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Electoral Incentives, Public Policy, and the New Deal Realignment

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This paper develops a model of the effects of electoral incentives on policy, then applies the model to the New Deal realignment. In the model, policy is the outcome of an agenda-setter game between the president and legislators. Specifically, the president sets policy subject to legislative approval. The president's ability to concentrate benefits in states with high electoral payoffs depends in part on his or her power to influence legislators' prospects for reelection. Regression analysis shows that New Deal spending and roll call voting patterns in the House of Representatives support the model. Historical accounts of other aspects of New Deal policy, including labor and civil rights issues, are consistent with the model. Together, the theoretical results and the empirical evidence help to explain several striking features of the policy and politics of the 1930s, including (i) why a government dominated by the Democratic Party would provide high benefits to swing states and much lower benefits to the traditionally Democratic South, (ii) why favoritism of swing states increased from the 1933–1934 period to the 1937–1938 period, (iii) why favoritism of swing states decreased from 1938 to 1939, and (iv) why, with the rise of the conservative coalition in Congress in the late 1930s, it was the representatives from traditionally loyal Democratic districts that created the strongest Democratic opposition to Roosevelt and the New Deal.

1. Introduction

This paper develops a model of the effects of electoral incentives on policy, then applies the model to the New Deal realignment. In the model, policy is the outcome of an agenda-setter game between the president and legislators. Specifically, the president sets policy subject to legislative approval. The president's ability to concentrate benefits in states with high electoral payoffs depends in part on his or her power to influence legislators' prospects for reelection. Regression analysis shows that New Deal spending and roll call voting patterns in the House of Representatives strongly support the model. Historical accounts of other aspects of New Deal policy, including positions on labor and civil rights issues, are also consistent with the model. Together, the theoretical results and the empirical evidence contribute to the understanding of several striking features of the policy and politics of the 1930s.

Overview of the Theoretical Implications and Empirical Findings

One of the model's key implications is that a reelection-seeking president has an incentive to seek policy more favorable to swing states than to states loyal to his or her party. Like the

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president in the model, once Roosevelt was in office, he, along with other Democrats who sought to build and maintain a broad national base of support for their party, had incentives to design policy that would win support in swing states. When applied to New Deal distributive policy, the model predicts that, to the extent that Roosevelt influenced the distribution of funds, spending data should show that more money went to swing states than to the traditionally Democratic South. This prediction fits Wright's (1974) findings and is confirmed by the empirical evidence in this paper.

In the model, the president's influence over policy is constrained by the need to have policy approved by a majority in the legislature. The legislative constraint will be more relaxed when the president has greater ability to influence the reelection prospects of legislators. Consequently, when applied to the New Deal, the model predicts that spending data should show, first, an increase in the favoritism of swing states from the 1933–1934 period to the 1937–1938 period (when the legislative constraint was relaxed) and, second, a decrease in the favoritism of swing states from 1938 to 1939 (when the legislative constraint was tightened). The empirical evidence confirms both of these predicted changes in spending.

The model also predicts the following: As a consequence of presidential incentives to favor swing states, the president is likely to face legislative opposition from his or her party's traditionally loyal states. The empirical evidence confirms this prediction. This explains why, with the rise of the conservative coalition in the late 1930s, the traditionally Democratic South provided the strongest Democratic congressional opposition to Roosevelt and the New Deal.

Contribution to the Literature

By developing a model of distributive politics and applying the model to the New Deal realignment, this paper contributes to several branches of research. One branch is distributive politics. With the assumption that the president determines policy subject to legislative approval, my model incorporates the basic principle of agenda-setter models (e.g., Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Rosenthal 1990). Modeling the president as the agenda setter adds to the insight provided by models of distributive politics within legislatures (e.g., Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981) and models of distributive games between the president and Congress (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985a, 1988). The findings also add to other work that has examined incentives to favor swing and loyal voters (e.g., Wright 1974; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985b; Cox and McCubbins 1986).[1]

Furthermore, my research contributes to the literature on critical elections and realignment (e.g., Key 1955; Burnham 1970; Ginsberg 1972, 1976; Sundquist 1973; Sinclair 1977, 1985; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980; Brady and Stewart 1982; Brady 1988; Nardulli 1995). Compared to previous work, my approach provides a more detailed examination of the reelection motives of Democrats following their rise to power in the early 1930s. This approach helps to explain an essential part of the realignment because, while public disapproval of the Republican Party's handling of the Great Depression gave the Democrats a chance to govern, it did not guarantee that the Democrats would stay in power. Once in office, President Roosevelt and his fellow Democrats had to provide popular policy in order to be reelected.

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[1] Similar principles have been applied elsewhere. For example, Stratmann (1992) shows that political action committees give large contributions to swing legislators. Similar issues arise in the literature on campaign spending (e.g., Jacobson 1978, 1990; Green and Krasno 1988, 1990; Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse 1995) and the executive veto (Grier, McDonald, and Tollison 1995).

By explaining the links between reelection incentives and New Deal policy, my work complements the previous literature's emphasis on critical elections. The critical election of 1932 gave Democrats a chance to govern and, therefore, played a fundamental role in realignment. But to understand the massive political changes of the 1930s, it is essential to consider two phenomena, both of which can be viewed as realignment. The first is a change in party dominance: The Democrats replaced the Republicans as the dominant party. The second is a shift in the alignments within the Democratic Party: With the rise of the conservative coalition in the late 1930s, many southern Democrats in Congress became frequently disloyal to their own party.

Understanding the link between these two realignment phenomena is facilitated by an understanding of the reelection motives analyzed in this paper. While policy favoring swing states was valuable for Roosevelt's reelection and for maintaining the Democratic Party's dominance at the national level, it caused legislators from traditionally loyal Democratic states to oppose Roosevelt and the New Deal. Thus, policy based on the incentives of Democrats to maintain the realignment with respect to party dominance led to the realignment within the Democratic Party. These findings complement not only the works cited above but the vast historical literature on the political economy of the New Deal (e.g., Freidel 1965, Patterson 1967, 1969; Sitkoff 1978; Schulman 1991; Brinkley 1995).

The findings in this paper also add to the empirical literature on the political economy of New Deal spending. This paper builds most directly on the work of Wright (1974), who constructs measures of political productivity and argues that spending was higher where it produced greater expected electoral benefits for the administration. He shows that per capita spending tended to be low in states that had been traditionally Democratic. Spending was greater in states where elections were more likely to be influenced by the level of benefits and, as a consequence, the funds would be more productive in maintaining the Democratic Party's new base of support.[2]

Structure of the Paper

Section 2 presents the model and derives the testable hypotheses that form the basis of the empirical analysis. Section 3 explains how the model applies to the New Deal; it also describes the spending, constituency, and roll call data used to test the hypotheses derived from the model. Section 4 presents the empirical tests. Section 5 discusses the rise of the conservative coalition, explaining the Democratic Party's division over civil rights issues, as well as economic policy, in the framework of the model. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Reelection Motives and Distributive Policy: A Model

This section presents the model's assumptions, along with a discussion of the model's solution and implications. For a mathematical presentation of the model, see Appendix A.

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[2] The literature building on Wright (1974) includes Wallis (1987) and Anderson and Tollison (1991). Wallis (1987) addresses the simultaneous determination of spending and the standard measures of unemployment by using industry-specific employment data to construct indices for state employment levels throughout the 1930s. He finds these indices related to per capita grants and concludes that "while politics are still important, responding to the needs of the unemployed was an important determinant of New Deal spending" (p. 516). Anderson and Tollison (1991) reanalyze aggregate New Deal spending as well as spending by the Bureau of Public Roads. Their principal innovation is the addition of a variety of variables intended to reflect congressional influence. They interpret their results as evidence that "in addition to the influence of the executive, institutionally important members of the House and Senate also played an important role in the allocation of New Deal spending" (p. 171).

Objectives and Assumptions of the Model

The model's assumptions are based on the following objectives. First, the model is intended to focus on the effects of electoral incentives. Second, the model must allow for executive and legislative influence on policy. Specifically, it should capture the effect of interaction between the president and legislators when the president has influence as an agenda setter. Third, the model should consider the value of policy to voters. It should incorporate the fact that the policy that wins the most votes in one state may be unpopular in another state, and it must have a useful spatial interpretation (i.e., indicate whether some policy position is close to what voters want). Fourth, the model should capture two intuitive points about reelection of the president: (i) By implementing policy that pleases voters in a state, the president will obtain a larger vote share in that state, and (ii) the president's vote share is not known with certainty when policy decisions are made. Fifth, the model should reflect two factors influencing the reelection of legislators: (i) A legislator is likely to receive more votes if, ceteris paribus, the legislator votes for the outcome with the higher value to his or her state, and (ii) a legislator is likely to receive more votes if a popular president assists (or refrains from opposing) the legislator's campaign.

Assumptions

(A.1) *Electoral Incentives.* The president and legislators are concerned exclusively with the next election. The president seeks to maximize the expected number of states in which he or she receives a majority vote. Each legislator seeks to maximize his or her own expected vote share.

(A.2) *Executive and Legislative Influence on Policy.* Policy is the outcome of a one-round game between the president and legislators. First, the president selects a proposed policy. Second, legislators vote under majority rule to approve or reject the president's proposal. Rejection causes policy to revert to a known outcome (the status quo) equally distant to all states' ideal points.

(A.3) *The Value of Policy to Voters.* To capture conflicting interests between states, the number of policy dimensions is assumed to equal the number of states. On each dimension of policy, one state has a high marginal net value curve while the other states have a low marginal net value curve. For simplicity, these curves are assumed to be linear and decreasing.[3] To facilitate a spatial interpretation, valuations of policy are assumed to be symmetric, with each state having its own most important policy dimension.

(A.4) *Reelection of the President.* The president's vote share increases linearly with the value of policy to voters in a state; the form of the linear relationship may differ across states.[4] The vote share also includes a random factor, distributed uniformly over some known range, independently across states, and independently of policy.[5] In other respects, states are identical.

(A.5) *Reelection of Legislators.* Two factors matter: (i) All else being equal, supporting constituent interests in the decision to approve or reject the president's proposal increases a legislator's vote total. The amount of the increase is proportional to the difference between the

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[3] This is very straightforward and a quite general approximation. It is consistent with a linear marginal cost curve and a linear marginal benefit curve, as in a basic supply and demand model.

[4] As a practical matter, the linear function can be viewed as a first-order approximation over the relevant range of policy. If the linear function takes a value less than zero or greater than one, then the vote share will be zero or one.

[5] In other words, the president knows that, conditional on policy, his or her vote share will fall into some specific range.

value that voters place on the president's proposal and the value they place on the status quo.[6] (ii) The president decides either to provide or not to provide assistance in a legislator's bid for reelection; the number of votes that assistance will yield is exogenous.

Policy Outcomes in the Model

Based on the above assumptions, the president faces a constrained optimization problem: He or she maximizes the probability of reelection subject to the legislative constraint. To solve this problem, it is useful to consider, first, what the president will want and, second, what the president can obtain. In other words, first solve for the president's ideal point (i.e., the policy the president would choose if there were no legislative constraint) and then consider the effect of the legislative constraint. These steps yield testable hypotheses about policy outcomes and roll call voting patterns.

The President's Ideal Point

In a particular state, the president's probability of winning reaches a maximum when policy is set at that state's ideal point (i.e., the policy that maximizes the state's valuation of benefits). On any policy dimension, moving away from a state's ideal point will reduce the president's probability of winning in that state.

Some basic properties of the president's ideal point are easy to see. On policy dimension *i,* the president's ideal point will not be higher than the ideal point of the state with the highest demand on policy dimension *i.* Similarly, the president's ideal point will not lie below the minimum among states' ideal points on that dimension.

Because each state has a different ideal point, the president's ideal point will be, essentially, a weighted average of states' ideal points. Hence, when turning to the issue of which states the president's ideal point would favor, the key question is to determine which states have the most weight. In short, the answer is swing states. More precisely, the answer depends on two aspects of the way policy affects the president's chance of winning in each state.

The first aspect is how much the president's expected vote share in a state changes in response to the value of policy to voters in that state. For states in which the president, at his or her ideal point, faces neither a sure win nor a sure loss, the greater the change in the vote share for a given change in the value of policy, the more favorable the president's ideal point will be for that state. Intuitively, the president will seek to favor states that have a large number of swing voters.[7]

The second aspect is the degree to which the state's voters tend to lean for or against the president. To see why this matters, it is useful to consider the president's expected vote share in various states, conditional on policy at the status quo. If the president's expected vote share in a particular state were sufficiently high, policy could be made less attractive to that state while still ensuring that the president would win in that state.[8] Hence, the president's ideal point will give relatively little weight to the ideal point of that state. Similarly, if the president's expected vote share in a state were sufficiently low, the state would be a sure loss; the president's

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[6] In other words, the more constituent benefits there are at stake, the greater the electoral cost of voting against constituent interests.

[7] In the model, the parameter relevant to this discussion is the slope of the line describing the relationship between vote share and the value of policy. This is α in the mathematical model.

[8] In the mathematical model, this is a state with a very high value of c.

ideal point would give no weight to that state.[9] In other words, the president will seek to favor states that are neither sure wins nor sure losses over states in which voters are expected to vote overwhelmingly for the president or expected to vote overwhelmingly against the president.[10]

The Legislative Constraint

Simply determining what the president wants does not solve the model. The president can only implement policies that the legislature will approve.

The legislative constraint may or may not be binding. In nonbinding cases, the policy outcome is simple; the president proposes his or her ideal point, which is approved by the legislature. If the legislative constraint is strictly binding, however, the legislature will not approve the president's ideal point. In order to obtain legislative approval, the president must propose a policy position which, compared to implementing his or her ideal point, leads to fewer expected states won.

A key determinant of the legislative constraint's location and, hence, of whether the constraint is binding is the president's influence over legislators' bids for reelection. The president's optimal use of reelection assistance can be determined using a simple, intuitive rule: Legislators who support the president get the maximum assistance, while legislators who oppose the president get nothing.[11] With presidential assistance determined in this manner, the greater the president's influence over elections, the farther the president's proposal can be from a state's ideal point without causing legislators from that state to vote against the proposal. Hence, the greater the president's influence over elections, the greater the president's ability to favor swing states.

This leads to some interesting implications. Suppose that the legislative constraint is binding and, as a result, it is optimal for the president to propose policy that is valued just enough in certain loyal-electorate states to obtain the support of their legislators. Now consider the effect of an increase in the president's influence over the reelection prospects of legislators from those states. Because the president could then obtain legislative support over a wider range of policy, the result will be policy less favorable to those loyal-electorate states and more favorable to the swing states in which the president seeks to increase electoral support.

Roll Call Voting

If any legislators vote to reject the president's proposal, they will be from the states that receive less valuable policy as a result of presidential influence.[12] Because swing states will be favored, legislators voting to reject the president's proposal will come from nonswing states, including those in which the electorate is very loyal to the president.

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[9] In the mathematical model, this is a state with a very low value of c.

[10] Note that this implication depends on the structure of the model. For example, one could modify the model so that the game was repeated and the parameter c depended negatively on past spending in the state. In this case, a president might favor states with loyal supporters (to prevent a reduction of loyalty in the long run). This suggests that the model presented in this paper is most appropriately applied when the time horizon relevant to presidential decisions is short.

[11] Other optimal strategies may exist (e.g., providing no assistance to legislators who would support the president in the absence of assistance). All optimal strategies will be equivalent with respect to policy outcomes in the model.

[12] Intuitively, legislators from districts that strongly dislike the president's policy will oppose the president, while those from districts that mildly dislike the president's policy will support the president in order to obtain assistance for reelection.

Summary of the Principal Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Among states that are neither sure wins nor sure losses at his or her ideal point, the president will seek to favor states where his or her vote share is more sensitive to the value of policy.

Hypothesis 2. At the president's ideal point, policy will tend to favor states that are neither sure wins nor sure losses over states in which voters are expected to vote overwhelmingly for or against the president.

Hypothesis 3. An increase in the president's ability to influence legislators' prospects for reelection will relax a binding legislative constraint, allowing the president to move policy closer to his or her ideal point. This will reduce the value of policy to those loyal-electorate states in which the president sets policy for the purpose of securing legislative support. It will increase the value of policy to states the president favors for the purpose of obtaining electoral support.

Hypothesis 4. Legislators who vote to reject the president's proposal will tend to be from states that (i) are nonswing (including states in which the electorate is very loyal to the president) and (ii) receive less valuable policy as a result of presidential influence.

3. Historical Background, Hypotheses, and Data

This section provides the background for testing the model. It explains how the model and hypotheses fit the historical context of the New Deal. It also describes the data used to test the hypotheses about spending and roll call voting patterns. The discussion is divided into four parts: the effects of Roosevelt's incentives to favor swing states (based on Hypotheses 1 and 2), shifts in the legislative constraint and the resulting changes in favoritism (based on Hypothesis 3), the effects of presidential favoritism on congressional roll call voting patterns (based on Hypothesis 4), and alternative hypotheses and control variables.

Roosevelt's Incentives to Favor Swing States

After the Democratic landslide in 1932, Roosevelt was in the position of the incumbent president in the model. For Roosevelt to win reelection and for the Democrats to remain dominant at the national level, it would not have been sufficient to win only the support of voters in traditionally loyal Democratic states. Thus, like the president in the model, Roosevelt (and other Democrats who sought to maintain their party's dominance at the national level) had electoral incentives to design and implement policy that would win votes in swing states.

Roosevelt and Congress both influenced policy. Consider, for example, the case of the largest New Deal distributive program, the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Roosevelt created the WPA by executive order under authority granted to him by the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 1935 (ERAA). As Wallis (1991, p. 522) describes the control of benefits, "While Congress gave Roosevelt and [federal relief administrator] Hopkins an unprecedented amount of discretion in the ERAA of 1935, it was able to control the WPA indirectly through a subsequent series of ERAAs." Thus, parallel to my model, Roosevelt controlled the WPA subject to congressional approval.

Distributive policy was a major component of the New Deal. Thus, if the model helps to explain important aspects of New Deal policy, spending data should be consistent with presidential influence being used to favor swing states. To measure favoritism in overall spending,

I follow Wright (1974) in using SPND, per capita spending on New Deal programs, 1933–1939. High values of SPND indicate favorable treatment by the New Deal. (See Appendix B for definitions of variables; see Appendix C for descriptive statistics.)

Hypothesis 1 suggests that one influence on spending would be the tendency for a state's electorate to switch with respect to the party it supports. For this reason, I follow Wright in using SD32, which is the standard deviation around the trend of the Democratic vote share in presidential elections, 1896–1932. One would expect spending to have a greater effect on voters who show more variability in the party for which they vote. Thus, spending in states with high values for SD32 would tend to be more politically productive.[13]

Hypothesis 2 suggests that it is also important to include some measure of the partisan leanings of a state. For this purpose, I use two variables, XMEAN71 and XMEAN71_SQ. Both are calculated from Poole and Rosenthal's X-coordinate scores, which are based on roll call voting in the House of Representatives.[14] Because it is important to measure alignments prior to the New Deal, my variables are based on the X-coordinate scores from the 71st House (elected in 1928). I have averaged Poole and Rosenthal's scores to construct a state level index, XMEAN71. The variable XMEAN71_SQ is simply the square of XMEAN71.[15]

A low value of XMEAN71 indicates alignment with the Democratic Party in the late 1920s. Thus, if low values of XMEAN71 predict low spending, it supports the argument that few New Deal benefits went to traditionally loyal Democratic states.[16]

The variable XMEAN71_SQ is included because spending tends not to be politically productive in states strongly loyal to either party. Since a value of XMEAN71 near zero indicates a state that could be considered neutral between the parties, low values of XMEAN71_SQ indicate swing states in that they had moderate representatives and/or a mix of Republicans and Democrats. Thus, higher spending for lower values of XMEAN71_SQ indicates favoritism of swing states.[17]

Shifts in the Legislative Constraint and Changes in Favoritism

In the model, the president faces a legislative constraint. Similarly, Roosevelt's ability to set policy was constrained by Congress. I argue that the need to obtain support in Congress from traditionally loyal Democratic states constrained Roosevelt's ability to favor swing states.

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[13] The variable SD32 is the empirical counterpart to α in the mathematical model.

[14] Based on an algorithm that uses nearly all roll call votes in the history of Congress, Poole and Rosenthal assign legislators scores on two dimensions. These scores determine legislators' locations in a two-dimensional, vote-predicting space. On most votes, the spatial locations account for much of the variance in voting. Poole and Rosenthal view members' locations as measures of ideology, with the first dimension (X-coordinate) reflecting the primary dimension of cleavage on roll call voting. They interpret this primary dimension as "party loyalty" (see, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal [1990, 1991a, b]).

[15] An alternative, and in practice very similar, measure of states' partisan leanings is mass voting behavior. Poole and Rosenthal's scores have several advantages. For interpreting "how Republican" or "how Democratic" a state was on policy issues, the scores are extraordinarily useful because they indicate not just whether voters favored Republicans or Democrats but what kind of Republicans and Democrats they elected. And, because positive scores indicate Republican leanings and negative scores indicate Democratic leanings, there is a straightforward and interesting interpretation of the squared term, XMEAN71_SQ. Furthermore, the scores can easily be compared across states, avoiding some of the problematic causes of cross-state variation in mass voting behavior (e.g., what if some candidates run effectively unopposed?). In the end, however, choosing the measure of partisan leanings did not affect the paper's conclusions. As noted later, if one uses mass voting behavior in presidential elections to measure state-level party loyalty, one obtains empirical results very similar to those based on Poole and Rosenthal's scores.

[16] A high value of XMEAN71 corresponds to a low value of c in the mathematical model.

[17] Low values of XMEAN71_SQ correspond to moderate values of c in the mathematical model.

In a close fit to the model's characterization of the president using influence over legislators' prospects for reelection, Roosevelt openly used his influence at the polls to obtain support in Congress. He was famous for his threats and efforts to prevent the reelection of his adversaries, even if they belonged to his own party (see Patterson 1967). To formulate hypotheses about the effects of movement in the legislative constraint, the key issue to consider is how Roosevelt's influence over Congress changed over time.

Much of the effectiveness of Roosevelt's threats increased and decreased with his popularity. From his election in 1932 to his reelection in 1936, Roosevelt's popularity grew to an extraordinary level; in the 1936 election, he carried 46 of the 48 states. Roosevelt's efforts to influence Congress by using his power with voters peaked in the wake of his 1936 victory, when he undertook his notorious purge attempt, actively campaigning against anti-New Deal incumbent Democrats in the 1938 primaries.

By 1939, however, Roosevelt had much less power to obtain congressional support by threatening the reelection prospects of members of Congress. His popularity had fallen considerably from the time of his 1936 landslide, leaving members of Congress less fearful of opposing him. Furthermore, his 1938 purge attempts mostly failed. As Patterson (1967, p. 286) explains, "The lesson to conservatives was obvious: it was possible to defy the President."[18]

Concurrent with the changes in Roosevelt's popularity were changes in the partisan balance of Congress. In the 1934 and 1936 elections, Democrats gained 21 seats in the House and 17 in the Senate (leaving them with more than three quarters of both houses). Then, in 1938, the Democrats lost 72 seats in the House and 7 in the Senate (Martis 1989). These gained and lost seats matter in the context of my model because the pressure for legislators to support Roosevelt at the expense of constituent interests typically would have been greater for Democrats than for Republicans, in part because Roosevelt could more easily threaten Democrats with defeat in Democratic primaries than he could threaten Republicans with defeat in Republican primaries.[19]

In view of these historical events, it is clear how Hypothesis 3 applies to the New Deal. From the beginning of the New Deal to the period following the 1936 elections, there were increases in Roosevelt's ability to influence members of Congress, which would tend to relax the legislative constraint. Thus, Hypothesis 3 will be confirmed if favoritism of swing states increased over that period of time. Similarly, from the period after the 1936 election to the period after the 1938 elections, there was a decrease in Roosevelt's ability to influence members of Congress. This would tend to tighten the legislative constraint. Thus, Hypothesis 3 will be confirmed if favoritism of swing states decreased over this time period.

The first variable to measure changes in favoritism is $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$, the proportional increase in spending from the 1933–1934 period (the 73rd Congress, the first of the New Deal) to the 1937–1938 period (the 75th Congress). The second is $\Delta SPND_{38-39}$, the proportional change in spending from 1938 to 1939.[20] Hypothesis 3 will be supported if $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ tends to be high and if $\Delta SPND_{38-39}$ tends to be low for swing states.

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[18] My emphasis on purge or assistance activities as the basis of the link between presidential popularity and congressional voting fits Roosevelt's behavior. Other factors, such as changes in representatives' concern about presidential "coattails," may have complemented Roosevelt's activities, leading to the same results (Rivers and Rose 1985; Sullivan 1987; Miller 1993).

[19] Quite obviously, other factors, including various methods of party discipline, could have complemented Roosevelt's influence.

[20] Since I have not found comparable spending data for 1940, I do not have a dependent variable that is based on two-year periods, as is $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$. This does not pose a problem for testing the model because, as the empirical evidence presented later shows, the effects of Roosevelt's decreased ability to favor swing states appear immediately in the spending patterns: The 1939 data show a sharp change from the 1935–1938 period.

Effects on Roll Call Voting Patterns in the House

Hypothesis 4 predicts which legislators will vote against the president's choice of policy. If Roosevelt used his influence to favor swing states, then roll call voting should indicate that he met opposition from districts with strong preferences for the policy desired by traditionally loyal Democratic states. Furthermore, if the model captures the realignment within the Democratic Party, House roll call voting patterns should show a shift that matches the shift in policy away from the ideal points of the loyal states. Specifically, the data should show that, relative to Democrats from the increasingly favored swing states, Democrats from the traditionally loyal Democratic states became more likely to vote against their party.

To capture the changes in roll call voting patterns from the period before the New Deal to the period when Roosevelt faced strong opposition from Democrats upset by the New Deal, I use the changes in Poole and Rosenthal's primary dimension (party loyalty) scores. The main variable, $\Delta X_{71\text{–}76}$, is the change in a member's score from the 71st House (elected 1928) to the 76th House (elected 1938). If the model explains a major realignment in the Democratic Party, then Democrats from traditionally loyal Democratic states should show a substantially increased propensity to vote against their party (indicated by high values of $\Delta X_{71\text{–}76}$). And, if favoritism of swing states over traditionally loyal states contributed to the realignment, then favoritism in spending should predict low values of $\Delta X_{71\text{–}76}$ (i.e., increased Democratic loyalty).

The fact that Poole and Rosenthal's scores are based on nearly all roll calls, without regard to issue content, has a great advantage in that it eliminates the difficulty in trying to select the votes that accurately reflect changes in support and opposition to the president. Furthermore, because $\Delta X_{71\text{–}76}$ reflects votes on all issues, if the spending variables explain substantial changes in Poole and Rosenthal's measures, it suggests that favoritism of swing states played an important role in overall realignment.

Control Variables

An important possibility that should be controlled for is that funds were concentrated where the Depression was most severe. Thus, as control variables, I use two variables that Wright (1974) used as measures of the severity of the Depression. The first variable is UNEMPL 1930, which is the level of unemployment measured by the 1930 Census. The second variable is %FALL INC 1929–32, which is the percent fall in personal income from 1929 to 1932. High values for these variables indicate severe effects of the Depression.

Another important factor in the allocation of funds may have been committee power, especially that of the appropriations committees (e.g., Anderson and Tollison 1991). In an overwhelmingly Democratic government, one might expect that committee members would have more influence if they were Democrats rather than Republicans. Committee members from traditionally Democratic states would, of course, typically be Democrats. Thus, with respect to the distribution of overall spending, the model's predicted favoritism of swing states over traditionally Democratic states might be underestimated without controlling for each state's representation on appropriations committees. Consequently, variables are added to control for the proportion of each state's delegation that was on an appropriations committee (averaged over the period from the 73rd through 76th Congresses, calculated separately for the House and Senate and separately for Democrats and Republicans).

Turning to the explanation of changes in spending, an interesting issue arises. Even if the model predicts those changes accurately, it is important to test empirically whether the legis-

lative constraint is a useful component of the model.[21] The reason for this is that changes in the partisan composition of Congress could, at least in principle, reallocate funds between swing and loyal states through two different mechanisms. The first mechanism, which is characterized by the model, operates through shifts in the legislative constraint. The second, which is not characterized by the model, operates through changes in what are, effectively, the collective preferences of Congress. To see why distinguishing between these two mechanisms is an empirical concern, consider Democratic seats gained in 1934 and 1936. Even if the legislative constraint were unimportant, the addition of Democratic seats could produce changes in favoritism that fit the model if both of the following were true: (i) the seats acquired and lost by Democrats were predominantly in swing states and (ii) the newly elected swing-state Democrats, relative to the Republicans they replaced, had a greater ability or desire to obtain funds for their home states.[22] For this reason, I add control variables to measure, for each state, the change in the number of congressional seats held by Democrats and the change in each state's representation on congressional appropriations committees.

Shifts in congressional voting patterns can result from factors other than distributive politics. Because economic disaster striking while the Republicans were in power might be expected to strengthen the electorate's preferences for Democrats, I add control variables for the severity of the Depression (unemployment from 1930 and the percent fall in income from 1929 to 1932). In addition, by including dummy variables for the South and Border regions, I test whether voting patterns might have shifted in response to any of a variety of factors that differed between those regions and the rest of the country.

4. Empirical Results

This section tests the model's key hypotheses, using the spending, constituency, and roll call data described in the previous section.

Favoritism of Swing States: Empirical Evidence

The New Deal distributed funds unevenly; per capita New Deal spending (SPND) ranges from a low of $143 in North Carolina to a high of $1130 in Nevada. The differences between regions are also substantial. For southern states, the mean value of SPND is $202; for the mountain states, the mean is $586.

The first empirical question is this: Can the large differences in spending be partially explained by the variables used to indicate swing states?[23] Regression 1 in Table 1 shows the relationship between SPND and the three swing variables SD32, XMEAN71, and XMEAN71_SQ. All three coefficients have the hypothesized signs. As found by Wright (1974), the coefficient for SD32 is positive, highly significant (with a t-statistic of 4.36), and reflects a substantial amount of money. Since the coefficient on SD32 is 22.92 and the standard deviation

[21] As discussed later, there is historical evidence about civil rights that complements the empirical support for modeling a vote-seeking president subject to legislative constraint.

[22] If the gained and lost seats were randomly distributed throughout the country, there would be little reason for concern about a specification error.

[23] Note that the model does not predict that spending will necessarily be zero anywhere. Even in the case of a nonbinding legislative constraint, spending may be positive in states the president will win regardless of policy and in those the president will lose regardless of policy. In the mathematical model, spending will be positive everywhere if $I_{low} > 0$.

Table 1. Spending and Changes in Spending for New Deal Programs

Dependent Variable	1 SPND	2 SPND	3 $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$	4 $\Delta SPND_{38-39}$
C	53.02	177.14	0.8047	0.3584
	(0.777)	(0.822)	(5.05)	(5.41)
SD32	22.92	24.62	0.02364	−0.01024
	(4.36)	(4.02)	(1.92)	(2.00)
XMEAN71	82.25	91.13	0.9400	−0.5140
	(0.904)	(0.819)	(4.43)	(5.81)
XMEAN71_SQ	−68.67	−95.20	−2.164	1.134
	(0.222)	(0.295)	(2.99)	(3.77)
UNEMPL 1930		−783.42		
		(0.468)		
%FALL INC 1929–32		−2.457		
		(0.549)		
Number Observed	48 states	48 states	48 states	48 states
R^2	0.359	0.365	0.430	0.539
R^2 adj.	0.316	0.290	0.391	0.508

Regressions are ordinary least squares; *t*-statistics are in parentheses. See Appendix B for variable definitions. See Appendix C for descriptive statistics.

of SD32 is 4.37, a one-standard-deviation increase in SD32 would increase per capita spending in a state by about $100. While the other two variables have the hypothesized signs, neither is statistically significant. The 82.25 coefficient on XMEAN71 does, however, reflect a substantial amount of money; a one-standard-deviation increase in XMEAN71 would increase SPND by about $23.

The second regression shows, as Wright (1974) also finds, that there is little explanatory power in measures of the severity of the Depression: unemployment in 1930 and the percent fall in personal income from 1929 to 1932. Thus, an alternative explanation, that spending was concentrated where the Depression hit hardest, is not supported. And, most importantly for testing the model, the swing variables retain their hypothesized signs; indeed, adding the control variables increases the magnitude of all three swing variables.[24]

Changes in Favoritism of Swing States: Empirical Evidence

The next empirical question follows from Hypothesis 3. Specifically, did favoritism of swing states increase and decrease as the model predicts?

Spending Changes from the 73rd Congress (1933–1934) to the 75th Congress (1937–1938)

With $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ as the dependent variable, Regression 3 (in Table 1) tests the hypothesis that favoritism of swing states increased over the period from the 73rd Congress (1933–1934) to the 75th Congress (1937–1938). All three explanatory variables have the hypothesized signs. The positive coefficient on SD32 (with a 1.92 *t*-statistic) indicates that spending patterns shifted

[24] This is not to argue that New Deal programs ignored need. New Dealers had ample opportunity to match politically valuable spending patterns to plausible measures of need (Fleck 1997).

in favor of states in which voters showed variability in which party they supported in previous presidential elections. The positive coefficient on XMEAN71 (with a 4.43 *t*-statistic) indicates that spending patterns shifted in favor of states with less traditional loyalty to the Democratic Party.[25] The negative coefficient on XMEAN71_SQ (with a 2.99 *t*-statistic) indicates that spending patterns shifted in favor of states with moderate or mixed partisan leanings.

Based on the estimated coefficients for both XMEAN71 and XMEAN71_SQ, the regression predicts that, ceteris paribus, a 0.217 value of XMEAN71 would produce the peak value of $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$. A state with an XMEAN71 value of 0.217 would be slightly more Republican than average and would rank 21st in Republican loyalty. Thus, for states with party loyalty in the range of solidly Democratic to slightly more Republican than average, the regression predicts that additional Republican loyalty would increase $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$. But for states that were substantially more Republican than average, the regression predicts that additional Republican loyalty would decrease $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$. These findings indicate increasing favoritism of swing states.[26]

In sum, all three variables confirm the model's prediction. When Roosevelt's popularity increased and the Democrats acquired seats in Congress, the legislative constraint was relaxed; consequently, swing states received an increased share of funds, while traditionally loyal Democratic states received a decreased share.

Spending Changes from 1938 to 1939

With $\Delta SPND_{38-39}$ as the dependent variable, Regression 4 (Table 1) tests the hypothesis that favoritism of swing states should have decreased from 1938 to 1939. All three swing variables support the model. The negative coefficient on SD32 (with a 2.00 *t*-statistic) indicates that spending patterns shifted against states in which voters showed variability in which party they supported in previous presidential elections. The negative coefficient on XMEAN71 (with a 5.81 *t*-statistic) indicates that spending patterns shifted in favor of the traditionally loyal Democratic states. The positive coefficient on XMEAN71_SQ (with a 3.77 *t*-statistic) indicates that spending patterns shifted against states with moderate or mixed party affiliation of representatives. These findings strongly confirm the hypothesis that, when the legislative constraint was tightened, swing states received a decreased share of funds, while traditionally loyal Democratic states received an increased share. Thus, it appears that the drop in Roosevelt's popularity and his failure to defeat Democratic foes in the 1938 primaries, combined with the loss of Democratic seats in Congress, reduced the favoritism shown to swing states.[27]

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[25] Other specifications also show that changes in spending favored regions with less traditional loyalty to the Democratic Party. If alternative measures of Democratic loyalty are substituted for XMEAN71, the findings are similar. For example, there is a −0.58 correlation between $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ and the predicted Democratic vote share in the 1932 presidential election, based on the trend from 1896–1932 (as in Wright's work). (Note that there is a 0.43 simple correlation between $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ and XMEAN71.) Thus, one finds that spending patterns shifted against loyal Democratic states whether party loyalty is measured by the voting behavior of the public or by Poole and Rosenthal's scores.

[26] Alternative specifications confirm this interpretation. For example, regressions based on spline (continuous, piecewise linear) functions show that weak Democratic loyalty led to higher spending than did strong Democratic loyalty, while strong Republican loyalty led to the same or lower spending than did moderate Republican loyalty.

[27] Using party loyalty variables based on the voting behavior of the public rather than representatives yields the same conclusion. There is a 0.71 correlation between $\Delta SPND_{38-39}$ and the predicted Democratic vote share in the 1932 presidential election (based on the trend from 1896–1932, as in Wright's work).

