CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE OF DECEPTION AND APPLICANT FAKING BEHAVIOR

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The use of personality based employment tests has made the intersection of the applicant and the organization much more interesting. While the interpretation of cognitive ability tests is straightforward, noncognitive selections tools offer applicants another opportunity to put their best foot forward, albeit in a fashion not intended by the creators or users of the instruments. Applicants have a great deal of latitude in how they choose to respond to noncognitive employment tests, and may choose to do so in a fashion that does not reflect their true level of the trait.

In fact, between 30 and 50% of applicants elevate their scores (Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2008; Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, in press). Not to be outsmarted, Industrial Organizational (I/O) psychologists have armed themselves with more difficult formats and often warn the applicant that if they misrepresent themselves they will be detected (likely a lie on our part). Some I/O professionals find the discussion of applicant faking distasteful and refuse to acknowledge it. Other I/O psychologists try to
hush any conversation regarding faking so we can keep this little family secret to ourselves.

However, the news is out. There are several popular "how to" guides concerning methods for optimizing one’s score on personality tests. These helpful hints to applicants date back to the 1950s (Whyte, 1956). In a recent *Time* magazine article titled “What Are They Probing For?” Ehrenreich (2001) described her experience of applying for low paying jobs and faking personality-based selection measures. She stated, “The tests are easy to ace” and offered several faking strategies. Applicants can now purchase the book *Ace the Corporate Personality Test* (Hoffman, 2000). The book offers a tutorial on how applicants can manipulate noncognitive employment tests to maximize their chance of getting hired. The author describes the dimensions of personality, scoring procedures, and lie scales. Hoffman provides example questions and provides advice on how to frame responses that fit specific positions (sales, management, etc.). The Internet provides a wealth of information about faking and personality measures, with stories appearing in widely accessed Web sites such as CNN.com and ABCnews.com. Several Web sites discuss personality assessment, the faking process, and how to watch for lie scales and response patterns that might end in detection (Butcher, 2003; Connolly, 2005; Song, 2005; Swartz, 2003). In some ways these popular applicant resources may be helpful to our science. Instead of ignoring a potential weakness in noncognitive assessment, our field may now be compelled to more closely examine the faking issue.

In this chapter, we will discuss the use of personality-based selection measures, and introduce the topic of applicant faking. We will then review literature examining the nature of deception, and its prevalence in society. While the discussion of the animal kingdom and Greek philosophy is not often covered in the applicant faking literature, we use examples from these diverse fields of study to demonstrate the robustness of deceptive behavior across settings. In addition, we briefly discuss the foundations of our current assumptions regarding deception, and how those assumptions may color our understanding of faking behavior. Finally, we will pose some questions regarding the state of our knowledge about applicant faking behavior and introduce the remaining chapters of this text.

**PERSONALITY MEASUREMENT AND FAKING BEHAVIOR**

The use of personality measures for employee selection has increased greatly in the last 20 years, and has been accompanied by a tremendous surge in research. This resurgence followed a relative lull in the literature, largely due to the influence of authors such as Guion and Gottier (1965)
and Mischel (1968). Previously, researchers have claimed that personality measures did not add significantly to the prediction of job performance over and above other selection techniques (Schmidt, Goody, Noe, & Kirsch, 1984). However, due to the wide-ranging support of the five factor model, a generally accepted taxonomy of personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Costa, 1996; Digman, 1990), and meta-analytic support for the validity of the scales, personality measures have made a strong comeback. Self-report measures are favored by organizations for several reasons. First, many personality measures have demonstrated useful validity with respect to personnel-related decisions (Barrick & Mount, 1991, 1996; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Not only do they demonstrate criterion validity, but they are also essentially unrelated to ability measures and therefore add incremental variance when included in a selection battery (Salgado & de Fruyt, 2005; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Second, they are easy and inexpensive to administer to large groups of applicants. Third, self-report measures, such as personality measures and integrity inventories, exhibit less adverse impact than alternative selection devices such as cognitive ability tests (Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001; Sackett & Wilk, 1994).

Although personality measures are generally supported as effective tools for personnel selection, they have been criticized because they are easily faked by job applicants (Douglas, McDaniel, & Snell, 1996; Hough & Oswald, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2000). This phenomenon has been studied under a variety of names including response distortion, impression management, social desirability, unlikely virtues, self-enhancement and self-presentation (Hogan, 1991; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Hough & Paulin, 1994; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). While many of these terms are conceptually distinct, they all pertain to the elevation of scores on a personality inventory under motivated applicant conditions. Under these circumstances, respondents often raise their scores on positive attributes (such as conscientiousness) and lower their scores on undesirable traits (such as neuroticism). While the general concept of trait elevation is understood, little consensus on the operational definition of faking has been reached (Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004). In addition, we know little about the outcomes associated with faking behavior. Thus we have few answers to the elusive question of what constitutes faking behavior, and the extent to which faking matters.

Research has suggested that practitioners are aware of applicant faking and are interested in efforts to reduce it. In a study conducted by Rees and Metcalfe (2003), 39% of managers reported that personality measures were easy to fake, and that they believed over half of all applicants engaged in faking behavior. Goffin and Christiansen (2003) suggested
that 69% of practitioners either use, or would like to use, corrections for socially desirable responding on noncognitive selection measures.

Why the concern? Perhaps employers harbor the fear that if an applicant has been dishonest on a selection measure, that applicant may choose to be dishonest on the job. Previous research has suggested that honesty and integrity are rated as the most important characteristics required in applicants (Coyne & Bartram, 2000; Bartram, Lindley, Marshall, & Foster, 1995). This research demonstrated that these characteristics were considered more essential than ability, work experience, and academic qualifications. Thus, as far as employers are concerned, fakers may already have one strike against them. Where do these concerns come from? Why do fakers garner so much attention? Many of these concerns stem from our assumptions about deceptive behavior in general. Therefore to understand where the attitudes towards faking behavior originate, it may be useful to examine the broader literature surrounding deception. The deception literature ranges across a number of diverse disciplines including philosophy (Fingarette, 1998; Frankfurter, 2005; Mele, 1999; Solomon, 1996, 2003), law (Alexander & Sherwin, 2003; Beahrs, 1991; Meissner & Kassin, 2002), anthropology (Dongen, 2002; Smith, 1987; Whiten & Byrne, 1988), business ethics (Cramton & Dees, 1993; Friedman, 2000; Strudler, 1995) and psychology (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003; Ekman, 1985; Hyman, 1989; Lykken, 1979). It is our hope that briefly introducing a broader perspective on deception may challenge previously held notions regarding the prevalence and pervasiveness of dishonesty, and that these new assumptions may help reframe the assumptions surrounding applicant faking behavior.

THE NATURE OF DECEPTION

Deception is defined as “the deliberate attempt to conceal, fabricate, and/or manipulate factual or emotional information in order to create and maintain in another a belief that the communicator considers false” (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004). Intention is a key component in this definition, and it is a common element in other definitions (Bok, 1978; DePaulo & Depaulo, 1989; Ekman, 1985; Miller & Stiff, 1993).

It has been suggested that deception has a basis in evolution, and is an adaptive characteristic (Smith, 2004). Organisms that are able to gain a competitive advantage by deceiving predator or prey have a better chance to survive and reproduce (Bond & Robinson, 1988). Thus, deception is all around us. At first glance the king snake looks remarkably similar to their poisonous cohort the coral snake, which deters predators from dining on
them (Greene & McDiarmid, 1981). The opossum deceives potential predators by “playing dead” (Bracha, 2004). Species select for any advantage that will aid in survival against enormous odds. Surviving on this planet is statistically challenging, and deception may provide an edge to those species that effectively use it (Bond & Robinson, 1988). Animals that blend into background with camouflage are less likely to be eaten, and are more likely to eat. The same is true for species that mimic their surroundings, or other species. However, these types of deception are different from our current focus in that they are passive, and outside of the organism’s control.

Evolutionary psychology suggests that more active forms of deception also play an adaptive role. In a study of chimpanzees, researchers have found that these primates utilize deception to achieve their goals (Scott, 2001). For instance chimps have been observed faking a limp to garner attention, and ignoring food found while other chimps were present to retrieve it later so the food would not have to be shared (de Waal, 1982; Goodall, 1988). Some researchers have suggested that social complexity, and the deception that accompanies it, may in part be responsible for the advanced development of the human brain (Adenzato & Ardito, 1999). Unlike other mammalian species, the determining characteristic of primate dominance is not size alone. Primate species achieve dominance through the development and maintenance of social networks, and deception is a key tool in this coalition building (Adenzato & Ardito, 1999).

Thus, it should not be surprising that deceptive behavior is part of the competition for employment. Rather, we should be shocked if it were not. Nature provides an abundance of examples of how deception is used to gain a competitive advantage. The employment setting can be viewed as an extension (albeit a socially constructed one) of the competitive forces of nature.

Across many disciplines and literature sources, deception has a strong negative connotation. Deception is often associated with a lack of morals or integrity (Bok, 1978). Western society is based on the notion that truth is a virtue, and that deception is a vice. In fact, the beginning of Judeo Christian ethics commences with the tale of a lie. In the Garden of Eden, Eve told God “The serpent deceived me, and I ate.” Western philosophy almost universally portrays deception as a breach of character. In a discussion regarding the inflation of one’s accomplishments, Aristotle suggested that deception reflects on the character of an individual, and ultimately on one’s virtues (Aristotle, 1991). Kant (1787) describes truthfulness as a moral imperative, and deception a disruptive social force that can erode trust in communication. Nietzsche (1989) stated that deception inevitably ends in compromised relationships. While some philosophical positions
have less stringent views of deception, in only a few instances is it portrayed in a positive manner. History also reveals a consistent public attitude toward deception. While George Washington is revered for his inability to tell a lie, Bill Clinton was impeached for it.

Despite our strong social norms against deception, it is a pervasive element in society. We all engage in deception, and we do it quite frequently. On average, people tell three lies for every 10 minutes of conversation (Smith, 2004). While most individuals view themselves as moral (Taylor & Brown, 1988), most lie every day (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Dwyer, & Epstein, 1996). Some researchers suggest that deception is a part of our social fabric and that successful functioning of society would be hampered without it (Nyberg, 1993; Scheibe, 1980; Smith, 2004). In some ways we have not been socialized to be completely honest, but to know when and how to use deception so that it is socially appropriate. Anybody who has ever had a significant other ask the question “Do you like my new haircut?” knows that there is only one right answer to that question! While we have come to associate deception with a lack of integrity and unethical behavior, it is often a socially acceptable alternative to completely truthful communication. In fact, we seldom like people to be totally honest. Those people who do not understand the rules of acceptable deception, or choose to ignore them are often seen as grating, and are socially scorned (Nyberg, 1993). While we scold others for being deceptive, we are likely engaging in the same behavior to achieve a desired goal of our own. Therefore “fakers,” who have been somewhat stigmatized in the I/O literature, may not be behaving much differently than most other people are at any given moment.

Deception is a persuasion strategy. Few individuals deceive for the sake of dishonesty; most use deception as a means towards achieving a desired goal (Miller & Stiff, 1983). During this process the deceiver alters his or her communication in an attempt to influence the beliefs of the target. Altering the beliefs of the target is only one step in the intended action of achieving a predetermined end state that benefits the deceiver. To successfully complete this communication strategy, the deceiver must assess the situation, the current belief state of the target, and the target’s ability to facilitate goal achievement. The deceiver then can modify his or her message in a fashion that will maximize the chances of obtaining the goal, and minimize the consequences of deception (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). This description of deception seems fairly cognitive and suggests decision-making components, but deception is not an entirely cognitive phenomenon. Emotions are closely associated with deception (Ekman, 1985; Ekman & Frank, 1993).

One such emotion is the fear of getting caught. If the magnitude of the fear outweighs the valence of the desired goal, individuals are less likely to
engage in deception. Ekman and Frank (1993) suggested that fear will be greater if the deceiver perceives the target to be difficult to mislead and if the consequences associated with getting caught are severe. Another emotion that is associated with deception is guilt. Our socialization regarding deception is strong and we consistently receive messages reinforcing the notion that deceptive actions are wrong. Depending on the strength of the socialization of the deceiver and the situation, guilt may be strong enough to interfere with the attempts at deception. In some cases this guilt may be very strong! In a research study we conducted at the University of Akron, we instructed students to respond to a personality questionnaire in such a fashion as to make the respondent look desirable to a potential employer. One subject approached us in the course of the study and pointed out that we were asking her to lie, and that she would not do it! The subject’s socialization against deception was so strong that even responding to an instructional set caused her great distress. Situational factors that are associated with guilt and deception include the relationship between the deceiver and target, and the social sanctions associated with deception in that context. Eckman and Frank (1993) suggested that liars feel less guilty when their targets are impersonal or totally anonymous. In addition, if the deceiver feels that “everyone is doing it,” they may not be deterred by the general social sanctions that apply to dishonesty.

Extrapolating these individual differences and situational cues to the applicant situation does not paint an encouraging picture in terms of discouraging deception. Some applicants might believe that their attempts at faking can be detected (if they actually believe our warnings, which again are likely fabrications on our part). However the consequences for getting caught are minimal. Perhaps they will not get the job, but their name will not appear on a national registry of known deceivers and application fakers. They will simply move to the next available job and complete another measure (unless conditions are such that other jobs are not available, in which case the punitive consequences of being detected may be higher). Other factors are likely to make the selection setting prone to deception on the part of the applicant. The applicant is not likely to have a relationship with the target (in this case the organization). In an increasingly corporate service economy, the target may be perceived as a distant disembodied giant, not a person. Applicants may also feel that not faking may leave them at a competitive disadvantage if they believe the behavior is widespread. In a recent study, 74% of applicants believed that other applicants were engaging in faking behavior (English, Griffith, Graseck, & Steelman, 2005). Thus, the conditions surrounding the application process seem to be fertile ground for deception.
Much of the deception literature refers to a central concept called Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This theory suggests that to effectively deceive an individual, the deceiver must understand what the target knows and how that information can be altered in a way to achieve a goal and evade detection. Individuals must develop this “mind reading” skill to effectively utilize deception. Small children, while often willing to deceive, are not very good at it. Research has suggested that the inability to place themselves in the mind of the target may be responsible for this failure to effectively lie (Wimmer & Perner, 1988). This same inability has been posited to explain why individuals with autism may be less effective at deception (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).

It may be surprising to researchers and practitioners, but many applicants who fake also have the inability to effectively deceive on noncognitive employment instruments. Perhaps as many as 20% of applicants fake in the wrong direction (Christiansen & Montgomery, 2005; Griffith, Yoshita, Gujar, Malm, & Socin, 2005; R. L. Hogan, personal communication, October 11, 2005), and much of this dysfunctional faking may be due to the theory of mind explanation. Applicants who do not understand the job or the organizational requirements actually reduce their score, and may fake themselves out of a job. Vasilopoulos, Reilly, and Leaman (2000) suggested that applicants who fake effectively are better able to develop an adopted schema (or implicit job theory) detailing the traits of a successful employee. Deceiving another individual requires a considerable amount of information processing. Not only must the deceiver understand the relationship of the distorted information with the desired goal, they must also understand the target’s construal of the situation, and the response that will be most effective with each target.

Simple mathematics tells us that some process must be occurring when applicants respond to a measure. Completing the questionnaire takes considerably more time than reading the sentences that comprise the items. Reading a 20-item scale takes about 1.5 minutes, however the average administration time for a scale of that length takes about 10-15 minutes. Something is going on during that time. While time is necessary to access self-relevant information, ample time is still left to consider the impact of this self-reported information, and to consider different reporting strategies that might be more successful. If a decision is made to adopt a less than truthful response, additional time may be necessary for the successful completion of the faking process to occur. Previous research has suggested that there is some response latency when faking occurs (Dwight & Alliger, 1997).

When examining the employment testing setting, it becomes clear that deceptive behavior on the part of the applicant is likely, and in some ways a normal response to the situation. First, evolutionary psychology would
suggest that we might be born to deceive. Deception is an adaptive mechanism selected by nature, and thus may be a hard-wired component of human behavior. Second, the situational demands of the applicant setting contain the elements that are likely to elicit deceptive behavior. Applying for a job is a goal driven competitive setting, and few emotional barriers are present to suppress deception. Given this combination of determinants, deception may be the rule rather than the exception in applicant settings. Combined with the robust phenomenon of self-enhancing bias, deception in the applicant setting is likely to produce a significant number of individuals who elevate their scores on personality instruments. In light of our knowledge regarding deception, the research question of “do applicants fake” is silly. The better question might be “why wouldn’t they fake?”

Faking and Future Research

Despite the almost universal view of deception as a negative behavior associated with a lack of character, we all engage in deception many times in any given day. However, the use of deception in the employment context in the form of applicant faking still has a stigma associated with it, and often leaves future employers uneasy about their selection choices. Because deception varies in form and severity, we would expect a variation in the outcomes associated with faking. In the end, it may be that “fakers” will engage in behavior counterproductive to the organization, but the truth is we do not have evidence to support that position. Nor do we have evidence to support the counter position. At this present time, little is known about the characteristics of individuals who choose to elevate their scores.

To date, our science has been ineffective at building a basic understanding of the faking phenomenon. While most practitioners support the notion that applicants elevate their scores in an applicant setting, researchers have struggled to adequately define and explain this elevation. Furthermore, research has yet to scratch the surface of the possible associated outcomes of this variety of response distortion. Part of our lack of success in uncovering the nature and consequences of applicant faking is the lack of tested models of faking, or even a theoretical backbone to support such a structure. In recent research history a straw man argument divided researchers instead of facilitating collaboration. Researchers quickly took a side on the issue of “does faking matter?” and often, deep lines were drawn in the sand between the two positions.

The idea for this book was to bring some of those divergent opinions on the nature of faking together, and to address questions regarding the
phenomenon of faking and our research efforts to untangle it from the personality measurement process. The question "Does faking matter?" is a rather blunt dichotomous question; however, we aim to address that question, perhaps indirectly, through a closer examination of applicant faking behavior. The questions that are the primary focus of our discussion will center on the complexity of faking behavior and attempt to come to some agreement on the basic assumptions that may underlie our research. It is the hope that a more common set of assumptions will allow future research to become integrated so as to provide more complete understanding to guide our practice. To that end, the chapters of this book discuss the following questions:

1. What is "faking"? This phenomenon has gone by many names, but has generally been based on a few common assumptions. Much of the applicant faking literature has equated faking with deception. Deception in turn is often equated with a lack of morals, and those attempting it are cast in a negative light. However the base rate of deception in society is not comprised of a few morally bereft liars who are shunned, but of almost the entire population. Deception in its varying forms is extremely prevalent in our society, with some claiming that it is the very basis of social interaction. So, is applicant faking a form of deception? Can other variables explain the elevation in scores? If so, how do those mechanisms operate?

2. What is the overarching goal of faking research? To some extent, the progress of this research has been slowed by what appears to be several goals of the research that focus too closely on the phenomenon of faking without keeping the larger goals of I/O psychology in mind. In the case of faking research, what is the "end" to our means? Is this goal (or set of goals) appropriately targeted to reach a meaningful resolution to the issue? Are our research questions and designs currently congruent with these goals?

3. What is occurring when an applicant fakes? What is the process of faking, and what variables (individual differences, situational, etc.) interact to create favorable/unfavorable faking conditions? Much of our research has examined the outcomes of faking, but little has examined the process. How can knowledge of this process contribute to our overarching goals?

4. What are the characteristics of the "typical" faker? Is there a stable set of characteristics that are associated with this type of behavior? If so are these characteristics associated with negative performance (as is assumed by many researchers), better performance, or performance equivalent to a nonfaking sample? What kinds of perfor-
mance (if any) may be most impacted by hiring fakers? Are these characteristics and situational influences stable across cultures?

5. How do we assess whether an individual has faked in an applied setting? Much of what we have learned (or have not learned) about faking stems from studies using instructional sets. These studies tell us something about how much an applicant fakes, but do not tell us much about the applicant setting. Social desirability (SD) measures have been widely used to assess faking behavior. How sensitive are these measures to faking? What, if anything, are they assessing? How can this information be used to improve the predictive validity of personality measures?

6. What methods can be used to reduce the impact of applicant faking, and how effective are these techniques? Warnings and alternative items formats have long been used to deter fakers. How well do these techniques work, and what are some of the consequences of their use? How can these methods be improved to help researchers and practitioners meet the overarching goals of personality measurement? What has our research history taught us, and how do we apply those lessons?

7. There have been several prominent calls for the cessation of faking research (most notably Kevin Murphy’s discussion in a 1999 SIOP symposium where he stated he would no longer accept faking papers at the Journal of Applied Psychology). Why has there been resistance to this kind of research? Why are so many people interested in it? Are some research designs and analytic techniques more promising than others in our efforts to understand the phenomenon? How have the unique artifactual characteristics of the designs and analytic techniques colored our understanding of applicant faking behavior?

These questions are addressed in the remaining chapters of this book, and additional questions are posed by a group of researchers with extensive research expertise in the measurement of personality and applicant faking behavior. There are several consistent themes that run through the chapters of this text. The first is that faking research has largely been atheoretical, and that future research should be based on sound theoretical models of applicant responding. The second theme is that applicant faking behavior is complex, and that “faking” is not likely to be a unitary construct. Finally the third, and perhaps most important, theme that runs through the book is that personality measures are useful predictors of important organizational outcomes, and that although they are flawed by faking, they continue to be beneficial in selection batteries. To this group
of researchers, addressing the faking issue only improves the usefulness of the measures.

In chapter 2, Zickar and Gibby present a historical review of faking research. While the topic of faking has received much recent attention, the issue has been discussed for almost as long as personality measures have existed. In this chapter the authors detail the development of the mechanisms used to combat faking, such as lie scales and warnings, which are discussed in later chapters. Much of the emphasis of the chapter is on research conducted prior to 1970, however after decades of research many of the same research questions remain unanswered. The chapter concludes with a brief review of contemporary research, and suggestions for future study.

In chapter 3, Tett and colleagues present seven nested questions regarding the viability of faking research, and propose an interactionist model of faking. While faking researchers are familiar with the traditional 3 questions surrounding faking (can applicants fake? do they? does it matter?), the authors expand this line of questioning and use this framework to address the recent calls for the cessation of faking research. The second portion of this chapter proposes a model of faking that integrates both individual differences and situational factors in a trait activation structure. The authors then apply this framework to explain and reconcile previous research results.

Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran discuss the strengths and weaknesses of various research designs and analytical methods that have been used to examine faking in chapter 4. In addition, the authors discuss the kind of research questions that can be addressed by each of these designs, and how the inappropriate use of design can cloud research results. In the latter portion of the chapter, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran discuss the extent to which individuals differ on faking behavior, and whether the lie scales and SD measures used to capture faking are beneficial to organizations.

Burns and Christiansen discuss the development of social desirability (SD) measures, and their role in statistical corrections for faking in chapter 5. SD is discussed both as a trait, and as a response set. In addition, the relationship of SD to other substantive constructs is discussed. Measures of socially desirable responding are the most common method of controlling faking, but the authors of this chapter suggest that these proxy measures may not actually be tapping faking behavior. Burns and Christiansen advise caution when drawing conclusions from SD scores, and suggest further refinement of the construct and scales.

In chapter 6, Griffith and colleagues review potential antecedents of applicant faking behavior, including situational influences, cognitive
biases, and individual difference variables. The authors then summarize the results of a program of research that tested these antecedents empirically. Their research suggests that a portion of faking behavior can be explained by nonvolitional components such as trait activation and temporal biases. In addition, the individual differences of integrity and locus of control were significantly related to the amount of faking. Perhaps of most interest is the finding that measures of SD were not related to actual levels of faking behavior.

