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62 Deaths May Be Linked To Tires

By Caroline E. Mayer and Neil Irwin
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, August 16, 2000 ; E01

Federal highway safety regulators yesterday boosted the number of deaths that may be linked to the failure of the Bridgestone/Firestone tires over the past several years to 62, from the 46 they reported last week.

That number may increase more, officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration said, because the data are based only on complaints filed before Aug. 9. That was the day Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. announced a recall of about 6.5 million tires. More than 60 percent of the 15-inch all-terrain tires involved in the recall were standard equipment on new Ford Explorers.

NHTSA said that as of Aug. 8, it also received reports of at least 100 injuries, up from the 80 it reported a week ago. And the total number of complaints about Firestone's Wilderness and ATX tires has passed 750--more than double the nearly 300 complaints it had reported receiving earlier.

According to NHTSA's latest data, most of the complaints continue to be from Arizona, Texas, California and Florida, where previous incidents have been concentrated. There are eight complaints from Virginia, seven from Maryland and one from the District; one injury was reported in each state.

Firestone officials declined to comment on the new figures, saying they have not had a chance to examine the numbers in detail. But Executive Vice President John Lampe said he was not surprised. "As more media has been made on this, more claims will become known," he said in telephone conference call with reporters.

In some of the accidents NHTSA is investigating, the treads separated from the tires, causing full or partial blowouts.

Firestone officials yesterday continued to blame the failures on consumers who did not properly inflate and maintain their tires.

Ford Motor Co., the main customer for the recalled tires, has said its analysis of Firestone data showed that most of the failed tires were made at the Decatur, Ill., plant during the mid-1990s.
That plant suffered a lengthy strike during that period. Firestone's Lampe said none of the replacement tires are being made at Decatur.

Today, in advertisements in 41 major newspapers, Firestone is saying how it plans to reimburse customers who have the recalled tires. Information can also be found on the company's Web sites (www.bridgestone-firestone.com and firestonetire.com) or by calling its consumer hot line, 800-465-1904.

Firestone officials said the company will replace for free all tires--but only if the work is done at a Firestone Tire and Service Center or authorized Bridgestone/Firestone retailer, which includes Ford dealers.

Firestone said it will reimburse consumers--up to $100 per tire--who had their tires changed elsewhere in the past week. Today is the last day that offer will be available, however, officials said.

Lampe added that the company has stepped up production of replacement tires. If there is not sufficient quantity of Bridgestone or Firestone tires in stock, he said, dealers have been instructed to use those made by competitors.

The company had no precise numbers on how many tires have been exchanged, but Lampe said it was well into "the hundreds of thousands." He acknowledged that some customers may face delays in getting tires changed at Firestone dealers but said dealers are being told to "take names and try to get back to customers as quick as they can."

Consumer groups have said there are problems with millions of more Firestone tires, particularly 16-inch Wilderness tires that Ford recalled in other nations.

Lampe and Ford officials said they are continuing to look at other tires used on Explorers and other sport-utility vehicles and light trucks, including the 16-inch tires. But, Lampe said, so far the "data is very conclusive that the incidents are limited to the tires we announced in the recall."

NHTSA officials have said they continue to investigate whether the 16-inch tires should be recalled.

© 2000 The Washington Post Company
 



 

Tire Recall Overseas Kept Quiet


By James V. Grimaldi and Cindy Skrzycki
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, September 6, 2000 ; A01

Ford Motor Co. and Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. executives discussed notifying U.S. safety authorities about a planned recall of Firestone tires in Saudi Arabia last year, a Ford memo shows, but Ford decided to replace the tires overseas without telling federal regulators.

Bridgestone/Firestone attorneys had "major reservations" about Ford's plan, according to a Ford memo dated March 12, 1999. "First, they feel that the U.S. D.O.T. [Department of Transportation] will have to be notified of the program, since the same product is sold in the U.S.," the memo says.

There is no legal requirement for U.S. manufacturers to notify federal regulators about overseas recalls. But politicians, safety advocates and trial lawyers have lambasted the corporations and the government for the lack of public notice. Sue Bailey, administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, said yesterday that she intends to plug the loophole.

NHTSA didn't find out about Ford's replacement of Firestone tires overseas until this May, just three months before Firestone announced the recall of 6.5 million similar tires in the United States. NHTSA is investigating 1,400 incidents involving Ford Explorers equipped with the Firestone tires that have ended in more than 88 deaths and 250 injuries. Besides the recalled tires, the safety agency has issued an advisory on 1.4 million more tires that Firestone has refused to recall but said it will replace at no cost.