Controlling for Committee Membership and Partisan Mix

The first regression in Table 2 estimates the effects of the swing variables on total spending, as in the second regression in Table 1, but with four additional variables. These additional variables control for the proportion of each state's congressional delegation that was on an appropriations committee. All three swing variables maintain their hypothesized signs. The most interesting change is in the coefficient on XMEAN71, which nearly tripled in magnitude and became statistically significant. As discussed earlier, an increase in the magnitude of the coefficient on XMEAN71 is expected if committee members had more influence if they were Democrats rather than Republicans. This is consistent with the finding that, for both houses, the coefficients on committee membership are larger for Democrats than for Republicans.[28]

Table 1 shows that favoritism of swing states increased and decreased as the model predicts. As discussed earlier in this paper, however, to investigate why the model predicts spending changes accurately, it is important to consider the partisan composition of Congress. For this reason, Regressions 2 and 3 (in Table 2) control for changes in the number of House and Senate seats held by the Democratic Party in each state. These regressions also control for changes in each state's representation on the appropriations committees. In both regressions, the estimated effects of the three swing variables have the hypothesized signs, and, furthermore, the results are very similar to those in Table 1. These findings support the argument that a relaxation and tightening of the legislative constraint caused the predicted increase and decrease in the favoritism of swing states.[29]

The Timing of Shifts in Regional Spending Levels

As further verification that spending levels changed as the model predicts, it is useful to examine changes in regional spending patterns. Figure 1 shows per capita New Deal spending relative to the national average from 1933 to 1939 for three informative groups of states: (i) the South and Border states, (ii) the West and West North Central states, and (iii) the other states. (See Appendix B for definitions of regions.) Confirming the regression results, in every year, the New Deal allocated less to the traditionally Democratic South and Border states than to the rest of the country. Furthermore, these states received a decreasing share of spending from the early New Deal (1933–1934) to the peak period of Roosevelt's influence (1937–1938). Then, with the decline in Roosevelt's influence from 1938 to 1939, spending in the South and Border states shows a sharp increase toward the national average.

The West and West North Central regions had the highest electoral variability (SD32) and,

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[28] It may be tempting to interpret the coefficients on committee membership as measures of committee power. If the coefficients do in fact measure committee power, the results indicate a substantial amount of money delivered due to committee membership. Unfortunately, interpreting the coefficients is not straightforward. First, the incentives to seek an appointment to an appropriations committee are likely to be greater for members of Congress from states that expect to receive a disproportionately large share of funds. This makes interpreting the direction of causality between committee membership and the allocation of funds highly problematic. Second, setting up an efficient organizational structure for a legislature may require allocating committee seats to legislators from states that receive a disproportionate share of benefits (e.g., Krehbiel 1991). For these reasons, this paper uses the committee variables simply as controls for testing the model.

[29] As discussed in the previous footnote, interpreting the coefficients on committee membership variables is highly problematic. Before interpreting coefficients on changes in committee membership and changes in the partisan mix of a state's legislators, one should consider that high spending in a state might have caused additional Democrats to be elected to Congress (and perhaps to appropriations committees). This creates the potential for the relationship between committee membership and fluctuations in spending to be either positive or negative.

Table 2. Controlling for Committee Membership and Partisan Mix

1		2		3	
Dependent Variable	SPND	Dependent Variable	$\Delta SPND_{73-75}$	Dependent Variable	$\Delta SPND_{38-39}$
C	−158.59	*C*	0.7549	*C*	0.3434
	(0.775)		(4.05)		(4.73)
SD32	16.47	SD32	0.0302	SD32	−0.00861
	(3.11)		(2.05)		(1.54)
XMEAN71	245.98	XMEAN71	0.9447	XMEAN71	−0.5182
	(2.18)		(4.12)		(5.04)
XMEAN71_SQ	−174.56	XMEAN71_SQ	−2.067	XMEAN71_SQ	1.117
	(0.640)		(2.99)		(3.43)
UNEMPL 1930	−748.87	ΔSEATS 73–75 HOUSE	0.2123	ΔSEATS 75–76 HOUSE	0.01881
	(0.480)	DEMS	(1.06)	DEMS	(0.216)
%FALL INC 1929–32	5.053	ΔSEATS 73–75 SEN	0.01380	ΔSEATS 75–76 SEN	−0.01467
	(1.23)	DEMS	(0.131)	DEMS	(0.210)
APCOM HOUSE DEMS	713.52	ΔAPCOM 73–75 HOUSE	−1.008	ΔAPCOM 75–76 HOUSE	−2.620
	(4.22)	DEMS	(−3.098)	DEMS	(1.16)
APCOM HOUSE REPUBS	−73.86	ΔAPCOM 73–75 HOUSE	−0.3562	ΔAPCOM 75–76	−0.06954
	(0.301)	REPUBS	(1.04)	HOUSE REPUBS	(0.214)
APCOM SEN DEMS	90.06	ΔAPCOM 73–75	0.00464	ΔAPCOM 75–76	0.06028
	(1.72)	SEN DEMS	(0.043)	SEN DEMS	(0.819)
APCOM SEN REPUBS	30.70	ΔAPCOM 73–75	−0.03557	ΔAPCOM 75–76	0.09897
	(0.410)	SEN REPUBS	(0.176)	SEN REPUBS	(0.882)
Number Observed	48 states	Number observed	48 states	Number observed	48 states
R^2	0.616	R^2	0.582	R^2	0.568
R^2 adj.	0.525	R^2 adj.	0.483	R^2 adj.	0.466

Regressions are ordinary least squares; *t*-statistics are in parentheses. See Appendix B for variable definitions. Descriptive statistics for all 16 variables reflecting the composition of Congress and committees are available from the author.



Figure 1. So/Border, South and Border States; West/WNC, West and West North Central States; Appendix B defines geographic regions

thus, are appropriately considered swing regions. Consistent with the model's prediction and the regression results, these regions also had the highest spending levels. Furthermore, as Figure 1 shows, the spending changes ran counter to those of the South and Border states. From the early New Deal (1933–1934) to the peak period of Roosevelt's influence (1937–1938), the West and West North Central states received an increased share of spending (although it should be noted that the share peaked in 1935, not during the 1937–1938 period). Then, from 1938 to 1939, their share of spending decreased, as predicted.

In sum, these findings confirm that spending patterns shifted when the model predicts they would. Furthermore, the changes from 1938 to 1939 clearly reflect the rise of the conservative coalition and its substantial benefits for the traditionally Democratic southern states.

Changes in Congressional Voting Patterns: Empirical Evidence

The first question to ask about roll call voting patterns is whether important shifts took place. In other words, do the roll call data reflect trivial changes or do they reveal an important realignment within the Democratic Party? This question can be answered by examining regional voting patterns. In the 71st and 72nd Congresses, South and Border Democrats tended to be loyal members of their party. By the 76th Congress, the reverse was true. Figure 2 uses Poole and Rosenthal's party loyalty scores to show how the Democrats from the South and Border regions moved from the loyal side to the disloyal side of their party. This reversal fits the model's prediction about voting patterns: Representatives from the traditionally loyal South and Border regions became the least supportive members of their party.

It is important to note that the reversal demonstrated by Poole and Rosenthal's scores reflects more than simply an influx of liberal New Dealers. This point is clear from the fact that a similar reversal took place among the 50 Democrats who belonged to the House in both the pre-Depression 71st Congress (elected 1928) and the "zenith of the conservative coalition" 76th Congress (elected 1938). For these members, the X-coordinate scores for the two periods



Figure 2. Party Loyalty Measured by Poole and Rosenthal's scores; So/Border, South and Border States; Appendix B defines geographic regions

actually have a negative correlation (−0.06). Thus, Poole and Rosenthal's scores reflect more than just the effects of new representatives; they show representatives from traditionally loyal states becoming less loyal and members from traditionally less loyal states becoming more loyal.[30]

The next step is to determine whether changes in members' voting patterns match changes in spending, as suggested by Hypothesis 4. As Regression 1 in Table 3 shows, for the 50 Democrats in both the 71st and 76th Congresses, SPND and $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ account for 63.8% of the variance in ΔX_{71-76}, the change in members' scores from the 71st to the 76th Houses. The highly significant negative coefficient for $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ (with a 9.09 *t*-statistic) indicates that large increases in spending predict decreases (i.e., greater Democratic loyalty) in the X-coordinate score.[31] Thus, it is clear that, consistent with the model, the Democrats who became more likely to vote against their party's position tended to come from the states with the least favorable spending changes during the period when Roosevelt acquired greater ability to favor swing states.[32]

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[30] Compared to the difference between new and old members, the regional trends in Figure 2 are large. For Democrats, the average party loyalty score in the 76th House was −0.244. For the 50 Democrats who were also in the 71st House, the average party loyalty score in the 76th House was −0.265.

[31] R^2 is 0.629 when $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ is the only regressor.

[32] The same conclusion is reached if ΔX_{71-76} is replaced by ΔX_{73-75}, the change in Poole and Rosenthal's scores from the 73rd House (elected 1932) to the 75th House (elected 1936). Compared to ΔX_{71-76}, ΔX_{73-75} has the disadvantage of covering only part of the important realignment period. However, it has the advantage of expanding the number of useful observations. With ΔX_{73-75} as the dependent variable, the coefficients for $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ remain similar when the sample is expanded either to include all of the 186 Democrats who belonged to the 73rd and 75th Houses or to include all 289 seats that were Democratic in the 73rd and 75th Houses. Whether the Democrat holding the seat in the 75th House also held the seat in the 73rd House or 71st House has a statistically insignificant effect on the estimated coefficient for $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$. (The *t*-statistics are below one for testing differences in coefficients.) This confirms the

Table 3. Changes in the Party Loyalty of Democrats[a]

Dependent Variable	1 ΔX_{71-76}	2 ΔX_{71-76}	3 ΔX_{71-76}	4 ΔX_{71-76}
C	0.161	−0.134	0.1749	−0.091
	(1.98)	(5.48)	(2.10)	(0.751)
SPND	0.00042			0.0002
	(1.07)			(0.537)
$\Delta SPND_{73-75}$	−0.275		−0.228	−0.148
	(9.09)		(3.87)	(3.36)
%FALL INC 1929–32				0.00634
				(2.48)
UNEMPL 1930				−2.22
				(2.81)
SOUTH (dummy)		0.2357	0.0440	
		(7.22)	(0.763)	
BORDER (dummy)		0.2327	0.1056	
		(3.87)	(1.69)	
Number Observed	50 members	50 members	50 members	50 members
R^2	0.638	0.540	0.651	0.734
R^2 adj.	0.622	0.520	0.628	0.715

Regressions are ordinary least squares; t-statistics are in parentheses. See Appendix B for definitions of variables and regions. See Appendix C for descriptive statistics.

[a] Sample: the 50 Democrats belonging to both the 71st House and the 76th House.

Do Changes in Favoritism Explain Regional Shifts in Congressional Voting Patterns?

Because the shifts in congressional voting were closely related to geographic regions, it is important to consider whether $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ can account for the regional shifts. Consistent with the regional shifts shown in Figure 2, when dummy variables for the South and for Border states are the only regressors, they are significantly related to ΔX_{71-76}. As Regression 2 in Table 3 shows, the two regional dummies account for 54% of the variance in ΔX_{71-76}.

However, as Regression 3 shows, adding $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ as a regressor eliminates the high degree of statistical significance for the regional dummies (with the t-statistic for SOUTH falling from 7.22 to 0.763). Most importantly, $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ remains highly significant, with a 3.87 t-statistic. The sustained significance of $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ verifies the importance of changes in spending, demonstrating that the explanatory power of $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ reflects more than regional shifts. Indeed, the results suggest that changes in spending caused the regional shifts. Specifically, the finding that regional dummies are highly significant alone, but not when $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ is included, would be expected if the increased favoritism of swing states caused the decrease in southern Democratic loyalty.

Did the Depression Itself Cause Shifts in Congressional Voting Patterns?

The electorate's response to the Depression was undoubtedly a major factor in placing Roosevelt and the Democratic Party in power. For this reason, it is important to consider the possibility that the Depression itself, rather than New Deal policy, produced the shifts in voting

results in Regression 1 by showing that the hypothesized relationship holds for seats that switched members as well as for those that were occupied by only one member.

patterns among Democratic representatives. In particular, economic disaster striking with the Republican Party in power would be expected to strengthen the electorate's preference for Democrats. If that caused the observed shifts in House voting, then representatives of the areas most severely affected by the Depression should show increased support for the Democratic Party's positions. To address this consideration, Regression 4 (Table 3) includes two measures of the severity of the Depression.

One of the two variables fits the expected relationship; the other does not. The coefficient on 1930 unemployment is negative and statistically significant (with a t-statistic of 2.81). This indicates that "liberal" shifts occurred where unemployment was highest, as expected if economic disaster under the Republicans influenced the voting patterns among Democrats in the House. A contrasting conclusion is suggested by the coefficient on the percent fall in personal income from 1929 to 1932; the positive and statistically significant (with a t-statistic of 2.48) coefficient indicates that the more a state's income declined, the further away from Democratic loyalty the members moved.[33] That is the opposite of economic disaster under the Republicans leading to "liberal" shifts. For testing the model, the most important finding is that the spending variable $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ remains large and statistically significant, with a 3.36 t-statistic.[34]

Summary of Findings

In sum, the model is strongly supported by four key empirical findings. First, New Deal spending favored swing states over traditionally Democratic states. Second, when the legislative constraint was relaxed by an increase in Roosevelt's influence and an increase in the number of Democratic seats in Congress, favoritism of swing states increased, leaving traditionally loyal Democratic states with a decreased share of spending. Third, when the legislative constraint was tightened, favoritism of swing states decreased, leaving traditionally loyal Democratic states with an increased share of spending. And fourth, roll call voting patterns shifted over the course of the New Deal, corresponding closely to the increase in favoritism of swing states that occurred when the legislative constraint was relaxed.

5. Economic Policy, Civil Rights, and Southern Support for the Conservative Coalition

By the late 1930s, Roosevelt and New Dealers faced strong opposition in Congress from a conservative coalition composed largely of Republicans and southern Democrats (e.g., Patterson 1967; Brady and Bullock 1981; Shelley 1983; Brady 1988). The situation was a sharp contrast to the early New Deal, when Democrats often overcame conflicts among their diverse interests, forming overwhelming majorities in Congress to pass landmark legislation and grant Roosevelt discretionary power over programs (e.g., Patterson 1967; Brady 1988).

The empirical findings in the previous section provide interesting evidence about south-

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[33] The same result holds when income decline is the only regressor.

[34] These conclusions hold when the sample is expanded to include all "old" Democratic districts (i.e., adding those that remained similar geographically through the early 1930s reapportionment and were held by Democrats in both the 71st and 76th Congresses, even if the occupant changed). The effects of changes in spending, unemployment, and fall in income remain significant with the same signs. The interesting change is that SPND becomes significant with the expected negative sign.

erners' reasons for opposing Roosevelt and the New Deal. Before the conservative coalition's rise to power, southern states received a low and decreasing share of spending. Then, when the conservative coalition gained power, southern states obtained an increased share. These findings fit the model, but they are not the only evidence in support of the model's account of the rise of the conservative coalition. Other aspects of New Deal economic policy, as well as the increasing divisiveness of civil rights issues within the Democratic Party, support my argument that Roosevelt (i) sought to shift policy away from what the electorate in traditionally Democratic states preferred and toward what the electorate in swing states preferred and (ii) faced a binding legislative constraint imposed by legislators from traditionally Democratic states.

Other Aspects of New Deal Economic Policy

Over the time period that $\Delta SPND_{73-75}$ shows a decrease in the southern share of spending, other changes in the administration of federal programs redirected funds within the South in ways that upset many southern representatives. In the early New Deal, the distribution of federal funds in the South was largely controlled by southerners. For example, under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the owners of cotton plantations were given significant power in the administration of agricultural programs, and they received a large share of the benefits (Whatley 1983; Wright 1986; Schulman 1991). In addition, Schulman argues that the Tennessee Valley Authority was designed in a manner that avoided upsetting the southern social and economic structure. Furthermore, during the early New Deal, control of federal relief programs in the South was left largely to local authorities.

In later years, however, federal agencies assumed greater control and made efforts, though not entirely successful, to give more to those who had received few benefits from the southern political system. For example, many New Dealers sought a greater share of agricultural benefits for sharecroppers and tenant farmers and a smaller share for landlords.[35] Also, by officially prohibiting racial discrimination in work relief, Roosevelt sought to provide relief jobs to southern blacks, who had been largely excluded from employment by southern relief administrators.

In terms of the model, these policy changes correspond to a shift toward swing states' ideal points. Specifically, the electorate in swing states typically placed a higher value on money given to sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and blacks than on money given to plantation owners. As Wright (1986, p. 229) notes, "Many northerners thought of sharecropping as a 'form of slavery.'" Furthermore, a substantial number of votes were cast by northern blacks, and it seems safe to assume that efforts to provide federal benefits to southern blacks would have won votes among northern blacks. Consequently, to win votes in the northern swing states, it was useful to allocate southern agricultural benefits to sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and blacks and not to plantation owners.

Also, as in the model, the shift toward swing states' ideal points increased opposition to Roosevelt among legislators from states in which voters valued, for example, benefits to plantation owners more than benefits to sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and southern blacks. Such districts were common in the South due to the composition of the electorate. In the South, few sharecroppers, tenant farmers, or blacks voted; consequently, their preferences had little influence on their representatives in Congress (e.g., Key 1950). Wealthy southerners typically voted

[35] Efforts to distribute a greater share of benefits to tenants and sharecroppers were not entirely successful. "Reforms" increased landlords' incentives to employ wage laborers instead of tenants and sharecroppers. Whatley (1983) and Wright (1986) discuss landlords' incentives in detail.

and were much more influential constituents. Thus, by allocating more to sharecroppers and tenant farmers, more to blacks, and less to plantation owners, the New Deal moved away from the relevant constituent interests in many southern districts. These changes in the distribution of benefits within the South, along with the reduction in the South's share of spending, decreased southern representatives' support for Roosevelt and the New Deal.

Democratic opposition to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 is also consistent with the model. The FLSA, which imposed minimum wage and maximum hours standards, created a major split in the Democratic Party. Like distributive policy, the FLSA won support in swing states but created opposition in the traditionally Democratic South, where low-wage employers were strongly opposed to the act (e.g., Fleck 1994). The coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats against the FLSA is widely considered to mark the emergence of the conservative coalition (e.g., Key 1950; Sinclair 1978, 1985; Brady and Bullock 1981; Brady 1988).[36]

Civil Rights

During both the 1930s and the following decades, the issue of civil rights for blacks played a very prominent role in southern politics. Furthermore, because the issue frequently divided southern Democrats from the rest of their party, it is essential to consider whether the Democratic Party's internal conflict over civil rights fits the model. It does.

First, consider the importance of civil rights for winning electoral support in swing states. Prior to the New Deal, blacks were not an important part of the Democratic Party's base of support. With the elections of 1934 and 1936, however, blacks in the urban North voted in large numbers for Roosevelt and other Democrats. Because northern states were swing states, setting policy to please northern black voters was important to Roosevelt and others who sought to keep the Democratic Party in power.

