Classified/Top
Secret (No Just Kidding)
January
16, 2024
Presidential
Review Directive 18
To:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
Attorney General
National Security Advisor
White House Chief of Staff
CC:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of National Intelligence
Subject:
Potential Chinese Action against Taiwan
The
President has directed that the National Security Council undertake a review of
US options in the event of aggressive Chinese action against Taiwan.
The
review should focus on the following concerns:
1.
What are the types of economic,
diplomatic, and military actions China could take to coerce Taiwan?
2.
What are the ways
Taiwan can defend itself economically, diplomatically, and militarily?
3.
Is the likelihood of Chinese action
against Taiwan increasing?
4.
If China takes action against Taiwan,
what will be the response of key US allies, in particular Japan, and South Korea?
5.
If China takes action against Taiwan,
what will be the response of key Chinese allies, in particular Russia, and
North Korea.
6.
If China takes action against Taiwan,
what will be the response of key multilateral bodies, such as the United
Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (the Quad – US, Japan, India, Australia)?
7.
What are the legal responsibilities of
the US toward Taiwan under international law and US domestic law?
8.
What are the economic consequences of the
potential conflict in the East Asia and South China Sea region? Special attention should be given to energy
and technology (semiconductors) sectors.
9.
What are the range of options the US has
in responding to economic coercion, diplomatic isolation, maritime blockade, or
direct military action by China against Taiwan?
10.Options considered might include: multilateral diplomacy through
the United Nations, actions taken through multilateral alliances (the Quad or
AUKUS – Australia, United Kingdom, United States or the ASEAN regional Forum),
and/or through bilateral diplomacy (US-Japan); economic responses such as
embargoes or tariffs; immediate and longer-term military assistance to Taiwan
(similar to what the US has done for Ukraine); and/or direct US military
intervention at some level.
11.US responses to even potential Chinese aggression will have long
term consequences regarding overall deterrence of China in East Asia, China’s
emergence as a global peer competitor to the US, the balance of power in East
Asia, and US and Chinese relationships with other powers in the region (Russia,
Japan, the Koreas, and ASEAN). What are the longer-term implications of an
assertive US response to Chinese threats vs. a less assertive response? In short, how will different types of US
responses to threats against Taiwan be seen by US allies and opponents in the
region? How will different types of
responses reflect on the US reputation as a reliable ally or a formidable foe?
Tasking (These are the research questions
assigned for your role)
The
following officials will be responsible for background papers that will support
the drafting of a Presidential Review Directive.
State
Department
Secretary
of State: Should the US formally abandon
strategic ambiguity? What is the impact
on the US’s reputation as an ally if it does not pledge to defend Taiwan? Will this be perceived as an invitation for
China to become the regional hegemon and a signal that the US is no longer a
reliable ally to the democratic nations in the region? Can a forceful US response be seen as a
reassertion of US leadership in the region?
Deputy
Secretary of State: What are the
possible responses of regional powers to Chinese aggression? Consider the
reactions of Japan, and Russia.
Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs: What are
balance of power implications of more assertive China? If China increases its pressure on Taiwan,
how will that reshape the emergence of China as a rival to the US in East Asia?
Is this the beginning of a Chinese sphere of influence in East Asia?
US
Ambassador to the United Nations: How
likely is it that the UN Security Council will be able to mount a response to
Chinese actions? What will be the
response of other Perm 5 members (Russia, UK, and France)? Consider their actions at the UN, not their
overall policy in East Asia. Will China’s presence on the UN Security Council
require the use of the UN General Assembly to deal with these issues?
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security: Given the alliance relationships the US has
in the region, what are the likely political-military responses of Russia and
India to Chinese coercion of Taiwan?
Assistant Secretary
of State for International Organization Affairs (IO): What are the
options for the US to use the Quadrilateral Security Alliance or the ASEAN
Regional Forum as tools for deterring China or reducing the potential for
conflict?
Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP): Given the alliance relationships the US has in the region, what
are the likely political-military responses of Japan and South Korea to Chinese
coercion of Taiwan?
Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
Given the alliance relationships the US has in the region, what are the likely
political-military responses of ASEAN nations (particularly Vietnam and the
Indonesia) to Chinese coercion of Taiwan?
Department
of Defense
Secretary
of Defense: Should the US abandon strategic
ambiguity? If the US wants to deter
China from aggression against Taiwan, and deter China from making a bid for
regional supremacy, should the US make a clear statement that it will defend
Taiwan. Examine the pros and cons of
strategic clarity.
Deputy
Secretary of Defense: If the US should decide to use force,
what options are available given current US capabilities in the region?
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
What are the options for the US to use
the AUKUS or the ASEAN Regional Forum as tools for deterring China or reducing
the potential for conflict?
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs: What are balance of power
implications of more assertive China? If
China increases its pressure on Taiwan, how will that reshape the emergence of
China as a rival to the US in East Asia?
This is a big picture question about the future of East Asia if China
acts aggressively. Is there balancing or
Bandwagoning?
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific
Security Affairs: Given the defense relationships the US has in the region, what
are the likely political-military responses of India and Australia to Chinese
coercion of Taiwan?