At a hearing today, Rep. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin (R-La.), chairman of the House Commerce subcommittee on telecommunications and consumer affairs, said he plans to ask about the Ford memo, which congressional investigators made available to The Washington Post.

"This is the first document that seems to indicate that they were intentionally keeping this information from the federal authorities," Tauzin said. "That's serious business."

Firestone spokeswoman Christine Karbowiak said the tiremaker did not participate in Ford's action in Saudi Arabia "because there was no evidence of a tire design or manufacturing defect."

"If Ford believed at that time there was a safety-related defect, it was Ford's obligation to comply with regulatory requirements," she said.

Ford spokesman Ken Zino said: "We don't have any obligation to tell the DOT. This [memo] is a discussion about why Firestone was not willing to do the recall."

Tauzin disagreed: "Did they not have a moral obligation knowing that the tires they were replacing in Saudi Arabia were the same ones being used in the United States? My answer is unequivocally yes."

Tauzin and other members of the committee will get a chance today to ask Masatoshi Ono, chief executive of Bridgestone/Firestone's parent, Bridgestone Corp. of Tokyo, and Ford chief executive Jacques Nasser about the issue.

NHTSA's Bailey said in an interview yesterday that the agency plans to require manufacturers that do recalls outside the United States to report them to the agency. NHTSA also is likely to require that manufacturers inform the agency of claims that consumers make against a product and lawsuits that are filed alleging safety defects.

Until now, the agency has insisted that it did not have the authority to seek such information from companies. "I'm committed to creating a process that will give us that kind of data," Bailey said.

The Ford memo on the dispute over the tire problems in Saudi Arabia says Saudi officials could be expected to "react dramatically, including prohibiting the import of the current [Firestone] tire."

The memo says Firestone officials "believe the best course of action for the vehicles already in the market is to handle the tire issues on a case-by-case basis."

Other documents show that Firestone officials were bucking Ford's suggestions that the recalls were necessary. One Bridgestone/Firestone memo rejects a Ford suggestion that 16-inch Firestone Wilderness AT tires contained a "defect." U.S. safety advocacy groups are seeking a wider recall that would include the 16-inch Wilderness tires.

John E. Behr, the Firestone liaison to Ford, said in a January 1999 memo to other Firestone officials, "I attempted to assure the Ford people that we are not aware of any defect with these tires, and that we've supplied over 1.1 million of the same tires to Ford over the past three years (1996 through 1998) for usage in North America, with excellent field performances."

Ford had warnings about Wilderness tires as early as 1997. Paul Wright, of a Ford-affiliated dealership in Saudi Arabia, wrote in October 1998 complaining of tire problems.

"As you know, this concern goes back to mid-1997 when we first notified you of this concern," Wright wrote. "I have to state that I believe this situation to be of a safety concern, which could endanger both the vehicle and more importantly the user of the vehicle. So I am asking what is going on? Do we have to have a fatality before any action is taken on this subject?"

© 2000 The Washington Post Company
 



 

Venezuela Puts Blame On Ford, Firestone


By Francisco Toro and Frank Swoboda
Washington Post Staff Writers
Friday , September 1, 2000 ; A01
 

CARACAS, Venezuela, Aug. 31 –– Venezuelan officials alleged today that Ford Motor Co. and Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. "share responsibility" for dozens of accidents and at least 47 deaths that occurred in that country when Firestone tires failed on Ford Explorers.

The accidents resulted from "a lethal combination" of the Explorer's design and certain Firestone tires, said Samuel Ruh Rios, president of Venezuela's consumer-protection agency, Indecu.

Indecu's allegations, the first official findings that point to the design of the popular Explorer as a factor that may have contributed to Firestone tire failures, prompted a vehement denial from Ford chief executive Jacques A. Nasser, who repeatedly insisted that the tires are solely to blame.

"This is a tire issue, not a vehicle issue," Nasser said during a news conference at the company's headquarters in Dearborn, Mich., his first since Firestone announced a U.S. recall of 6.5 million tires Aug. 9.

The recall came three months after U.S. safety officials opened an investigation into accidents involving Firestone tires. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is focusing its probe on the tires but may also look at the design of vehicles that have been involved in accidents with the tires.

NHTSA today raised to 88 the number of U.S. fatalities linked to accidents involving Firestone tires. The number of injuries is now at 250 in more than 1,400 complaints filed with the agency. Many of the complaints involve accidents in which the tread separated from the tires, which came as standard equipment on many Explorers and pickups.