In chapter 7, Snell and Fluckinger reframe the faking issue by focusing on the validity of personality measures and presenting an applicant response model based on James’s theory of conditional reasoning. The authors point out that most faking research has been conducted in an atheoretical fashion, and has unsuccessfully searched for a “silver bullet” to put our concerns regarding faking at rest. The authors suggest that a theoretically sound applicant response model will lead to more informative research, and ultimately generate better strategies for improving the validities of noncognitive measures.

Johnson and Hogan present a socioanalytic view of applicant responses in chapter 8 that is based on self-presentation theory. The authors suggest that previous models of applicant responding, which portray applicants as detached individuals who provide accurate account of their reflections, are unrealistic. Instead they suggest that test-takers use the personality assessment as an opportunity to present themselves in a manner that will further their agendas. The model of responding presented by the authors in chapter 8 has interesting implications for the construct validity of noncognitive measures. This model implies that we are not assessing the person’s personality per se, but their projected personality.

In chapter 9, Peterson and Griffith examine the faking/job performance relationship. The authors break this issue into two research questions. First they examine the performance of personality measures under faking conditions by asking the question, “Are personality measures useful when a substantial portion of applicants fake?” In addition the authors discuss the job performance of those individuals who choose to fake, and are hired by the organization. The chapter uses several hypothetical scenarios to explore the effects on criterion-related validity and the quality of hiring decisions.

Converse and colleagues review the research surrounding the use of forced choice measures to reduce the impact of faking in chapter 10. Forced choice measures, attempt to reduce faking a priori, versus attempting to make faking corrections post hoc. The authors discuss recent studies that have demonstrated reduced fakability, and criterion-related validities comparable to Likert scales. In addition, the authors
address key questions regarding the ipsative nature of the measures, and the actual use of forced choice measures in selection settings.

Chapter 11, authored by Pace and Borman, discusses the use of warnings to reduce the effects of faking on personality measures. Traditionally, warnings have been constructed so that applicants are informed that their attempts at faking can be detected, and that punitive action will be taken if they are detected. Pace and Borman suggest an alternative format of warnings that may have less of an effect on applicant reactions. These warnings emphasize the notion that faking is not in the best interest of the applicant, and therefore reduce the motivation to fake. The authors recommend the development of additional warning approaches grounded in theory.

Chapter 12 details the interaction of cognitive ability with several methods used to deter applicant faking. Vasilopoulos and Cucina suggest that these deterrents (warnings, forced choice, subtle items) can have the unintentional consequence of increasing the cognitive load of the personality item response process. Therefore to effectively fake under these conditions cognitive ability may play a role. The authors also state that the attempts at reducing faking may affect the adverse impact and incremental validity of noncognitive measures. In addition, they point out that the interaction of cognitive ability may affect the construct validity of personality measures.

Frei, Yoshita, and Issacson examine the phenomenon of faking across cultures in chapter 13. More specifically, the authors suggest that the meaning of faking may differ across cultures, such that elevated scores in one cultural setting may not have the same meaning as another. Frei et al. summarize the studies on response distortion in international employment testing and highlight potential cultural variables that might influence applicant faking. The latter portion of the chapter provides an example of how indigenous cultural variables in Japan might impact applicant faking in such a way that it would be hard to label it as faking.

Finally in chapter 14, Ryan and Boyce address the motivation of researchers who choose to examine applicant faking. They suggest that the desire to answer practitioner’s questions about faking has largely driven the research. Ryan and Boyce suggest that faking should be addressed within the broader question of what affects the ability and motivation to respond to items in an accurate manner, and that asking the question of “Does faking matter?” may be too imprecise. These authors correctly point out that being more specific in our research questions and basing research on sound theory is likely to lead to better solutions for the users of personality tests.
CONCLUSION

Our primary goal for this book is to challenge the assumptions that have served as the basis of contemporary faking research. To that end this group of authors was asked to wipe the slate clean and try to get past the "does faking matter" question, and closely examine the complexity of the faking phenomenon. If successful, this book will raise more questions than it answers and the questions will lead to theoretically sound tests regarding the assumptions regarding applicant faking behavior.

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