JCS
Chair: If the US should decide to use force,
what options are available given current US capabilities in the region?
Vice Chair JCS: What are Taiwan’s
military capabilities to defend itself, and how much of that depends on
assistance from the US?
CINC INDOPACOM: What are
the likely ways China might use military force against Taiwan?
Department
of the Treasury (Meets with Energy and Justice)
Secretary
of the Treasury: What are the economic implications of a
disruption of trade between the US and China and an overall disruption of trade
in East Asia?
Deputy
Secretary of the Treasury: What kind of economic
leverage can China use over Taiwan as a means of coercion?
Department
of Justice (Meets with Energy and Treasury)
Attorney
General: What are obligations of the US under
domestic law related to legislation such as the Taiwan Relations Act?
Deputy
Attorney General: The US has defense treaties with South Korea,
and the Philippines. What are US
obligations for the defense of those nations?
Office
of the US Trade Representative (USTR) (Meets
with NSC Staff and White House Staff)
US
Trade Representative (USTR)
What
are the economic implications of a disruption of trade between the US and China
and an overall disruption of trade in East Asia?
Assistant
USTR for China Affairs
What
kind of economic leverage can China use over Taiwan as a means of coercion?
National
Security Council Staff (Meets with White House
Staff)
National
Security Advisor: In the long term, what can prevent the
US and China from becoming antagonistic rivals? Is great power rivalry
inevitable or can the US and China find some way to accommodate the changes in
the balance of power signaled by the emergence of China?
Principal
Deputy National Security Advisor: In
the long term, what can prevent the US and China from becoming antagonistic
rivals? Is great power rivalry inevitable or can the US and China find some way
to accommodate the changes in the balance of power signaled by the emergence of
China?
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Strategic Planning: What are the balance of power implications of more assertive
China? If China increases its pressure
on Taiwan, how will that reshape the emergence of China as a rival to the US in
East Asia? This is a big picture
question about the future of East Asia if China acts aggressively. Is there balancing or Bandwagoning?
Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania: The US has defense treaties with Japan
and the Philippines. What are US
obligations for the defense of those nations?
Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for China: What are the domestic
political implications of a Chinese coercion against Taiwan for the Chinese
Communist Party? Would a new aggressive posture be an attempt by Communist
party leaders to move domestic audience’s attention away from economic problems
at home? Would a lack of success in
coercing Taiwan endanger Communist party rule or simply the rule of Xi Jinping?
White House Staff (Meets with NSC Staff)
White House Chief of Staff: What
are the likely reactions of members of Congress – Democratic and Republican
leaders -- to US assertive or less than assertive US responses to Chinese
aggression?
Director of White House Office of Legislative Affairs: What are obligations of the US under domestic law related to
legislation such as the Taiwan Relations Act?
Intelligence
Community
Director
of National Intelligence: What are the likely actions China
might take against Taiwan? Consider
economic, diplomatic, and military actions.
Deputy
Director of National Intelligence: Given the relationships the US has in the
region, what are the likely political-military responses of Japan and Russia to
Chinese coercion of Taiwan?
Director
of Central Intelligence: What are
the likely actions China might take against Taiwan? Consider economic, diplomatic, and military
actions.
Director of CIA China Mission Center: What
are the domestic political implications of a Chinese coercion against Taiwan
for the Chinese Communist Party? Would a new aggressive posture be an attempt
by Communist party leaders to move domestic audience’s attention away from
economic problems at home? Would a lack
of success in coercing Taiwan endanger Communist party rule or simply the rule
of Xi Jinping?
Meetings
During
interagency meetings later in the year, the NSC will assess the following
options and provide a recommendation to the President in the form of a draft
Presidential Review Directive. The study
papers assigned above form the background work for the NSC interagency
process. As per PD-1 Organization of the
National Security Council Process (imaginary document from the Newmann
Administration), membership in the key interagency groups is as follows:
National Security
Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC)
1. Chair: National Security
Advisor
2. Secretary of State
3. Secretary of Defense
4. Secretary of Treasury
5. Attorney General
6. Director of National
Intelligence
7. Chair Joint Chiefs of
Staff
8. US Trade Representative
9. CINC INDOPACOM
10.White House Chief
of Staff
National Security
Council Deputies Committee NSC/DC
1. Chair: Principal Deputy
National Security Advisor
2. Deputy Secretary of
State
3. Deputy Secretary of
Defense
4. Deputy Secretary of
Treasury
5. Deputy Attorney General
6. Deputy Director of
National Intelligence
7. Vice Chair JCS
8. Director of Central
Intelligence
9.
Director of WH Office of Legislative Affairs
10.Counselor of the
State Department
National Security
Council Policy Coordinating Committees (NSC/PCCs)
China PCC
1.
Chair, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia
and Pacific Affairs
2.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs
3. Director of CIA China Mission Center
4.
Assistant USTR for China Affairs
East Asia PCC
1.
Chair, Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for East Asia and Oceania
2.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific
Security Affairs
3.
Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs (IO)
4.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Strategic Affairs PCC
1.
Chair, Special Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Strategic Planning
2.
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
3.
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security
4.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy