson, *Managing the White House*, pp. 237-239.

227. Important refinements in the description of each president's preferred executive work style are introduced by David K. Hall, "Evaluating the Feasibility of Multiple Advocacy Theory for National Security Decisionmaking," Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1980.

228. For a discussion of these three procedures, see chapters 9, 10, and 11 in A. L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).

Index

- Aaron, David, 221
 Adams, Sherman, 208, 209
 Adler, Alfred, 29, 55-56, 58
 Albright, Madeleine, 252, 259, 260
 Alexander, Franz, 15, 45, 58
 Allen, Richard, 223, 227
 Anderson, James William, 77, 78, 79.
See also Weinstein, Anderson, and Link
 Ansbacher, H.L., 55-56
 Aspin, Les, 243, 244, 252, 253
 Axson, Ellen (WW's fiancée), 86, 87
 Axson, Stockton (WW's brother-in-law), 89, 94-96, 101, 102, 108
 Baker, Howard, 231
 Baker, James, 230, 238, 239
 cooperation with B. Scowcroft, 240
 Baker, Ray Stannard, 57, 79, 80, 83, 93, 94, 95, 98
 Barber, James David, 149-186
 personality analysis of R.M. Nixon. *See* Nixon, Richard M., personality analysis
 prediction of presidential performance. *See* Theory of predicting presidential performance
 Benham, Edith, 128
 Benton, Arthur L., 84, 85
 Berger, Samuel R., 244, 245, 260
 Berglund, Bob, 217
 Biographer, Tasks of, 17
 empathy, detachment, control of countertransference reactions as requirements to understand biographer, 1, 18-20
 Biography, Psychological compulsiveness and compulsive type, 31-34
 deficiencies of, 24-25
 diagnosing and classifying personality types, 25-27
 use of typologies and theories of personality, 27-31
See also Psychobiography, Writing of
 Bones, Helen, 92, 93, 94
 Bones, James, 93
 Bongiorno, Joseph, 55, 62-63
 Bowles, Erskine, 260
 Brand, Katharine E., 79
 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 216-222
 disagreement with C. Vance, 220-221
 Bush, George, 234-241
 cognitive style, 235-236
 collegial management model, 238, 241
 foreign policy team, 234, 237-241
 international cooperation, 236