Some of the tires cited by Indecu's Ruh Rios, although manufactured in Venezuela, are the same 15-inch model being recalled in this country. But 16-inch tires faulted by Indecu are models used in the United States but not included in the recall.

U.S. safety advocates have called on the companies to expand the recall beyond 15-inch ATX, ATX II and certain Wilderness AT tires. Nasser repeated that Ford sees no reason to broaden the recall, stating, "The bad tires are clearly identified."

Indecu alleged that Ford and Firestone have been aware of serious problems with Wilderness tires on Explorers for at least two years, and that the companies conspired to keep the problems quiet.

Nasser said Venezuelan allegations of a conspiracy are "unfounded," adding emphatically: "We did not lie to the Venezuelan government."

Firestone officials in Nashville declined to respond to the Venezuelan charges, saying they needed time to go through the report  In a separate conference call with the news media, however, spokeswoman Christine Karbowiak said the company did not believe there was a conspiracy and is "working very closely with Ford to identify the cause" of the problem.

Based on Indecu's findings, Venezuelan prosecutors will launch a criminal investigation that could lead to charges of involuntary homicide against the companies' executives.

Under Venezuelan law, a corporation cannot be charged with a criminal offense but corporate officials could be targeted. In the past, directors of a company have been held criminally responsible for corporate wrongdoing.

Meanwhile, the dueling news conferences underscored the widening rift between Ford and Firestone, which have been business partners for nearly 100 years.

Nasser went out of his way to point the finger of blame squarely at Firestone, even suggesting at one point that the tiremaker's future "depends on the behavior of Firestone as we go forward."

"This has been an extremely difficult and disappointing period in our relationship, and we're going to take this a day at a time," he said.

Nasser did not comment on Ruh Rios's key assertion that the Venezuelan accidents "have been caused by a macabre combination between a suspension that is set too soft and tires that are not appropriate for the Explorer."

Softening a vehicle's suspension makes for an easier ride. Softening the suspension of an Explorer, which is a sport-utility vehicle, gives it the smoother ride of a car. But a soft suspension might also make a vehicle like the Explorer, with a higher center of gravity, more likely to roll over in an accident. Using less pressure in the tires can also help achieve a softer ride, but underinflated tires can cause heat to build up and prompt the tread to separate from the tire.

Indecu alleged that Ford made the problem worse by instructing dealers to inflate the Wilderness tires to only 28 pounds per square inch, rather than Firestone's recommended 32.

Ford said it asked Firestone in October 1998 to look into reports of tread separation of its tires on Ford vehicles in Venezuela and was repeatedly assured there was no problem with the tires. In May, as complaints mounted, Ford began replacing Firestone tires on its vehicles in Venezuela.

At that time, Ford also offered to install stiffer shock absorbers on the Venezuelan vehicles in response to owner complaints that the Explorers tended to slip sideways on rough roads. Ford said the shock absorbers had nothing to do with the tire problems.

According to Indecu, the Explorer is inherently unstable without the stiffer shocks, but Ford told customers they were offering the devices for aesthetic reasons--as a way to make the vehicle "look more rustic."

Indecu alleges that Ford kept the safety considerations under wraps. Not surprisingly, thousands of Explorer owners did not make the changes. The agency is now asking Ford to recall all Explorers that have not undergone these modifications.

Indecu also charged that Ford tried to deceive government inspectors who had gone to an Explorer assembly plant in Venezuela. Ruh Rios said they were shown vehicles that had been modified with stiffer suspensions.

Nasser said Ford did not understand that charge. He said the inspectors saw new vehicles on the assembly line that had different suspension systems than older models.

Nasser also said he would testify at a House Commerce Committee hearing in Washington on Wednesday. Nasser said he "will lay out what we knew and when we knew it and what we did about it."

Nasser said he had not planned to attend the hearings because they would primarily involve technical issues of the recall.

"It's very clear now that it's a broader issue than that," he said, acknowledging the public beating the company is taking as the death toll from defective tires continues to grow.

Toro, a special correspondent to The Post, reported from Venezuela. Staff writers Swoboda, Caroline E. Mayer, Cindy Skrzycki and James V. Grimaldi reported from Washington.

© 2000 The Washington Post Company
 



 

 Bridgestone/Firestone CEO Apologizes


 


By Caroline E. Mayer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 6, 2000

Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.'s chief executive publicly apologized today for his company's role in the more than 100 deaths linked to Firestone tires worldwide.

"As chief executive officer, I come before you to apologize to you, the American people &; especially to the families who have lost loved ones in these terrible rollover accidents," said Masatoshi Ono before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee this morning. The subcommittee was holding the first of several hearings scheduled to investigate the events surrounding the recall of 6.5 million tires used on light trucks and sport utility vehicles, mostly Ford Explorers. The hearings will continue this afternoon before the House Commerce Committee. "I also come to accept full and personal responsibility on behalf of Bridgestone/Firestone for the events that led to this hearing," Ono said.

Noticeably absent from Ono's testimony was Firestone's past and repeated claims that the problems with Firestone tires stemmed from improper consumer maintenance and underinflation. Instead, Ono said, the company will appoint an outside independent investigator to determine the root cause of the problem.

Senators were highly critical of Firestone and Ford Motor Co. for their failure to realize there was a problem with the ATX and Wilderness tires and their subsequent failure to notify the government, particularly after Ford began replacing tires on its Explorers in Saudi Arabia in May 1999.

"Ford and Firestone had at a minimum a moral obligation to make sure the products they sell . . . are safe," said Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala.), chairman of the subcommittee. "I regret both failed in that obligation." Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) went further, suggesting that the companies failure to report problems amounted to "reckless disregard" of the public safety that could be construed as second-degree murder.

In prepared testimony, Helen Petrauskas, Ford's vice president of environmental and safety engineering, said "this is a tire issue, not a vehicle issue." But appearing before the committee she excluded that statement after Shelby made it clear at the beginning of the hearing that such comment would be "a waste of time." However Petrauskas repeated Ford's defense of the Explorer saying "it is a very safe vehicle" and that there are no problems when Goodyear tires have been used on Ford Explorers.

Also testifying was the administrator of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Sue Bailey, who admitted in testimony that the timing of when Ford and Firestone notified the government of a potential problem was "a cause of concern."

© 2000 The Washington Post Company
 



 

A Cash Cow on the Firing Line


By Frank Swoboda
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, September 6, 2000 ; E01

From the beginning, the Explorer has been a winner for Ford.

Introduced on March 15, 1990, as a 1991 model, the Explorer quickly became one of the most popular sport-utility vehicles sold in America and a cash cow for the Ford Motor Co.

But in the weeks since Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. announced a recall of 6.5 million tires--most of which were used as original equipment on Ford Explorers and pickup trucks--customers have begun to turn against both companies, surveys show.

So the stakes are enormous for Ford President Jacques Nasser as he heads to Capitol Hill today to convince Congress and the American public that the Explorer's design did not contribute to scores of deadly accidents linked to Firestone tires.

"This is a tire issue, not a vehicle issue," Nasser said at news conference last week, summing up Ford's position on the accidents, which have resulted in more than 100 deaths in the United States and abroad.

Nasser will be testifying as a new survey of 2,800 prospective SUV buyers by CNW Marketing/Research of Bandon, Ore., shows that Ford's approval rating for its handling of the tire recall dropped from 70.3 percent on Aug. 15 to 17 percent by Aug. 31.

The survey also showed the number of people walking into Ford dealer showrooms to take a look at the new cars and trucks dropped dramatically after the recall. Before the recall, floor traffic in Ford showrooms was 12 percent higher than the industry average, largely because of the Explorer and other light trucks. By Aug. 25, that traffic was running six to nine points below the average.

Even more disturbing to Ford executives is that an estimated 27.6 percent of prospective SUV shoppers who ranked the Explorer first or second on their list before Aug. 9 had moved it to third or fourth by the end of the month.

All this makes Ford officials very nervous. Because of the Explorer, the nation's top-selling SUV by far, Ford dominates the highly lucrative U.S. light-truck market, in which the profit on the sale of a single vehicle averages $10,000.

Moreover, much of the company's light-truck future depends on the success of Explorer derivatives, such as the new Explorer Sport Trac and the Explorer Sport. And Ford already has begun beating the drums for its "all new" 2002 Explorer, which will go into production early next year.

With so much riding on the Explorer, Nasser has agreed to appear before a congressional committee to defend his bread-and-butter vehicle and the company's handling of the tire recall.

Ford created the Explorer by grafting a large station-wagon body onto the frame of a compact four-wheel-drive Ranger pickup truck--essentially gilding a frog to create the new standard for the nation's auto buyers. It was not the first SUV, but the Explorer, with its car-like qualities, did help redefine the market.

A decade later, light trucks--which include sport-utility vehicles, minivans and pickup trucks -- account for half of U.S. passenger-vehicle production. And Ford has begun the 21st century with a U.S. market share in the light-truck category greater than that of all the Japanese automakers combined and 10 points ahead of General Motors Corp., its nearest U.S. competitor.

When the Explorer was introduced, Thomas J. Wagner, then general manager of the Ford Division of Ford Motor Co., said the new truck was "blurring the traditional distinctions between cars and trucks."

"Explorer looks more truck-like than car-like, yet it offers some of the same comforts you would expect to find in cars," Wagner said.

By making a truck out of a car, Ford didn't have to worry about stricter federal safety and fuel-efficiency standards for cars. Under federal law, the overall fleet of passenger cars produced by a manufacturer must average 27.5 miles per gallon. The average for trucks is 20.7 miles per gallon. And for years, SUVs and minivans were not required to have such safety features as side-impact barriers, front-seat head restraints or driver-side air bags.

In the years since the Explorer was introduced, Ford and other automakers have seen SUV profit margins soar, forming the financial foundation of today's American auto industry.

But an increasing number of industry critics have begun to point to suspension problems with the Explorer as a possible contributing factor in the crashes involving Firestone tire failures.

These critics question whether Ford has gone too far in making a truck ride like a car, softening the vehicle suspension and reducing the recommended inflation rate of certain Firestone tires to the point where, under the wrong conditions, the tread is more like to separate from the rest of the tire.

The 2002 Explorer will be even more "car-like" than its predecessors, meaning that it will use an independent rear suspension to smooth out the ride. Independent rear suspensions allow rear wheels to react individually to road irregularities, producing a ride with less bumpety-bump than that of vehicles with solid rear axles.

In Venezuela, government officials have blamed the deaths of 47 people in tire-related accidents to what they have called a "lethal combination" of Ford design and Firestone manufacturing problems. Specifically, government investigators targeted the soft suspension on Ford Explorers as part of the problem.

The Venezuelan accidents were caused "by a macabre combination between a suspension that is set too soft and tires that are not appropriate for the Explorer," said Samuel Ruh Rios, president of the country's consumer-protection agency.

Ford has denied those allegations as well as government claims that the two companies conspired to cover up the tire and design problems. But Venezuelan officials point to the fact that when Ford replaced the Firestone tires for its customers, it also offered to install stiffer shock absorbers on the Explorers, which would give the vehicles a harsher ride and greater stability.

Ford insists the two had nothing to do with each other and the timing of the shock-absorber offer and the tire replacement was purely coincidental.

Ford officials have put the blame squarely on the Firestone tires by asserting that Explorers equipped with tires made by other companies did not experience similar tread-separation problems.

Nasser said he initially declined to appear at the congressional hearing because he expected it to focus on the technical issues of the recall.

He changed his mind last week, however, saying that "it's very clear now that it's a broader issue than that."

© 2000 The Washington Post Company
 



 

Tauzin: Tire Probe Will Continue
Congress Grills Ford, Firestone, NHTSA On Tire Recall
Ford Chief Made Strong Effort To Deflect Blame
Justice Department Looking At Case, Too


WASHINGTON, Sept. 7, 2000
 

(CBS) As the blame game got played by Ford, Firestone and a federal safety agency during 13  hours of congressional hearings, lawmakers emphasized that their investigation into the tire recall  has only begun.

Following a day of hearings, Rep. Billy Tauzin, R-La., said "this is just the beginning" of the investigative process. Wednesday's hearings failed to determine what is happening with Bridgestone/Firestone tires and Ford trucks, primarily the Explorer sport utility vehicle, that has caused them to be linked to 88 deaths and at least 250 injuries in the United States.

Meanwhile, Attorney General Janet Reno said Thursday the Justice Department is studying whether any criminal or civil laws apply to the case of defective Bridgestone/Firestone tires.

At her weekly news conference, Reno said Sen. Patrick Leahy had requested the department review the tire problem that has been blamed for dozens of fatal accidents.

"We are looking to what, if any, Justice Department action is warranted," Reno said. Justice lawyers are discussing the case with highway safety officials.

But a senior Justice official later said, that after a quick internal review, criminal action was considered unlikely and a civil case would be pursued only if the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration referred a case to the department. It has not done so.

Angry that it took months to address a problem that may threaten thousands on America's roads, two congressional committees Wednesday grilled officials from Bridgestone/Firestone, Ford Motor Company and the NHTSA, the federal agency charged with regulating them.

"There was a lot of finger pointing and blame shifting. The fact is, there was a lot of information early in this process that our own federal agency, Ford, Firestone could have seen, could have  understood and could have done something about," Tauzin said Thursday on CBS News' The Early Show. "I don't know why they didn't, and that's probably going to be for others to find out."

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., plans to hold hearings before his Senate Commerce Committee next week.

Documents obtained by CBS News and testimony in the hearings indicated the two companies knew about the tire problems as early as 1996.  Previously, Ford and Firestone have said they only recently began focusing on a pattern of tire separations, CBS News Correspondent Sharyl Attkisson reports.

But Ford admitted to Congress the tire problems first came to its attention in the Middle East three years ago, then more problems arose in Malaysia, Thailand and more recently in Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador.

"Firestone had a lot of information to know that a long time ago. But Ford was also getting a lot of information that these tires were bad," Tauzin said Thursday.

And internal documents showed that in 1998, a Ford dealer in  Saudi Arabia complained that Firestone's investigation of his complaints about three shredded tires had languished since 1997.

"Do we have to have a fatality before any action is taken?" the dealer asked Firestone in a memo.

In another memo, Ford claimed to have asked Firestone to probe possible flaws with the tires and received assurances that there were no deficiencies.

"...(Ford) asked Firestone to inspect more tire samples and again, we were told there was no tire defect," read part of the Ford document released. "...(Ford) demanded that Firestone analyze worn tires from the U.S. hot states...We were told that there were 'no tire deficiencies' and that the tires performed as expected."

In the documents, Ford and Firestone debated a recall, but decided against it.

"Firestone legal has some major reservations," said a Ford memo, worried that U.S. safety officials "will have to be notified_since the same product is sold in the U.S.."

Jacques Nasser, chief executive of  Ford, continued to deflect the blame from the car maker to Firestone, which announced on Aug. 9 a  voluntary recall of 6.5  million 15-inch tires.

"Ford did not know that there was a defect with the recalled tires until we virtually pried the data from Firestone's hands," Nasser testified Wednesday evening during a House panel hearing. "It was only then just a few days before the recall that Ford engineers discovered the conclusive evidence that the tires were defective."

He added afterwards: "If I have one single regret it's that we did not ask Firestone the right question sooner."

Nasser told Congress that Ford will work to implement an early warning system to detect the first sign of trouble with tires on the road.

For now, federal safety investigators are more interested in finding out why the warning of the current problems came so late. The NHTSA also came under intense congressional criticism Wednesday for not beginning formally investigations of accidents until May.

"We're not only finding out what went wrong, but we're beginning to see what we can do to fix it for the future," Tauzin said Thursday. "This ought not to happen again and I think we've got the agency finally realizing it's got to do a better job not only collecting but reading information.''

Testifying before the Senate committee, Bridgestone Corp. CEO  Masatoshi Ono said his company feels "a heavy responsibility to  make certain that we are worthy still of your continued trust and  confidence."

 "Unfortunately, I am not able to give you a conclusive cause at  this time," Ono said. "However, you have my word that we will continue until we find the cause."

NHTSA administrator Sue Bailey said Ford had no obligation to inform the regulator of actions overseas and said her agency may ask for more authority to force manufacturers to provide such additional information.

Lawmakers are already moving to change that: one proposed new law would give tire manufacturers and auto makers a mere two days to tell the Transportation Department about any foreign recall.

However, at Wednesday's hearings, lawmakers were sharply critical of the way NHTSA used the power it has.

Rep. Tom Bliley, chairman of the House Commerce Committee and a Virginia Republican, said the federal watchdog for highway safety "apparently was asleep."

Rep. John Dingell, D.-Mich., chided the NHTSA for not yet being able  to "identify why these tires are failing and why serious accidents  are occurring."

Bailey told lawmakers that her agency "is continuing its investigation to ensure that the scope of the recall is proper and that all unsafe tires are recalled."

CBS Worldwide Inc. All Rights Reserved.
 



 

Early Signs Given Of Tire Problems


By James V. Grimaldi and Dina ElBoghdady
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday , September 9, 2000 ; E01

A detailed Firestone report in mid-1998 showed a dramatic increase in customer claims on a particular model tire that was among those recalled two years later.

The report, part of the documents the House Commerce Committee gathered during its probe into Firestone tire problems, is one of dozens of documents reviewed by The Washington Post indicating that Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. had a series of warning signs about growing problems with the tires stretching earlier than known before. Similar documents had dated Firestone's assessment of such information at the end of 1999.

The June 24, 1998, Firestone document is part of a report that tracked payments on customer property-damage claims. It outlines 1997 claims and shows Bridgestone/Firestone executives had early knowledge of a growing problem with certain 15-inch tires that were among the 6.5 million tires Firestone recalled last month.