Now, to see how the model applies, consider the battle over a federal law on lynching. As expected, strong pressure for antilynching legislation came from northern Democrats responding to the demands of their black constituents and resistance came from the South. The issue was highly charged; in 1937 and 1938, an antilynching bill led to three southern filibusters. In his efforts to persuade Roosevelt to take a stronger stand against lynching, Walter White, secretary of the NAACP, described reelection incentives virtually identical to those in the model:

> The Secretary [Walter White] then called the President's attention to the tables . . . in which 17 states, with a total electoral vote of 281, have a Negro voting population, 21 years of age and over, sufficient to determine the outcome in a close election. (Freidel [1965, p. 86] quoting White's memoirs.)

White went on to argue that Democrats were safe from defeat in southern states and then told Roosevelt about the ambitious efforts of Republicans to regain the support of black voters. Thus, White explicitly argued that a stronger antilynching position would improve the Democratic Party's electoral strength in swing states but not significantly reduce its electoral strength

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[36] House voting on the FLSA as well as on conservative coalition roll calls from 1939 confirm that $\Delta X_{71\text{-}76}$ reflects the rise of the conservative coalition. The most notable 1939 votes were those on WPA appropriations, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) investigation, and the housing bill. Poole and Rosenthal's party loyalty scores show that the loyal Democrats of the 76th House sided with Roosevelt, while the disloyal Democrats of the 76th House supported the conservative coalition. But party loyalty scores from a decade earlier show the reverse: Democratic loyalty from the 71st House predicts support for the conservative coalition in 1939. These findings verify that Poole and Rosenthal's scores and hence $\Delta X_{71\text{-}76}$ reflect the rise of the conservative coalition.

in loyally Democratic states.[37] In response to White's earlier arguments, Roosevelt had described a binding legislative constraint:

> Southerners, by reason of the seniority rule in Congress, are chairmen or occupy strategic places on most of the Senate and House committees. If I come out for the anti-lynching bill now, they will block every bill I ask Congress to pass to keep America from collapsing. (Freidel [1965, p. 86] quoting White's memoirs.)

Roosevelt's explanation of why he did not push for the antilynching bill explains how his position on civil rights fits the model. Roosevelt was able to capture votes in swing states by breaking with the open racism supported by many traditional Democratic interests in the South. His position was constrained, however, because he feared that southerners would block his legislation in Congress.

The escalation of conflict over civil rights in the years following Roosevelt's presidency reflects the political changes set in motion by the Depression and the New Deal. Although Roosevelt encountered resistance from southerners in Congress, it was not until Truman's reelection in 1948 that southern voters failed to provide solid support for the Democratic presidential candidate. Like Roosevelt, Truman faced conflicting constituent demands with respect to civil rights. Truman's incentives, in light of advice given by his principal political strategist for the 1948 campaign, Clark M. Clifford, match the incentives in the model. Sundquist (1973) explains:

> Negroes might hold the balance of power in several large northern states, wrote Clifford. "The Negro has become a cynical, hard-boiled trader," and the Republicans were bidding high. Besides, Clifford argued, "as always, the South can be considered safely Democratic. And in formulating policy, it can be safely ignored." Truman decided to ignore the South.[38]

Truman's strong civil rights position, like the Roosevelt administration's division of benefits, won votes in swing states and caused resistance from traditionally Democratic states. Thus, viewed from the perspective of the model, the prominent civil rights split of the postwar years closely paralleled the rise of the conservative coalition in the late 1930s.

6. Conclusion

As a result of the Depression, the federal government's role in the economy became the dominant political issue, thereby giving the Democratic Party a new opportunity for a broad base of support. My model of reelection-seeking behavior suggests how and why the Democratic Party's constituency base and policy positions changed in response to this opportunity. By favoring swing states, the New Deal helped secure the Democratic Party's new position of power. However, that favoritism led to resistance from representatives of traditionally loyal Democratic interests. Taken together, these factors explain how the combination of the Depression and the New Deal helped bring about the realignment of the 1930s.

As illustrated by my discussion of civil rights, Roosevelt knew that winning votes in swing states was important for reelection. Furthermore, the empirical evidence in this paper matches

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[37] Arguments similar to Walter White's were made by other civil rights leaders and journalists (see Sitkoff 1978). The complaints of many southern leaders indicate that they also viewed New Deal civil rights policy as an attempt to obtain votes in swing states (Freidel 1965; Patterson 1967; Sitkoff 1978).

[38] Sundquist (1973, p. 248). The original source of Clifford's comments is a November 19, 1947, memorandum to President Truman; Sundquist cites Irwin Ross, *The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948* (New American Library, 1968), pp. 22–23, 27.

the pattern expected from reelection-seeking behavior. In view of these facts, the model's focus on reelection motives provides a very useful framework for studying the New Deal. But this does not mean that reelection was the only objective of New Dealers. For example, my evidence in no way rules out the possibility that civil rights supporters were motivated by their own desires to end discrimination. Similarly, spending decisions may have been influenced by beliefs about where spending would create the greatest social good. For example, some New Dealers may have acted on the belief that race relations and local politics within the South prevented federal funds from doing much to help those most in need. And some may have acted on the belief that land reclamation and road projects in the West were essential for maintaining and improving the country's stock of capital, and this would have tended to favor politically important states (Fleck 1997).

For explaining realignment, however, the critical point is that Roosevelt and the designers of the New Deal acted as if they were seeking, and consequently they did obtain, a national base of support for the Democratic Party. In part, the New Deal was able to win support throughout the nation because policy broke from the positions associated with traditional, pre-New Deal loyalty to the Democratic Party.

With respect to distributing benefits between states, distributing benefits within states, labor policy, and civil rights, Roosevelt and newly loyal Democrats took positions that were unpopular among traditionally loyal Democrats. If instead the Democratic Party had solidly adopted the positions of its traditionally loyal representatives, the Democrats who formed the conservative coalition would have had less reason to oppose their party. However, adopting those positions would have provided less favorable policy to the nation's electorally sensitive swing states, and that would have been an ineffective strategy for securing the Democratic Party's new broad base of electoral support. The realignment of the 1930s reflects a more effective reelection strategy. Roosevelt and the New Dealers used policy to build a realignment out of what might have been merely a brief chance to govern.

Appendix A: The Model in Mathematical Form

This appendix presents the model in mathematical form. To remain brief, the appendix will not pursue every potential facet of the model but instead focus on the four key hypotheses developed in the paper. (Refer to section 2 of the paper for the list of assumptions.)

Definitions

Let

$\mathbf{B}$	denote the vector reflecting policy on n dimensions, $\mathbf{B} = (B^1, \ldots, B^n)$;
$\mathbf{Q}$	denote the status quo, $\mathbf{Q} = (Q^1, \ldots, Q^n)$;
$W_i(\mathbf{B})$	denote the function determining the probability that the president will receive a majority vote in state i;
$U_i(\mathbf{B})$	denote the valuation of $\mathbf{B}$ by state i voters;
$V_i(\mathbf{B})$	denote the votes of legislators in state i, where $V_i = 1$ represents approval and $V_i = 0$ represents opposition;
$\mathbf{I}_i$	denote state i's ideal point, where $\mathbf{I}_i = (I_i^1, \ldots, I_i^n)$, and I_i^j represents state i's ideal point on policy dimension j;
$\mathbf{I}_P$	denote the president's ideal point;
A_j	denote the electoral value of the president's assistance in the reelection of legislators in state j.

The Optimization Problem

Based on the assumptions in section 2, the president maximizes

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} W_i(\mathbf{B}) \quad \text{subject to} \quad \sum_{i=1}^{n} V_i(\mathbf{B}) > 0.5n,$$

where $W_i(\mathbf{B}) = \text{Prob}[c_i + \alpha_i U_i(\mathbf{B}) + \epsilon_i > 0.5]$, ϵ_i is the random variable, distributed with density $1/(2d)$ over the interval $[-d, d]$; and c_i and α_i determine the relationship between policy and the president's vote share. Because the marginal net value curves are linear, the expression for $U_i(\mathbf{B})$ takes the form

$$U_i(\mathbf{B}) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_i^j (I_i^j - Q^j)^2 - \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_i^j (I_i^j - B^j)^2,$$

where $a_i^j = a_j^i$ (due to the symmetry assumption), $I_i^j = I_{\text{low}}$ if $i \neq j$, $I_i^j = I_{\text{high}}$ if $i = j$, and $I_{\text{low}} < I_{\text{high}}$.

The President's Ideal Point

The point $\mathbf{I}_P$ represents the policy the president would choose if there were no legislative constraint. To begin the analysis, it is useful to consider the first-order conditions when states are neither sure wins nor sure losses at $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{I}_P$. These conditions are

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial B^j} \sum_{i=1}^{n} W_i(\mathbf{B}) = 0 \quad \text{for all } j.$$

State i is neither a sure win nor a sure loss when

$$c_i + \alpha_i U_i(\mathbf{B}) - d < 0.5 < c_i + \alpha_i U_i(\mathbf{B}) + d.$$

Therefore, it follows that

$$W_i(\mathbf{B}) = (c_i + \alpha_i U_i(\mathbf{B}) + d - 0.5)/(2d)$$

$$\partial W_i(\mathbf{B})/\partial B^j = [\alpha_i/(2d)][2a_i^j (I_i^j - B^j)].$$

Straightforward analysis of the comparative statics shows $dI_P^j/d\alpha_i > 0$ for $i = j$ and $dI_P^j/d\alpha_i < 0$ for $i \neq j$. These findings yield the following plain-language hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1. Among states that are neither sure wins nor sure losses at his or her ideal point, the president will seek to favor states where his or her vote share is more sensitive to the value of policy.

