Abstract. The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate that wins all of the possible pair wise elections, meaning that each voter has a specific preference of who they favor. The Condorcet efficiency is described to be the conditional probability that the voting procedure will result in the Condorcet winner, assuming that this winner does exist.
We will then examine how the Condorcet method works in an election with different types of scenarios and how it's efficiency is affected by a complete preference schedule (where all the candidates are preferred over another for each voter), partial indifference (there are both cases of voters preferring and not preferring candidates), and complete voting indifference (all voters do not prefer any candidate over another). For the final section of this presentation, we will briefly explore one of the most intriguing questions: if Condorcet's method only works for elections that have voting preferences, is it possible for it's efficiency to increase as voting indifference increases? We will explore why or why not this is true in detail during this presentation.