It showed that the number of warranty claims on ATXII tires had jumped to 279 in 1997 from 42 in 1995, a more than sixfold increase. Two years later, another Firestone document further outlined the growing problem; by 1999, the number of claims had reached 564--more than a 1,000 percent increase.

The report also shows that Firestone knew of 259 tread-separation cases in 1997 involving ATXII tires on light trucks. Of those cases, 238 involved the 15-inch tires that were recalled last month.

The tiremaker saw further evidence of tread separation in 1998 claims. A table submitted to the House Commerce Committee shows that of the 469 claims of ATX II tread separation, 93 percent of them were on the 15-inch tires recently recalled.

Firestone spokeswoman Christine Karbowiak said last night that the company does not know why the spike in ATX II tread separations and claims occurred. "That's what we're trying to figure out," she said.

When asked about a similar document at a House hearing Wednesday, Firestone executives said that the claims data is not used to determine problems with products because not all claims are considered valid indications of defects.

"You can't use them to assess product performance or product quality," said Robert J. Wyant, vice president of quality assurance for Bridgestone/Firestone.

Firestone ATX, ATX II and Wilderness AT tires were recalled Aug. 9 because of reports that their treads peel away from the casings, mostly in hot weather climates at high speeds. The problem has been linked to more than 88 deaths and 250 injuries.

A week ago, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a warning on another 1.4 million Firestone tires.

Other documents from the House Commerce Committee files show Ford dealers in Saudi Arabia were passing on customer complaints about the recalled tires both before and after Ford replaced Firestone tires there last year.

By January 1998--seven months before the replacement program--Glenn R. Drake, then Ford's regional marketing manager in the United Arab Emirates, sent an e-mail to other Ford executives complaining about Firestone's response to tire problems. Firestone had been blaming motorists for mistreating the tires, and Drake wasn't buying it.

"If this was a single case, I would accept Firestone's response as they are the experts in the tire business, case closed," Drake wrote. "However, we now have three cases and it is possible that Firestone is not telling us the whole story to protect them from a recall or a lawsuit."

At NHTSA, another document shows, the official who received an early tip from State Farm Insurance that there might be a problem with the tires dismissed it as "unremarkable." In an Aug. 18 memo, nine days after the recall, Steve Beretzky wrote that he found only five complaints about ATX tires.

Even if those were combined with the State Farm numbers, "this would not have indicated a defect trend," Beretzky concluded. "This is hardly tantamount to a 'warning' about a trend in Firestone tire failures as depicted by State Farm," he said in a memo to his boss defending why he did not act on the information.

Tire production numbers reach the millions in a given model year and tire blowouts and tread separations are found among all brands of tires, Beretzky explained. Many of the complaints cited by State Farm also included vehicles with more than 40,000 miles on them, creating wear-out issues, Beretzky said.

In a related development, Ford said yesterday that the recall will mean lower revenue and higher costs for the automaker.

In a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the world's second-largest automaker said it was too early to know the full financial impact of the recall on its earnings. Most of the tires have been on Ford's Explorer sport utility vehicles.

In the filing, Ford repeated its commitment to bear an unspecified portion of Bridgestone/ Firestone's recall costs. The company said it has suspended production of Explorer, Mountaineer, Ranger and B Series models for two weeks so that some 70,000 replacement tires could be used in the recall.

That move will cut third-quarter production of Explorers by about 10,000 and Ranger pickup trucks by 15,000, something the investment community had already taken into account.

Staff writers Daniella Deane, Caroline E. Mayer and Cindy Skrzycki contributed to this report.

© 2000 The Washington Post Company
 



 



Industry Battles Criminal Penalties


By Cindy Skrzycki
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, September 27, 2000 ; Page E01

Corporate lobbyists in and outside the auto and tire industries are aggressively opposing any legislation inspired by the Firestone tire recall that might expose companies to criminal penalties for making products with safety defects.

Over the past week, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers have joined car and tire makers in trying to delay or water down the measures, including a House bill being considered today. The companies and trade groups are concerned that legislation allowing criminal penalties to be brought against the auto companies would spill over into other product-liability issues.

"I'm committed to stop it, slow it down and get it out of the klieg lights," said Bruce Josten, executive vice president for the chamber, which called together legal representatives of about 50 corporate trade associations last Thursday to brief them on the bill.

"Just as speed kills on the highways, speed can have a deadly effect in sloppily drafted legislation," Josten said. "If this gets on the books, it's a very dangerous precedent."

The bills are in direct response to weaknesses found in the federal regulatory system since the recall of 6.5 million Firestone tires, which have been implicated in the deaths of more than 100 Americans. Most of the tires were used on Ford Explorers.