The next step is to generalize the first-order conditions stated above. If $U_i(\mathbf{I})$ is just large enough so that $W_i(\mathbf{I}) = 1$, then $\partial W_i(\mathbf{B})/\partial U_i$ will be discontinuous at $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{I}$ and, similarly, $\partial W_i(\mathbf{B})/\partial B^j$ will be discontinuous at $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{I}$ for all . In this case, one cannot simply use the first-order conditions from the case in which states are neither sure wins nor sure losses. A more general expression is, for all j,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial B^j} \sum_{i=1}^{n} W_i(\mathbf{B}) \geq 0 \quad \text{for } B^j \text{ in a neighborhood of } I_P^j \text{ and } B^j > I_P^j$$

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial B^j} \sum_{i=1}^{n} W_i(\mathbf{B}) \leq 0 \quad \text{for } B^j \text{ in a neighborhood of } I_P^j \text{ and } B^j > I_P^j.$$

States will be sure wins at the president's ideal point if $W_i(\mathbf{I}_P) = 1$. This means that $c_i + \alpha_i U_i(\mathbf{B}) - d \geq 0.5$ and, hence, $\partial W_i(\mathbf{B})/\partial B^j = 0$ (unless at the discontinuous point). Similarly, states will be sure losses at the president's ideal point if $W_i(\mathbf{I}_P) = 0$; in this case, $c_i + \alpha_i U_i(\mathbf{B}) + d < 0.5$ and $\partial W_i(\mathbf{B})/\partial B^j = 0$. (If $U_i(\mathbf{I})$ is greater than necessary for $W_i(\mathbf{I}) = 1$, then $\partial W_i(\mathbf{B})/\partial B_j = 0$ at $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{I}$ for all j. Similarly, if $U_i(\mathbf{I})$ is less than necessary for $W_i(\mathbf{I}) = 0$, then $\partial W_i(\mathbf{B})/\partial B_j = 0$ at $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{I}$ for all. The case will not occur in which $U_i(\mathbf{I}_P)$ is just small enough so that $W_i(\mathbf{I}_P) = 0$.)

The key results here concern the effects of high and low values of c_i. For any given $\mathbf{B}$, if c_i is high enough, then $W_i(\mathbf{B}) = 1$. Consequently, for sufficiently high c_i, it follows that $I_P^j = I_{\text{low}}$. Similarly, for any given $\mathbf{B}$, if c_i is low enough, then $W_i(\mathbf{B}) = 0$. Thus, for sufficiently low c_i, it follows that $I_P^j = I_{\text{low}}$. These findings yield the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2. At the president's ideal point, policy will tend to favor states that are neither sure wins nor sure losses over states in which voters are expected to vote overwhelmingly for or against the president.

The Legislative Constraint

If

$$\sum V_i(\mathbf{I}_P) \geq 0.5n,$$

the legislative constraint is not binding and, therefore, the president proposes $\mathbf{I}_P$. If

$$\sum V_i(\mathbf{I}_P) < 0.5n,$$

the legislative constraint is binding; the president proposes a policy $\mathbf{B}^*$, for which

$$\sum V_i(\mathbf{B}^*) \geq 0.5n \quad \text{and} \quad \sum W_i(\mathbf{B}^*) < \sum W_i(\mathbf{I}_P).$$

With a binding constraint, the most interesting implications relate to A_j, the electoral value of the president's assistance in the reelection of legislators in state *j*. If the president uses policy for the purpose of securing legislative support from a loyal-electorate state *j*, it will be optimal to provide policy just favorable enough to state *j* in order to obtain support from state *j* legislators. Restated mathematically, if c_j is large, $V_j(\mathbf{I}_P) = 0$, and $V_j(\mathbf{B}^*) = 1$, then the president sets $\mathbf{B}^*$ so that $U_j(\mathbf{B}^*)$ is just high enough for $V_j(\mathbf{B}^*) = 1$ to hold. If state *i* is a favored state, it is easy to show that $dB^{j*}/dA_j < 0$ and $dB^{i*}/dA_j > 0$. These key points can be stated as the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3. An increase in the president's ability to influence legislators' prospects for reelection will relax a binding legislative constraint, allowing the president to move policy closer to his or her ideal point. This will reduce the value of policy to those loyal-electorate states in which the president sets policy for the purpose of securing legislative support. It will increase the value of policy to states the president favors for the purpose of obtaining electoral support.

Legislative Voting

Whether a legislator from state *j* supports the president's proposal is determined by A_j and the electoral value of voting in line with constituent interests, $V_j(\mathbf{B}^*) = 1$ if $A_j + \alpha_j[U_j(\mathbf{B}^*) - U_j(\mathbf{Q})] \geq 0$. In other words, more favorable policy encourages legislative support and, conditional on policy, so does greater presidential influence over legislators' bids for reelection. Thus, because swing states will be favored, one can state Hypothesis 4.

Hypothesis 4. Legislators who vote to reject the president's proposal will tend to be from states that (i) are nonswing (including states in which the electorate is very loyal to the president) and (ii) receive less valuable policy as a result of presidential influence.

Appendix B: Definitions of Variables and Regions

SPND. Spending on New Deal programs, 1933–1939, per capita, by state (Arrington 1969). (This variable was also used by Wright [1974].)

ΔSPND$_{73\text{–}75}$. Proportional change in spending on New Deal programs, from the 73rd Congress (1933–1934) to the 75th Congress (1937–1938), by state. Calculated using data from Reading (1972).

ΔSPND$_{38\text{–}39}$. Proportional change in spending on New Deal programs, from 1938 to 1939, by state. Calculated using data from Reading (1972).

SD32. Standard deviation (around the trend) of Democratic share in presidential elections, 1896–1932, by state. Calculated using electoral data from Petersen (1963). (This variable was also used by Wright [1974].)

XMEAN71. State average of Poole and Rosenthal's first dimension scores for members of the 71st House (elected 1928).

XMEAN71_SQ. The square of XMEAN71.

UNEMPL 1930. The fraction of gainful workers out of a job, able to work, and looking for a job (1930 Census), by state and by congressional district. The district-level variable was estimated from county-level data obtained from an Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) data tape. (The state level variable was used by Wright [1974].)

%FALL INC 1929–32. Percent decline in personal income from 1929 to 1932, by state (Arrington 1969).

ΔX$_{71\text{–}76}$. Change in Poole and Rosenthal's first dimension scores from the 71st House (elected 1928) to the 76th House (elected 1938), by congressional district/member.

ΔX$_{73\text{–}75}$. Change in Poole and Rosenthal's first dimension scores from the 73rd House (elected 1932) to the 75th House (elected 1936), by congressional district/member.

SOUTH. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia.

BORDER. Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia.

WEST. Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.

WEST NORTH CENTRAL (WNC). Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota.

APCOM HOUSE DEMS, APCOM HOUSE REPUBS, APCOM SEN DEMS, APCOM SEN REPUBS. The proportion of each state's delegation that was on an appropriations committee (averaged over the period from the 73rd through 76th Congresses). Calculated separately for the House and Senate and separately for Democrats and Republicans. Data from Congressional Directory.

ΔAPCOM HOUSE DEMS, ΔAPCOM HOUSE REPUBS, ΔAPCOM SEN DEMS, ΔAPCOM SEN REPUBS. The change, from one Congress to another (specifically, from the 73rd to 75th or from the 75th to 76th), in the proportion of each state's delegation that was on an appropriations committee. Calculated separately for the House and Senate and separately for Democrats and Republicans. Data from Congressional Directory.

ΔSEATS HOUSE DEMS. The change, from one Congress to another (specifically, from the 73rd to 75th or from the 75th to 76th), in the Democratic Party's share of the state's seats in the House. Data from Congressional Directory.

ΔSEATS SEN DEMS. The change, from one Congress to another (specifically, from the 73rd to 75th or from the 75th to 76th), in the number of Democratic senators from a state. Data from Congressional Directory.

APPENDIX C: Statistics for Variables

	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Sample: All 48 States				
SPND	291.708	177.402	143.000	1130.00
$\Delta SPND_{73-75}$	0.96727	0.43903	0.24412	1.90136
$\Delta SPND_{38-39}$	0.29250	0.20328	−0.03596	0.75186
SD32	10.2357	4.36970	3.33729	18.6164
XMEAN71	0.12547	0.27754	−0.40250	0.62300
XMEAN71_SQ	0.09116	0.08346	0.000004	0.38813
UNEMPL	0.04335	0.01719	0.01278	0.08187
%FALL INC	43.2291	6.26112	30.0000	59.0000
Sample: The 50 Democrats Belonging to Both the 71st House and the 76th House				
ΔX_{71-76}	0.00674	0.15852	−0.37000	0.32300
SPND	205.220	36.2374	143.000	362.000
$\Delta SPND_{73-75}$	0.87454	0.46630	0.24412	1.62590
%FALL INC	44.1789	5.37608	31.8729	55.7894
UNEMPL	0.04207	0.02630	0.00414	0.09051
SOUTH	0.52000	0.50467	0.00000	1.00000
BORDER	0.08000	0.27405	0.00000	1.00000

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