One industry delaying tactic is trying to convince the the House and Senate leadership that there isn't enough time to take up the bills. Another is to get the Judiciary committees in both houses to hold hearings, which would further delay a final vote.

Auto industry lobbyists, meanwhile, have stressed that significant changes to the authority of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration could be made next year, when Congress reauthorizes the agency.

Public safety groups attacked the corporate lobbying campaign for trying to leave the legislation so weakened that even a criminal-penalty provision would do little to deter wrongdoing.

Joan Claybrook, president of Public Citizen, said at a news conference yesterday that "automakers are working furiously behind the scene to mold legislation to their liking," as they have done before. She cited a 1986 Ford Motor Co. memo bragging that in the previous year the automaker had killed safety legislation that included criminal penalties.

Josten said the chamber opposes the entire bill that the Senate Commerce Committee passed last week after less than 10 minutes of discussion. That bill, some of whose provisions may be incorporated in House legislation, includes a 15-year prison term for individuals who knowingly sell vehicles that violate NHTSA's safety standards or have a safety defect, or who refuse to comply with a recall order.

A five-year prison term could be imposed on an executive selling a car that resulted in "grievous bodily harm."

The National Association of Manufacturers has written a letter to Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee and sponsor of the Senate bill, saying it is "very concerned about hurrying through major legislation that would radically alter the treatment of product liability culpability. This is particularly true during the heat of a crisis and a rush toward congressional adjournment."

The McCain bill may be scheduled for a vote in the Senate next week.

The auto industry has recommended changes to the bill, including substituting "may" for "shall" in the language about the Department of Transportation's authority to determine what foreign and domestic warranty and claims data manufacturers must turn over to the government.

Rep. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin (R-La.) said in an interview that any criminal provision in the House bill will have to be crafted carefully so that "it doesn't have the perverse effect of discouraging people from talking to the agency." The fear is that if companies felt they could be criminally prosecuted, they might not cooperate with the agency on even simple requests for information.

NHTSA is one of the few federal agencies that does not have a criminal provision in its authorizing statutes. The agency now refers cases to the Department of Justice. Justice did consider a criminal prosecution against an automaker once, but didn't go forward.

The Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission and other agencies within the Department of Transportation have provisions for imposing prison terms.

c 2000 The Washington Post
 



 

Republicans Anger McCain by Blocking His Auto Safety Bill


By Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday , October 7, 2000 ; Page A07

Senate Republicans yesterday blocked an infuriated Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) from bringing up auto safety legislation prompted by the Firestone tire recall, and McCain accused them of pandering to special interests when lives are at stake.

As McCain pushed several times to clear the way for action on the measure, Republican senators sent word anonymously through colleagues on the Senate floor that they would object to the unanimous consent that McCain needed to force a vote.

"The fix is in by the special interests" and "the automotive industry is now blocking this legislation," McCain fumed in one of his angriest exchanges with colleagues since returning to the Senate after his losing bid for the Republican presidential nomination. "This is really, really egregious . . . to block important legislation to save lives."

After Democrats made it clear they had no objections to his request for action, McCain suggested that Republicans could pay a political price in blocking such a bill. "That's really not good, it's not good at all," he said.

Reacting to Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.'s recall of 6.5 million tires like the ones that have been linked to more than 100 American deaths, the Senate Commerce Committee, which McCain chairs, unanimously approved last month legislation setting new reporting rules for manufacturers and imposing criminal and civil penalties for misleading the government about safety.

A somewhat stronger version of the legislation was unanimously approved on Thursday by the House Commerce Committee and put on track for approval by the House next week. What McCain wanted was an assurance that the Senate would be ready to go to a conference with the House and agree on a bill before Congress adjourns, possibly by next weekend.

But the Senate bill has been held up by anonymous "holds" under which members can delay consideration of bills. When the final version of the $58 billion transportation spending bill came to the floor yesterday, McCain seized the moment and threatened to hold it up unless the Senate agreed to consider his bill, too.

He backed off when Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) agreed to bring up the bill if McCain could get the consent of all his colleagues, McCain told the Senate. He also said Lott agreed that any senators with objections should make them in person.

But that was not to be. First, Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) objected on behalf of unidentified colleagues and got roasted by McCain for doing so. Then, when McCain tried again, Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.) objected on behalf of unnamed senators and refused to identify them, drawing more fire from McCain.

Sessions said later that he was concerned about "blurring the line between civil and criminal actions," as in McCain's version of the legislation, but that he was willing to take up the bill and try to amend it, although clearly other senators were not willing to take that risk.

c 2000 The Washington Post